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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List  
(b)(3)

FROM:

Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center  
Office of Global IssuesSUBJECT: Soviet Disinformation: Allegations of US  
Misdeeds (b)(3)

With SOVA support, we prepared the attached report at the  
request of the Secretary of State. (b)(1)

The report  
illustrates a number of recent campaigns which can readily be  
attributed to Moscow. (b)(3)

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## Attachment:

Soviet Disinformation: Allegations  
of US Misdeeds) GI M 86-20081,  
28 March 1986 (b)(3)

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SUBJECT: Soviet Disinformation: Allegations of US Misdeeds (b)(3)

(b)(3)

OGI/FSIC/SA/ (28 March 86)

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## MEMORANDUM

Soviet Disinformation: Allegations of US Misdeeds (b)(3)

1. Over the past two years we have witnessed continual Soviet charges about the international behavior of the United States that the Soviets know or have substantial reason to believe are patently false. These charges, which range from allegations of US involvement in assassinations of foreign political leaders to charges that the United States is responsible for major international outbreaks of disease, emerge through a variety of channels. Some are the direct product of their own media and are therefore easily identifiable as Soviet initiatives. The Soviets, however, also use clandestine means--for example, forgeries, rumor, and placement of disinformation in the foreign press--that are more difficult to trace conclusively to Moscow. Some examples of Soviet efforts to discredit the United States are described below in several major themes. (b)(3)

2. US Involvement in Assassinations. Moscow often attempts to implicate the United States when an international figure dies violently. (b)(3)

- o Immediately after Olof Palme was assassinated in February, TASS reported that Palme had been under surveillance by the CIA for many years. This implication of US complicity in the murder was followed by a similar report in Izvestiya and in Georgiy Arbatov's eulogy to Palme. By suggesting that the pattern of Palme's murder was similar to that of Indira Gandhi, the Soviet reports resurfaced old charges of US complicity in the assassination of Indira Gandhi and other political leaders. US embassies in Spain, India, and Uruguay, as well as Sweden, reported plays in the local press of the Soviet reports. (b)(3)
- o In the initial report of Palme's death on 1 March, the TASS analyst also referred to the death last year of Samantha Smith. Another TASS article on the same day described an alleged FBI assessment that Smith was a menace to national security. (b)(3)

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- o In another report, published on 2 November 1985, TASS accused the CIA of organizing the assassination of Grenadan Prime Minister Maurice Bishon, after which the United States invaded the country. (b)(3)

3. US Terrorism. Recurring Soviet themes--linking political assassinations, US aid to liberation movements, and CIA "special operations"--attacked the United States for making terrorism a state policy. (b)(3)

- o Recent attacks (TASS, 24 October 1985 and 7 March 1986) charged the United States with:

- conducting undeclared wars in Africa, Asia, and Central America;

- backing South African attacks against its neighbors;

- seizing hostages; and

- inciting national strife in India. (b)(3)

- o In an effort to counter US accusations of Libyan involvement in terrorism, the Soviets claimed, in a 13 March 1986 edition of Sovetskaya Rossiya, that the United States is a "factory of international terror," citing US Marine Corps actions in Grenada and mercenary training in the United States. (b)(3)

4. US Espionage Operations. The Soviets replay endlessly themes of secret US intelligence operations intended to subvert the populace of other countries and destabilize governments. (b)(3)

- o In January 1986 Radio Moscow charged that the CIA will be using funds to recruit scientists, journalists, missionary doctors, and university teachers to work in developing countries as CIA agents. In mid-February, elaborately fabricated packages were delivered to a number of African newspaper offices. The packages listed alleged CIA penetrations of media, and some contained over 100 names of US officials, journalists of various nationalities, and a few US university professors allegedly linked to the CIA. This disinformation operation surfaced in seven African countries and implicated media in nine other countries. Some press allegations of media associations with the CIA appeared concurrently in countries as far afield as the Philippines and Dominican Republic. (b)(3)
- o The Soviets have capitalized on Yurchenko's defection, most recently in the 11 March edition of Pravda, and the scientist Alexandrov's disappearance, in a 27 January

2 (b)(3)  
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Czech daily citing Izvestiya, to vilify the CIA for (b)(3) criminal actions and violations of human rights. [REDACTED]

- o The Peace Corps is the target of renewed Soviet charges that it is a "hornet's nest of espionage, a center of financial and political intrigues, and a center for drug traffic." According to a 2 March 1986 TASS report, the Peace Corps' duty is to conduct subversion against (b)(3) governments not to the liking of the United States. [REDACTED]

5. US Responsibility For Catastrophic Events. Whenever possible, Moscow will exaggerate or, if necessary, fabricate a story to imply US culpability in a human tragedy. [REDACTED]

- o In 1984 TASS and Moscow New Times reported that the United States conducted a defoliation operation in Brazil that resulted in the death of "whole tribes of Indians." This report subsequently appeared throughout Africa and in India. (b)(3) [REDACTED]
- o The notorious Soviet propagandist, Iona Andronov, writing in the Soviet magazine Literaturnaya Gazeta in 1984, proved "conclusively" that the CIA was responsible for a 1981 dengue fever epidemic in Cuba that killed over 100 people. (b)(3) [REDACTED]
- o Citing a report by President Daniel Ortega, Moscow New Times in October 1985 suggested that an epidemic of dengue fever and cotton disease in Nicaragua could have been the result of US use of chemical and biological weapons. (b)(3) [REDACTED]
- o Although the initial charge of US responsibility for causing the AIDS epidemic was attributed to an Indian newspaper, the real impetus for a recent worldwide anti-US AIDS campaign was an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta published in October 1985. Drawing on years-old stories of biological weapons tests, the story focused on the contemporary crisis and appeared in Kuwait, Bahrain, Finland, Sweden, Peru, and elsewhere. (b)(3) [REDACTED]
- o TASS, on 26 December 1985, presumably citing a Japanese source, charged that the 248 US peace-keeping troops killed in a plane crash before Christmas were returning to the United States from a secret "forward strike base." (b)(3) [REDACTED]
- o On 30 January 1986 TASS cited the shuttle "Challenger" disaster as a warning of the danger of pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

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6. US Diplomatic Meddling. Soviet disinformation campaigns often allege US interference in the internal affairs of Third World countries and often blame the United States for political developments that are inimical to Soviet interests. (b)(3)

- o An August 1985 TASS article, citing Izvestiya, charged the 'Department of Dirty Tricks' of the CIA with giving the Prime Minister of Liberia, Samuel Doe, \$250,000 to make him discontinue diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The report accused the United States of exploiting Liberia's domestic problems and blaming the Soviet Union for them. This article appeared in a Finnish Communist newspaper shortly after a break in Soviet-Liberian diplomatic relations. (b)(3)
- o For years the Soviets have accused South Africa of developing a biological "ethnic" weapon that would kill only blacks. A recent Novosti Press Agency article, citing a Senegalese source, reported that the United States was also involved in "ethnic" weapons research with the South Africans. Two Nigerian daily newspapers published the story in February 1986. (b)(3)
- o Last November, in a brief Radio Moscow report (in Greek), a Soviet observer reported that the partitioning of Cyprus was caused by the United States and other Western imperialists. In February 1986, Pravda asserted that US and NATO attempts to seize Cyprus increased noticeably in recent weeks. (b)(3)
- o Citing unnamed sources, Pravda inferred on 24 February that the anti-Marcos coup was prepared with the help of US special services. (b)(3)
- o In mid-December 1985, articles alleging US-Israeli intentions to attack PLO bases appeared in Middle Eastern and European newspapers. These articles were based on a Soviet report to the Yemenis who then released it to the media. (b)(3)

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**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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# **Terrorism Review**

(b)(3)

**April 1986**

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*DI TR 86-005  
April 1986*

*Copy* **540**

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NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR)	Caution—proprietary information involved
ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
REL...	This information has been authorized for release to...
WN	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved

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All material on this page is  
Unclassified.

~~Secret~~ (b)(3)**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

April 1986

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*This review is published every month by the Directorate of Intelligence.  
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other  
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.*

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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

April 1986

(b)(3)

**Focus****Japan's Chukaku-ha: A Threat to the Tokyo Summit?**

The successful disruption of Japan's national railway system last fall by Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), Japan's largest radical group, and recent improvements in the group's weapons raise concern about its ability to threaten the Tokyo Economic Summit in May. Chukaku-ha, however, must overcome numerous obstacles, including constraints on its finances and manpower and the extraordinary measures that the police are certain to mount against any attack on the summit sites. Even though protection cannot eliminate the possibility of a large-scale operation, given the difficulties facing the radicals, we expect they will opt to launch attacks against less protected facilities away from summit activities. (It is not yet clear whether Chukaku-ha launched the unsuccessful 25 March rocket attacks on the US Embassy and the Imperial Palace. Because of the crudeness of the rockets, police speculate that another leftist group may be responsible.) (b)(3)

**Chukaku-ha Raises Its Profile**

Although primarily a radical leftist group noted for its opposition to the expansion of Tokyo's largest airport, Chukaku-ha recently has stepped up guerrilla operations against a wide variety of targets in Japan. In the last few years, the group has begun to exploit the capabilities of covert branches located in western as well as eastern Japan, which together have an estimated roster of 120 to 150 members. Chukaku-ha's covert cadre have more than doubled their terrorist-type activities since 1984 (see table 1). Their most spectacular success—and the largest guerrilla operation in Japan since the late 1960s—occurred last November. In a well-planned operation in support of the leftwing railway workers union, Chukaku-ha paralyzed the national rail system by cutting signal cables throughout the country, as well as setting fire to a Tokyo train station. These incidents caused long delays for millions of Japanese commuters and \$10.2 million in damage. (b)(3)

The November success, combined with Chukaku-ha's stepped-up activities, suggest that the group has become stronger and more threatening.<sup>1</sup> A review of the group's recent weapons improvements lends some credence to this assessment. Until the last few years, Chukaku-ha's incendiary devices were crude, limiting their ability to strike protected installations such as government buildings and military bases. More recently, Chukaku-ha has improved the reliability of some weaponry, including a truck-mounted flamethrower with a range of 200 meters. The group has also employed a homemade rocket capable of traveling 1,000 meters, which has exploded successfully about half the time. (b)(3)

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<sup>1</sup> In early 1985, Chukaku-ha renounced its traditional policy of not attacking people, but it has yet to implement this policy change. (b)(3)

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**Table 1**  
**Chronology of Selected Chukaku-Ha Attacks**

	Location	Device Used	Comment
7 May 1982	Military recruiting office	Flamethrower	Building slightly damaged.
1 March 1984	Narita Airport offices	Truck-mounted launched incendiary device	Damaged two floors, first time device used.
10 August 1984	Camp Yao Airfield	Launched incendiary device	Six bombs launched but none exploded.
19 September 1984	LDP Headquarters	Truck-mounted flamethrower	Fire damaged five floors, \$2.4 million damage.
1 January 1985	US Consulate Kobe	Launched incendiary device	Three rockets launched, no damage.
17 February 1985	Osaka Police unit	Truck-mounted launched incendiary device	Ten rockets launched, none exploded.
20 February 1985	Narita Airport	Incendiary device	Damaged building and two vehicles.
12 April 1985	Haneda and Narita Airports	Truck-mounted launched incendiary devices	Fifteen bombs launched, hit several targets.
3 September 1985	Narita Airport	Launched incendiary device	No damage reported.
1 November 1985	Narita Airport	Platform-launched incendiary device	Four rockets landed on runway, no damage.
20 November 1985	Narita Airport sites	Incendiary devices	Slight damage to airport officials' homes.
29 November 1985	Tokyo, Osaka, southern Japan	Cut railroad lines, firebombed rail station	\$10.2 million damage, halted rail service.
29 January 1986	Tokyo	Incendiary devices set near railroad lines	No disruption of rail service.
8 February 1986	Narita Airport sites	Incendiary devices set at Narita Airport sites	Damage limited to equipment.

(b)(3)

Counterbalancing the group's enhanced weapons capabilities is its loss of support because of the general decline in popularity of the leftists in Japan. In part, the public has become disillusioned with constant bickering among the radical movement's leaders. More important, issues long identified with the radical movement—for example, opposition to US-Japanese defense ties—no longer provoke interest among Japanese students. The loss in student support poses a problem because students—unlike members with jobs—can frequently be counted on to give full-time commitments to group activities. The loss is also adversely affecting Chukaku-ha's finances, because it used to derive much of its funding from student associations. (b)(3)

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(b)(1)**The Tokyo Summit: Chukaku-ha Scales Back Its Plans**

Chukaku-ha's recent aggressiveness is designed in part to attract new sympathizers. [redacted] Its leaders believe that events in Japan during April and May 1986 will provide ideal opportunities to grab headlines and gain members. Among the events Chukaku-ha reportedly plans to disrupt is the 60th anniversary celebration of Emperor Hirohito's ascendancy to the throne on 29 April. The group views the Tokyo Economic Summit on 4-6 May as an even more important target. [redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)  
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According to their own literature, Chukaku-ha's leaders originally hoped to create an "atmosphere of terror" that would lead participants to scuttle their plans to attend the Tokyo summit. [redacted] Chukaku-ha wanted to re-create the mood present in 1960, when the Japanese Cabinet canceled President Eisenhower's visit because of violent demonstrations over the US-Japan Security Treaty. Recent attacks at Haneda, the airport that foreign leaders will use, seem to have this goal in mind. The November attack on the national railroads was a key element in this campaign as well. [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Some of Chukaku-ha's leaders have conceded that an attack on summit facilities—like the plans to prevent the summit—will be difficult to pull off, [redacted] Legal and financial worries, stemming from the arrest of over 300 members last year, are a major impediment to guerrilla actions at present. [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(3)

**Japan's Police: Taking Few Chances With Security**

Security measures by the police are by far the biggest challenge confronting Chukaku-ha. The police have a good track record in providing protection during high-level visits and meetings, and also have taken a preemptive approach in recent months, identifying and arresting as many Chukaku-ha activists as possible to disrupt the group's plans and preparations. The heart of the police program is a "roller strategy," first used in the early 1970s to contain the terrorist threat posed by the Japanese Red Army (JRA). Officers in each precinct visit every residence and business to identify anyone in their area who may be a potential security threat. The dragnet will be concluded with a final round of visits just before the summit. In addition, the police have placed the group's overt headquarters in Tokyo under constant surveillance. [redacted] (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

The police have been rewarded for their efforts thus far. Several Chukaku-ha members, including a key tactical leader of one of the covert branches, have been arrested [redacted]. More important, other overt members who have been arrested are talking freely, allowing the authorities to indict those detained. The arrests also have yielded valuable information on the group's organization and weapons that the police are certain to exploit. (b)(3)

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(b)(1)  
National Police Agency officials plan to mobilize 25,000 to 30,000 policemen (b)(3) to protect the summit meetings, a massive show of force of the kind that has discouraged Chukaku-ha in the past. [redacted] during the visit of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in September 1984, Chukaku-ha officials admitted that an attack on Chun was impossible because of the tight police security. Some of the same concerns were expressed recently by a group leader in regard to this year's summit. [redacted] (b)(3)

Whether these police efforts will be sufficient to guard against a guerrilla attack will depend in part on Chukaku-ha's weaponry, as well as the rapidity with which the group can pull plans and manpower together. A security ring of 1,500 meters established around most summit sites should prevent a successful attack if the Chukaku-ha relies on its older rockets. The newly developed rocket, with a range of 4,000 meters, poses more of a risk. The accuracy, payload, and other details of the new rocket are unknown, but its range would (b)(3) be the group to fire it from beyond the conventional security perimeter. [redacted]

If it is unable to directly attack summit facilities, Chukaku-ha might choose to launch attacks against less protected buildings away from the actual summit in the Akasaka Palace. Police speculate that the group could attack a government agency not directly linked to the summit or other public facilities, such as the railway system, to embarrass Prime Minister Nakasone and the political leadership. An attack on a US installation also cannot be ruled out. Chukaku-ha has suggested that it might set off small incendiary devices at such sites—presumably to make a statement rather than do real damage—and police admit it may be impossible to protect all possible targets during the summit period. [redacted] (b)(3)

#### Other Terrorist Threats to the Summit

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(b)(3) Although Tokyo police are concentrating on preventing a terrorist attack by Chukaku-ha, the recent discovery that a member of the JRA slipped into the country undetected has raised concern about the potential threat posed by other radical groups. [redacted]

[redacted] The JRA made similar threats before the 1979 Tokyo Summit. It was, however, unable to mount an attack at that time because of tight security, and the group appears even less capable now. In fact, the JRA has not staged a successful operation in nine years. Nor is it likely that other radical groups pose a threat to the Tokyo summit. Most European leftist terrorist groups limit their operations close to home, while Middle Eastern terrorists have not traditionally targeted such international gatherings and are not well positioned to operate in Japan. [redacted] (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Highlights** (b)(3)**Key Indicators****West Germany****US Consul General Facilities in Frankfurt at Risk**

Unknown persons apparently conducted surveillance of the residence and offices of the US Consul General in Frankfurt-am-Main. On 14 March, the contents of a box of 9-mm ammunition were found on the sidewalk and in the grass 15 meters from the residence. The next day, two persons tried to enter the grounds of the Consulate General building. Several more instances of surveillance were detected through 17 March. (b)(3)

The residence has previously been a target of Red Army Faction (RAF) surveillance. Two such incidents occurred during the RAF hunger strike campaign of December 1984–February 1985. After one of these, the residence was attacked with a small firebomb. (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)**France**(b)(1)  
(b)(3)**LARF Plans More Terrorist Operations in France**

In early March, Joseph Abdallah, the current leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), announced plans for a major terrorist operation within the next month in France in order to gain the release of his brother, George Abdallah, (b)(3) George Abdallah is the former LARF leader who was arrested by French police in October 1984 in Lyon. Joseph reportedly is also willing to smuggle a Soviet surface-to-air missile into Paris for use in a separate terrorist operation. (b)(3)

This announcement was followed by the bombing of a Paris-to-Lyon train on 17 March that injured 10 persons. The bombing was claimed by the Committee of Solidarity With Arab Political Prisoners and the Middle East. This group warned that the train bombing was "the first in a new series" of attacks unless three prisoners, including George Abdallah, were released. The other two prisoners cited were Varoujan Garbidjian, a member of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), convicted in the July 1983 bombing at Orly Airport, and Anis Naccache, leader of a five-man commando team convicted in

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the attempted assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1980. Press reporting indicates that this same group claimed responsibility for three bombings in Paris in early February in which 20 people were injured. (b)(3)

The bombing campaign and demands to release convicted terrorists will provide an early test for the new conservative government, with its election call for a tougher counterterrorist policy. (b)(3)

#### Significant Developments

##### Belgium

#### Fourth Major CCC Safehouse Discovered

The Belgian police's discovery on 25 February of a fourth major Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) safehouse in Liege may hamper rebuilding efforts by CCC members still at large. Police believe the safehouse was used by CCC leader Pierre Carette, who was arrested in December. An identity card, a driver's license, arms, ammunition, communication equipment, money, and CCC stationery were also discovered in the hideout. (b)(3)

The December 1985 arrests of four CCC members and the subsequent discoveries of their safehouses will reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks in Belgium in the near term. Remaining CCC hardcore members, however, could—possibly with support from other European leftist groups—carry out attacks on public officials in order to pressure the government into releasing their imprisoned comrades and to prove the group's viability. (b)(3)

##### France-Spain

#### French Court Decision May Have ETA on the Run

A French court decision in early March may indicate a hardening of that country's counterterrorist policy toward the Spanish Basque organization Fatherland and Liberty—Military Wing (ETA-M). On 13 March, for the first time, a French court sentenced alleged members of ETA-M as common criminals rather than as political refugees. This decision reportedly has prompted more than a dozen alleged ETA-M members to leave their French safehavens. Some Spanish officials believe that Spain's 12 March decision to remain in NATO may lead ETA-M to target Spanish or even US interests in Spain in the future. The recent disappearance of the ETA-M members may indicate preparations to carry out these acts. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Spain**

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**Palestinian Group Threatens Spanish Interests**

A Palestinian group called the "Organization of the Sons of the Martyrs of Tal al-Za'tar" threatened to attack Spanish interests if two Palestinian prisoners held there were not released within two weeks. The group issued the threat to retaliate in Spain and elsewhere in a broadcast from West Beirut on 18 February. [redacted]

[redacted] the two Palestinians were arrested in connection with the murder of two Israeli seamen in Barcelona last October. [redacted] (b)(3)

"Martyrs of Tal al-Za'tar" is believed to be a covername for Fatah's Force 17. This group sent a letter to the Swiss Ambassador in London threatening reprisals if the Swiss did not release two Palestinians held in Geneva. The two Swiss prisoners are probably Force 17 members who were arrested in a safehouse in Madrid last July. Press reports indicate that the two were planning to attack the Syrian Ambassador or Embassy in Madrid. [redacted] (b)(3)

**Sweden****No Apparent Progress in Palme Assassination**

Swedish police on 12 March arrested Viktor Gunnarsson, a 32-year-old Swede, and attempted to indict him in connection with the 28 February assassination of Prime Minister Palme. According to press reports, Gunnarsson once belonged to the European Labor Party, a staunchly anti-Soviet and anti-Palme fringe political group. The party said it cut all ties with Gunnarsson in May 1985 "after noticing some unbalanced features." The police were unable to hold him past the initial five days allowed under Swedish law, however, and, when witnesses could not identify him, he was released. There have been no other arrests in the case, and we are unable to state conclusively either that his murder was an act of terrorism or that there was any foreign involvement. [redacted] (b)(3)

**West Germany**

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**Cache of Grenades and Explosives Found**

On 10 March, a woman found four Soviet-made handgrenades, a pipebomb, a chemical timer, and a detonator of Western origin in a trash container in Munich. Police have offered a reward for information on the owners of the cache. They speculate that the items may be left over from a Palestinian cache, because similar grenades were used in the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and some of the material was wrapped in a newspaper dating from February 1971. (b)(3)

**Switzerland****Crackdown on Libyan Terrorist Activity**

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Swiss authorities have found increasing evidence that Libya is misusing its diplomatic privileges to cache weapons and false identity documents, according to the German press, and Libya may be targeting two persons for assassination. (b)(3)  
Swiss authorities recently opened a diplomatic pouch, probably to look for weapons, an indication that they are already taking steps to thwart Libyan activity. Tripoli reportedly believes its missions in West Germany and the rest of Europe also are being carefully watched. (b)(3)

Likely targets of Libyan terrorist activity are anti-Qadhafi dissidents or pro-Arafat Palestinians who were sentenced in late March for bombings of Libyan and Syrian installations there last year. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Austria**(b)(1)  
(b)(3)**Threat of "Plastic Pistol" Exaggerated**

Recent public reports alleging that the Austrian Glock-17 pistol represents a significant terrorist threat because of its plastic parts overstate the case. Although it has been claimed that the weapon is made mostly of plastic and can pass security scrutiny at airports, the pistol is actually 83-percent steel and is as easily discernible through X-ray and metal detectors as all-steel models. Furthermore, this is not a new pistol developed to be undetectable; more than 80,000 Glock-17s have reportedly been produced and are in service with the Austrian Army, the (b)(3) Norwegian armed forces, and a number of police and security organizations. (b)(3)

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(b)(3) their caliber (9 mm) and magazine capacity (17 rounds) make them (b)(1) desirable weapons, and they would be no more difficult to conceal than any (b)(3) handguns. (b)(3)

**Tunisia**

(b)(1)

**Libya Planning Terrorist Campaign?**

(b)(3) Tripoli may be prepared to undertake terrorist attacks in Tunisia to punish Tunis for its close ties to the United States. Libyan radio attacked the visit of the US Sixth Fleet commander to Tunis and described (b)(3) provocative. Tripoli presented a diplomatic note (b)(1) virtual declaration of war. Vice President Bush's trip to Tunis in early March almost certainly increased Tripoli's ire. Although Libya no longer has diplomatic relations with Tunisia and infiltrating terrorists has become more difficult, Tunisian dissidents or radical Palestinians could act as surrogates. (b)(3)

**Lebanon****Series of Bombings Against Phalange Party Offices**

Between 21 January and 8 March, a wave of bombings terrorized the Christian community in East Beirut. Most of the bombings occurred near Phalange Party offices and killed a total of 33 persons and wounded 165. Damage was extensive: shops were destroyed, cars were burned, and hundreds of windows were broken. The most significant incidents were:

21 January

A car bomb exploded in a busy commercial area, killing 22 and wounding more than 100.

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3 February A suitcase bomb exploded in a building 300 meters from a Phalange Party office. There was extensive damage to shops and parked cars, but no casualties were reported.

12 February A bomb exploded in front of a theater next to a Phalange Party office. The bomb contained the equivalent of 20 kilograms of dynamite and killed two persons and injured another 15.

24 February A car packed with explosives and mortar shells exploded near a busy supermarket, killing five persons and injuring 12. The blast set an apartment building on fire and destroyed 15 cars.

8 March A car bomb exploded in a residential neighborhood, killing four persons and injuring 38. A Phalange Party office nearby was not damaged. (b)(3)

Pro-Gemayel Christian officials have arrested 64 persons in connection with the bombings, which began shortly after ex-Lebanese Forces leader Eli Hubayqa fled to Syria on 15 January. No group has claimed responsibility for the bombings, although the most likely suspects are elements of the Lebanese Forces loyal to Hubayqa, who supported the Syrian-backed Lebanese peace agreement. The Hubayqa forces, probably acting with encouragement from Damascus, are trying to intimidate Gemayel and his supporters into signing the Syrian-brokered accord. (b)(3)

**Syria****Truck Bomb Explodes in Damascus**

A powerful bomb exploded inside a refrigerated truck under a bridge overpass in a Damascus suburb on 13 March. The blast reportedly killed six military cadets and seriously wounded as many as 110 other persons. Syrian television broadcast the "confession" of a Lebanese man who claimed Iraqi authorities coerced him into carrying out the attack. (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

The bomb was the first attack in Damascus since a series of explosions last fall believed to be linked to Syria's role in Lebanon. While Iraq may have been responsible, some Syrian officials are blaming Lebanese Phalangist elements, (b)(3)

**West Bank****Pro-Jordanian Mayor Assassinated**

The pro-Jordanian mayor of Nablus was assassinated outside city hall by an unidentified gunman on 2 March. (b)(1) (b)(3) the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine killed Zafir al-Masri to intimidate

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other Palestinians who may be thinking of cooperating with the Israelis. Israeli authorities said the weapon used was the (b)(3) one involved in at least two other terrorist attacks in the West Bank. (b)(3)

**Israel****US Officials Receive Threatening Leaflets**

US officials, including a member of the US MBFR delegation in Vienna and an assistant to the US Ambassador to Jordan, received leaflets signed by the Jewish terrorist group Terror Against Terror (TNT) attacking the Peres government and pro-Arab US officials. The leaflet warns Arab-Americans that they are in a "zone of danger" that is not limited to the territory of the United States. (b)(3)

TNT is believed responsible for about a dozen attacks against Arab and Christian holy places in the West Bank since 1980. The group conducted a similar letter campaign in 1984 aimed at political, media, and union officials in the United States and Europe. There were no attacks following those threats. (b)(3)

**Egypt****Israeli Citizen Killed in Cairo**

The wife of an Israeli Embassy employee was killed and three other Israelis were wounded when terrorists ambushed their car leaving the Cairo Trade Fair on 19 March. One car reportedly blocked the victims' vehicle while gunmen opened fire from another. The attack was claimed by a group calling itself Egypt's Revolution, a self-described nationalist movement violently opposed to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The group has taken credit for at least two attacks on Israeli diplomats in Cairo in the last two years. The hijackers of Egyptair Flight 648 last November used the name "Egyptian Revolution," but we cannot confirm the extent of the group's involvement in that incident. (b)(3)

**Saudi Arabia****Increased Security in Eastern Province**

Riyadh appears concerned about the security of its heavily Shia-populated (b)(1) Province. (b)(3)

(b)(3) Heavily armed police guards at government buildings, visible street patrols, and riot-control equipment sharply increased tensions between the Shias and the (b)(1) government, however, before they were lifted on 15 March, (b)(3) (b)(3) The large pro-Iranian minority among the Shias had reacted enthusiastically to recent Iranian battlefield successes, and radical pro-Iranian sentiment has grown significantly over the last few months. Radical religious leaders are drawing larger crowds, and conservatives—although still a majority—are losing support. (b)(3)

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The tight security reflects Saudi determination to prevent antigovernment demonstrations or Iranian-inspired terrorist attacks by radical Shias. Potential economic and military targets in the kingdom are heavily concentrated in the oil-producing areas of the Eastern Province. Although there is no evidence of direct Iranian meddling among the Shias there, the growing fervor of young radicals has increased the possibility of antiregime activity. Saudi security forces will quell public demonstrations ruthlessly but would have more difficulty preventing isolated terrorist attacks. (b)(3)

**Caribbean****Separatist Violence Linked to Libya, Cuba**

French Caribbean separatists receiving support from Libya apparently were behind the violence intended to disrupt local elections on 13 March. A police station in Martinique was bombed on 28 February, and molotov cocktails were thrown during two Gaullist political rallies in Guadeloupe, injuring three persons.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

**Ecuador****New Terrorist Group May Be AVC Splinter**

A group calling itself the Montoneros Patria Libre (MPL) (Free Homeland Guerrilla Fighters) on 22 January occupied the Heroes of Independence Monument on the outskirts of Quito, overpowered four guards, and stole their weapons. The MPL called for freedom from US "imperialism," and sent leaflets to the media explaining why the organization had been created. (b)(3)

Persistent rumors of internal dissension within the terrorist group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) lend credence to the suspicion that the MPL is most likely an AVC splinter group. Furthermore, the January operation resembled the AVC's m-  
operandi. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

**Colombia-Peru-Ecuador****Terrorist Groups Join "America Battalion"**

Members of the Peruvian Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Ecuadorean Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) have joined the Colombian M-19's new insurgent unit—the Ameri-  
talion—

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

M-19's long-term goal is to form the nucleus of a multinational "Bolivarian army" in the Andean region. The M-19 initially enlisted the AVC—with which it has had close operational ties since

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(b)(3) the latter was founded in 1983—to contribute members to the new unit, and in late February the MRTA announced that three of its squadrons were participating in it. The battalion has recently skirmished with Colombian troops in the south.

The America Battalion probably will remain a predominantly M-19 insurgent unit over at least the next six months. The M-19 is not in a position to actively foment regional revolution. In addition, neither the MRTA nor the AVC has so many members that they can afford to send large numbers to the new unit. (b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

**Pakistan****Tensions With Libya**

Pakistani authorities have detained a Libyan executive of a joint Libyan-Pakistani holding company for his alleged involvement in a series of murders that last year provoked rioting against Pakistani police ineptitude. Authorities may be preparing to portray the murders as a Libyan plot to erode confidence in the government. Islamabad believes Libya has undertaken other efforts to undermine the government, including plans to hijack a Pakistani airliner earlier this year and the funding of pro-Iranian, anti-US demonstrations in Lahore during a visit by Iranian President Khamenei in January. (b)(3)

**Japan****US Embassy, Palace Hit by Homemade Rockets**

On 25 March, at about 1315 hours local time, three homemade incendiary rockets were fired from a parked car into the grounds of the US Embassy in Tokyo. Virtually simultaneously, two more rockets were fired from another vehicle into the grounds of the Imperial Palace. None of the rockets did any damage or caused any casualties, although one rocket did land on the roof of the Embassy. (b)(3)

These incidents are reminiscent of the 1 January 1985 rocket attack staged by the radical group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) on the US Consulate General in Kobe. There were two major differences in the latest attacks, however: these rockets were less sophisticated than those the group had previously used and some that it reportedly is developing, and these attacks were staged during working hours, increasing the chances of casualties in the target areas and among bystanders. Because of these differences, Japanese police reportedly believe that some other leftist group opposed to the Western Economic Summit to be held in Tokyo in May could have been responsible for the attacks. (b)(3)

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We have not ruled out Chukaku-ha as a likely culprit, for a variety of reasons:

- The vehicles apparently used timers and self-destruct devices, hallmarks of Chukaku-ha incendiary attacks.
- Chukaku-ha devices frequently fail to explode after they reach their targets.
- Chukaku-ha is known to have been planning surveillance of US diplomatic targets in Japan in early March and is known to have planned and <sup>later</sup> ~~planned~~ <sup>executed</sup> an incendiary attack on the US Embassy in the fall of 1983. (b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) Chukaku-ha intends to create a climate of (b)(1) during the runup to the May summit, but (b)(3) the group faces many (b)(3) money, and time constraints and might not be able to conduct serious attacks. These incidents support the view that the perpetrators are reacting to time pressure, and we believe they are likely to continue to carry out attacks that generate maximum publicity in their attempt to derail the summit. (b)(3)

#### Malaysia

##### Bombings Mar Sabah State Politics

Between 12 and 20 March, a series of 26 bombings rocked the Malaysian state of Sabah, leaving three persons dead and seven others injured. Two other persons died in subsequent rioting. Similar low-level bombings occurred last spring following elections that brought a (b)(3) an-dominated party to power in the predominantly Muslim state. (b)(3)

These bombings, and the first set in 1985, are believed to have been perpetrated by Muslims loyal to the party that led the previous state government. The bombers apparently intend to create sufficient chaos to pressure the mostly Muslim (but secular) national government to step in and run the state. To the extent that Sabah Muslims remain disaffected with the current regime, more such bombings are likely. (b)(3)

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## Overview of International Terrorism in 1985 (b)(3)

The level of international terrorism has increased dramatically over the last two years, both in number of incidents and degree of lethality. From an annual average of about 500 incidents during the early 1980s, the level increased to nearly 600 in 1984. Preliminary figures for 1985 indicate the total is higher still—about 800 incidents.<sup>1</sup> Several disturbing trends are discernible from the 1985 figures:

- The United States and its friends and allies continued to be primary targets. Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, for example, suffered more attacks in 1985 than in any previous year, and several of our West European allies were attacked by resurgent domestic terrorist groups, ostensibly because of their ties to NATO and the United States.
- Terrorists increased their attacks on businessmen and other nongovernment targets, thereby widening the impact of their operations.
- The number of persons killed or injured in international terrorist attacks in 1985 exceeded 2,200—more than any other year. The previous record year was 1983, when the US and French contingents of the peacekeeping force and the US Embassy in Lebanon were bombed, causing record levels of death and injury.
- International terrorists continued to exhibit a greater willingness to harm innocent bystanders through indiscriminate attacks. Increased use of large bombs accounted for many of the heightened casualty figures. (b)(3)


### Middle East

Terrorism of Middle Eastern origin accounts for much of the increase in international terrorism over the past two years. In 1983, Middle Eastern groups

(b)(3)

### International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-85

Number of incidents (hundreds)



<sup>a</sup> Preliminary (b)(3)

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
accounted for 28 percent of all international terrorist incidents. In 1984, this share grew to 47 percent—a larger share of a larger total. Such groups operated at nearly the same level in 1985. (b)(3)

The continued high level of international terrorism by Middle Eastern groups owes much to state sponsorship—particularly by Syria, Iran, and Libya. Although the percentage of such incidents has declined from the level of the previous year, state-sponsored terrorism still constituted a significant proportion—about 25 percent—of all Middle Eastern-origin incidents in 1985. (b)(3)

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### Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-85

Number of casualties (hundreds)



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
A dramatic increase in Palestinian terrorism more than compensated for any decline in state-supported incidents. Palestinian terrorism accounted for more than half of all Middle Eastern incidents in 1985, compared with about one-third in 1984.

Many of the attacks in 1985 were conducted by *radical Palestinians*—such as the *Abu Nidal Group*—that are known to receive extensive support from Damascus. One of the most dangerous Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, this group conducted 23 attacks last year, more than 60 percent of them in Western Europe. The number of dead and wounded was 34 and 327, respectively.

Syrian-supported groups staged some 30 attacks in 1985—compared with 21 in all of 1984—including two against US facilities. President Assad continued to use terrorism to dissuade opponents and uncooperative allies from pursuing policies inimical to

### State-Supported International Terrorist Incidents, 1985<sup>a</sup>

Percent

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary.

(b)(3)

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Syrian interests. In 1985, for example, Syrian-supported groups conducted about twice as many terrorist operations against Jordanian officials and facilities as they did the previous year.

Syrian-supported groups have also attacked US facilities in Jordan. We do not know if Syrian officials explicitly approved such attacks and doubt that President Assad is intent on directly targeting US personnel and facilities. We believe, however, that he exploits the anti-American militancy of these groups in order to penalize the United States for policies that he opposes.

Iran and Iranian-supported groups were responsible for over 30 international terrorist attacks in 1985. France, the United States, and Iraq remained the primary targets, but the Persian Gulf states also faced threats. Iran also became increasingly involved in

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***Selected Chronology of 1985  
High-Casualty Incidents***

2 February	<i>A popular bar in the Athens suburb of Glyfada was bombed by unknown terrorists, injuring 78 persons, including 57 US servicemen and their dependents.</i>	6 November	<i>The seizure of Colombia's Ministry of Justice by guerrillas belonging to the 19th of April Movement resulted in more than 100 deaths when government troops stormed the building.</i>
12 April	<i>A restaurant outside Madrid was bombed, probably by radical Palestinians, killing 18 Spaniards and wounding another 82 persons, including 15 Americans.</i>	23 November	<i>An Egyptian jetliner was hijacked from Athens to Malta by Abu Nidal terrorists, possibly with the cooperation of Egyptian dissidents. Before Egyptian commandos stormed the plane—killing some 60 persons who remained aboard—the terrorists executed five persons, including an American woman, and wounded the other Americans aboard.</i>
19 June	<i>An armed attack on a cafe in San Salvador in June by terrorists tied to the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front killed 13 persons, including six Americans.</i>	7 December	<i>The bombing of two department stores in Paris by a hitherto unknown Middle Eastern group left about 35 holiday shoppers wounded.</i>
23 June	<i>A Shannon-bound Air India flight from Toronto was bombed over the North Atlantic, probably by Sikh extremists; 329 passengers and crewmembers were killed.</i>	27 December	<i>Near-simultaneous attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports carried out by the Abu Nidal Group left more than 20 persons, including five Americans, dead and some 120 wounded, including 20 Americans.</i>
8 August	<i>A car bombing at Rhein-Main Airbase—claimed by the West German Red Army Faction and French Action Directe—killed two Americans and wounded 17 other persons.</i>		

(b)(3)

agitation and propaganda activity among Muslim populations in countries as distant as Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. (b)(3)

Iran trains and finances numerous dissident and terrorist groups, such as:

- Radical Shia elements in Lebanon, including Hizballah, the group responsible for the bulk of anti-US attacks in Lebanon.

- Iraqi dissidents, who last year staged two attacks in Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's hometown.
- Shia dissidents from Kuwait and Bahrain. Pro-Iranian dissidents attempted to assassinate the Amir of Kuwait last May, and Shia terrorist cells were uncovered in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates during 1985. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

[redacted] Iran continues to target anti-Khomeini exiles. Last September, for example, an exiled Iranian tribal leader with (b)(3) ties to the Shah was gunned down in Karachi. [redacted]

Iran uses some of its diplomatic and cultural missions to support terrorists. Many elements of the Iranian Government, including several senior (b)(3)s, are directly involved in terrorist activity. [redacted]

Libyan-supported groups or clandestine state agents staged 15 successful attacks in 1985, mostly against Libyan exiles. Last year, Libyan state agents attacked so-called stray dogs in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria. Egyptian-based exiles were frequent Libyan targets. Tripoli also apparently targeted exiles participating in last year's pilgrimage to Mecca, but did not act on its plans. About 8,000 Libyan pilgrims—some in possession of explosives—did, however, stage a violent demonstration in Mecca immediately after the Hajj. (b)(3) [redacted]

In addition to providing training, arms, encouragement, and funds to dissident and insurgent groups, Libya increasingly strengthened its long-term relationship with radical Palestinian groups. Abu Nidal, the notorious Palestinian terrorist, reportedly is living in Tripoli and has moved part of his organization there. Qadhafi almost certainly views the radical Palestinians as potential allies in his terrorist operations. (b)(3) [redacted] Libyan exiles and non-Libyan opponents. [redacted]

Libya also focused increased attention on the United States. Libyans were observed taking pictures of the US Embassy in Sudan and also exerted pressure on the Somali Government to lease property adjacent to US Embassy housing in Mogadishu. In addition, Qadhafi has made references in recent speeches to his contacts with American radicals. (b)(3) [redacted]

In 1985, Libyan-supported terrorists also operated elsewhere, most notably:

- In Tunisia, about 50 suspected Libyan-backed saboteurs were arrested last fall. The terrorists were infiltrated into Tunisia when Libya expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers. Libyans carrying false documentation were among those arrested.
- In Zaire, security officials claim to have thwarted a Libyan-sponsored plot to kill President Mobutu in September.
- In Chad, Libya continued to target President Habre. (b)(3) [redacted]

We have identified *Palestinians* as the perpetrators of more than 200 international terrorist incidents during 1985. The continued internecine Palestinian feuding, coupled with Arafat's apparent inability or unwillingness to control hardliners aligned with him, indicates that the large share of international terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinians will continue. This increased Palestinian activity was reflected in:

- A rise in terrorist attacks inside Israel and the occupied territories, with virtually every Palestinian group claiming credit.
- An increase in the number of attacks by Syrian-sponsored groups—especially the Abu Nidal Group—in Western Europe.
- Intra-Palestinian terrorism resulting from the split last year in the Palestine Liberation Organization, and pressure from Fatah hardliners opposed to Arafat's political strategy. (b)(3) [redacted]


Increasingly, Middle Eastern terrorists are conducting attacks outside the region, particularly in Western Europe, and the data for 1985 affirm this trend. The 70-odd incidents of Middle Eastern-origin terrorism that occurred in Western Europe last year exceed 1984's total and are double the annual average for 1980-83. Most of the Middle Eastern-generated activity in Western Europe has not directly affected

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### Middle Eastern-Origin Terrorist Incidents in Western Europe, 1980-85

Number of incidents



\* Preliminary.

(b)(3)

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US interests, although this appears to be changing. The TWA hijacking in June, the seizure of the Achille Lauro in October, the diversion to Malta of the Egyptian airliner in November, and the attack on the Rome airport in December all resulted in US fatalities. (b)(3)

#### Western Europe

Some 200 international terrorist incidents occurred in Western Europe during 1985. About one-third of these were directed against US or NATO-related targets, primarily by West European terrorists. Although the growing number of incidents conducted in Western Europe by terrorists of Middle Eastern origin is of increasing concern, European authorities have also had to contend (b)(3) continuing activity from domestic terrorists. (b)(3)

In *West Germany*, sympathizers and hardcore members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) carried out more than a dozen attacks against US and NATO-related interests last year, including the car bombing

at Rhein-Main Airbase in August. Despite counterterrorist successes against the organization, West German security officials continue to believe that the RAF (b)(3) capable of conducting another major attack. (b)(3)

In *France*, Action Directe conducted 22 terrorist attacks last year, including the assassination in January of a high-level official in the Defense Ministry. Nearly all of these were directed at domestic political targets. In December, however, terrorists bombed the office in Versailles of the Central Europe Operating Agency, which monitors the NATO pipeline. (b)(3)

Most of the dozen or so international terrorist incidents that occurred in *Italy* during 1985 were conducted by Middle Easterners against non-Western targets. However, one of the most spectacular attacks of the year—the hijacking in October of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro—victimized many nationalities, primarily Western. An American tourist was killed before the incident ended. (b)(3)

*Belgian* terrorists carried out some 30 attacks in 1985. Most of these were conducted by the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), which surfaced in October 1984 in connection with a series of attacks against NATO and defense-related targets. The group bombed offices of the Motorola Company in Brussels on the day of President Reagan's meeting with allies to discuss the Geneva summit. In December, it blew up a control station on the NATO pipeline in western Belgium—within a half hour of the Versailles bombing. Since the arrest by Belgian security officials of key members of the group in mid-December, (b)(3) however, there have been no further attacks. (b)(3)

The separatist Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) remained *Spain's* most serious terrorist problem in 1985, despite counterterrorist successes by Spanish and French police and continued murders of ETA members by the Antiterrorist Liberation Group, which Spanish and French press sources have linked to the Spanish police. Spain's other major terrorist

\* For a more detailed examination of terrorism affecting interests, see the accompanying article in this issue. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

group, the leftist First of October Antifascist Resistance, spent much of the year attempting to recover from a police sweep in January. [redacted]

The level of terrorist activity in *Greece* remained high. One-third of the incidents that occurred there last year were directed against US targets, many in the form of arson and bombing attacks against vehicles belonging to US military personnel in Athens. The Revolutionary People's Struggle and the virulently anti-US 17 November Revolutionary Organization—which in years past had murdered two Americans and wounded another—continue to pose high threats to US interests in Greece. (b)(3) [redacted]

In *Luxembourg*, unknown persons carried out some 14 bombings against domestic targets since April 1985. Luxembourg officials believe that (b)(3) [redacted] were intended to discredit the government.

West European authorities are particularly concerned about indications of coordination among several West European groups—the German RAF, the French Action Directe, and the Belgian CCC, including the following:

- Since the middle of 1984, these groups have conducted, more or less simultaneously, a number of attacks against NATO and defense-related targets. Some of these operations required a great deal of planning.
- The terrorists have stated publicly that they acted in concert: Action Directe and the RAF, for example, issued a joint communique in January 1985 declaring war on the "imperialist" system. Both groups also claimed responsibility for the car bombing in August at Rhein-Main Airbase.
- French, West German, and Belgian terrorists used, in separate operations, explosives that belonged to a lot stolen from a Belgian quarry in June 1984.
- Points on the NATO pipeline in Belgium bombed by the Belgian terrorists in December 1984 had been marked on a NATO document confiscated from Red Army Faction members arrested in West Germany that summer. (b)(3) [redacted]

#### Latin America

Some 130 international terrorist incidents occurred in Latin America, nearly two-thirds of which were directed against US interests. The majority of the incidents were bombings, followed by armed attacks and kidnappings. The use of terrorist tactics by a variety of groups, including drug traffickers, continued. (b)(3) [redacted]

The threat to US facilities, personnel, and interests from terrorist groups is particularly high in the Andean countries of South America, where a number of the anti-US incidents occurred. The breakdown of the Colombian Government's efforts to achieve peace with various guerrilla movements and domestic problems in Peru and Ecuador have provided fertile ground for terrorist activities. Increasing evidence of cooperation among groups in this region heightens our concern. We expect that US interests in South America will continue to be one of their primary targets in 1986. Elsewhere in the region, Chile was the locale of more terrorist incidents (most of them domestic) than any other country in the world. (b)(3) [redacted]

In *Colombia*, leftist guerrilla groups such as the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Ricardo Franco Front, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the National Liberation Army continued to target US interests. Despite the M-19's defeat at the hands of the Colombian military during the group's ill-fated takeover of the Palace of Justice in November, the M-19 still retains the ability to stage terrorist operations. (b)(3) [redacted]

In *Ecuador*, the threat came from the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) terrorist group. The small, urban-based organization is strongly anti-US and maintains links to Colombia's M-19. Government officials are concerned that such ties to the larger, more experienced M-19 will significantly enhance the AVC's capabilities. (b)(3) [redacted]

In *Peru*, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Sendero Luminoso (SL) posed serious problems for the Garcia government. There were more than a dozen international terrorist attacks

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in Peru during the year, mostly directed against US interests. In November, members of the MRTA threw bombs and fired machineguns at the US Embassy in Lima, as well as at US businesses. Sendero Luminoso continued to target US interests, primarily by dynamiting and shooting at the US Embassy. (b)(3)

In *Chile*, which saw more than 865 bombings, some two dozen international terrorist incidents occurred throughout 1985, a number of which were directed against US interests. The Communist-affiliated Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front conducted most of the anti-US terrorist attacks in Chile. (b)(3)

Outside the Andean Region, the terrorist threat was greatest in Central America, especially in *El Salvador*. Of particular concern to authorities there was a possible resurgence of urban terrorism. Elements of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN)—in particular the urban terrorist wing of the Central American Revolutionary Worker's Party, the Popular Liberation Forces, and the renegade Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front—continued to target US personnel in El Salvador. In fact, the greatest single death toll of US citizens last year came as a result of the "Zona Rosa massacre" in downtown San Salvador in June: six Americans, four of them Marine security guards, died in the attack. (b)(3)

*Cuban* President Fidel Castro continued to support political violence in selected Latin American countries, despite his efforts to portray himself as a responsible statesman. Castro's policy of revolutionary subversion and his support for leftist guerrillas will continue to be a stumblingblock for US counterterrorist programs. Cuba maintained its longstanding support to terrorists in countries such as Colombia and apparently undertook new initiatives in Bolivia and Argentina in support of regional terrorist groups. (b)(3)

#### Asia

Asia remains on the periphery of international terrorism. Our preliminary compilation of incidents for 1985 shows that only about 6 percent of all international terrorist incidents occurred there. The activities of two Asian groups, however, raised concern in 1985:

- Sikh terrorism in 1985 was international in scope. Its attacks victimized foreigners and resulted in high levels of lethality. Sikh extremists were probably responsible for the worst single incident ever recorded—the Air India crash last June. The large number of Sikh communities worldwide could provide staging bases for future Sikh terrorism.
- Japan's radical Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) conducted more attacks last year than in most previous years. It began the year with a January rocket attack on the US Consulate General in Kobe and demonstrated its capabilities to disrupt Japanese society when it shut down a large section of Japan's commuter rail system in late November. Thus far, this group has gained from deliberately causing casualties.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed treatment of terrorism in Asia last year, see the accompanying article in this issue. (b)(3)

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**Lebanon-France:  
Hostage Negotiations (b)(3)  
Appear Stalemated**

One of the first challenges facing the new conservative government in Paris will be the problem of the French hostages in Lebanon. Earlier this year, a deal fell through, and the stakes were raised when the kidnapers distributed photos of one French hostage they allegedly killed and four more Frenchmen were seized in Beirut. The new government may support most of the concessions made by President Mitterrand in January, but the sticking point is likely to be the reluctance of the Lebanese Shia kidnapers to agree to a deal negotiated through Iran and Syria. (b)(3)

In early January, Socialist Party officials in Paris hoped to bolster their party's chances to retain power in the March National Assembly elections by negotiating for the release of the French hostages in Lebanon. The shape of the deal Paris reportedly agreed to earlier this year remains murky, but President Mitterrand apparently accepted Iran's principal demands. These were the release of five Iranian-backed terrorists imprisoned in France for the attempted assassination of a former Iranian Prime Minister in May 1980,<sup>1</sup> the repayment to Tehran of \$1 billion deposited in France by the Shah, and a clarification on Iranian dissident activity in France. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

We suspect that the agreement fell through because the Hizballah element actually holding the hostages was not directly involved in the negotiations and was not willing to accept the terms agreed to by France, Iran, and Syria. The kidnapers' demands have not changed since early this year, and we do not believe they will issue new conditions in the near future.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> French officials told US diplomats that Paris would release one prisoner for "medical" reasons and would guarantee the release of the other four by the end of Mitterrand's term in 1988. (b)(3)

<sup>2</sup> In an interview with a French newspaper in mid-February, Syrian President Assad acknowledged that a deal had been worked out to release the French but the "persons covering the hostages" backed out at the last minute. Assad denounced the captors for reneging and said that Syria's relations with the group could not improve until it released its foreign hostages. (b)(3)

Alternatively, it is possible that the deal soured because elements of the Iranian Government imposed last-minute demands that France was not willing to meet. (b)(3)

Although pressure to reach an agreement eased after the Socialist defeat in the 16 March parliamentary election, we believe the new government is likely to accept most of the concessions agreed to by President Mitterrand in January. New Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, a conservative, strongly supports Iraq, however, and his government probably will be reluctant to halt arms sales to Baghdad, even for a short time. (b)(3)

Mitterrand may now decide to direct the negotiations personally. Outgoing Defense Minister Quilès complained recently that he, outgoing Foreign Minister Dumas, and former Prime Minister Fabius were being kept in the dark by Mitterrand. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
Dr. Razah Ra'd, a Lebanese-born French heart specialist, has occasionally acted as "unofficial" emissary to Beirut and Damascus, and, soon after the elections, a Syrian businessman named Omran Adham told the press that he was Mitterrand's (b)(3) envoy to Syrian President Assad. (b)(3)

There is no evidence that the American hostages have been part of any negotiations to date. Should Paris successfully negotiate the release of its hostages in the near future, the deal will not include the release of the American hostages. Although the same Hizballah element holds both sets of hostages, the demands for each are different. Hizballah has consistently said that it will set the American captives free only if the United States forces Kuwait to release the 17 Dawa prisoners arrested for the bombings of the US Embassy and other targets in Kuwait in December 1983. The terrorists have showed no willingness to agree to a compromise for anything less. (b)(3)

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Following is a chronology of significant developments:

22 March 1985 Diplomats Marcel Fontaine and Marcel Carton are kidnaped in West Beirut. Danielle Perez, Carton's daughter and a secretary at the French Embassy, is also taken hostage, then released on 31 March. "Islamic Jihad" and the previously unknown (b)(3) "Haybar Brigades" claim credit. (b)(3)

23 May 1985 Journalist Jean Paul Kauffmann and researcher Michel Seurat are kidnaped in West Beirut. "Islamic Jihad" claims credit. (b)(3)

Early January 1986 French press reports indicate that Paris is close to a deal to secure the release of the hostages. French officials confirm (b)(3) substance of these reports. (b)(3)

10 January 1986 French officials tell US diplomats that negotiations are at a stalemate. (b)(3)

19 February 1986 Paris expels four Iranians, four Iraqis, and three Lebanese. Two of the Iraqis—Hamza Hadi Fawzi and Hassan Khayr al-Din, members of an Iraqi opposition group—are sent to Baghdad. Press reports claim that at least one is executed in Baghdad. Tehran, which supports Iraqi oppositionists, is said to be angered, further setting back negotiation efforts. (b)(3)

6 March 1986 An anonymous caller tells a foreign news agency in Beirut that "Islamic Jihad" has executed Michel Seurat as a spy. He also criticizes Paris for deporting "innocent Muslims," particularly its two "Iraqi brothers." The caller warns that French policy in the Middle East is endangering its nationals and demands that French officials "move away from the destructive policy that they are pursuing, and abandon America and its affairs." (b)(3)

8 March 1986

An anonymous caller claiming to speak for "Islamic Jihad" threatens to kill one of the French diplomats unless Paris arranges the release of the two deported Iraqis. The caller also demands that Paris send Dr. Ra'd to negotiate with the kidnapers. Ra'd was involved in hostage negotiations last summer. (b)(3)

Four members of a French television crew—Phillippe Rochot, Georges Hansen, Aurel Corenea, and Jean-Louis Normandin—are kidnaped after covering a Hizballah rally in Beirut's southern suburbs. (b)(3)

9 March 1986

An anonymous caller claims that "Islamic Jihad" was responsible for kidnaping the TV crew. (b)(3)

The French Ambassador to Iraq meets with the expelled Iraqis in Baghdad. Both are reported alive and in good health. (b)(3)

9-13 March 1986

A series of official and unofficial French mediators arrive in the Middle East to explore all possible avenues in the hostage crisis. Foreign Ministry officials travel to Beirut, Damascus, and Tehran. (b)(3)

10 March 1986

Unidentified couriers deliver a statement in the name of "Islamic Jihad" to a foreign news agency in Beirut, along with three photographs. The statement says they are intended to prove the execution of the "specialized intelligence expert" Michel Seurat. French officials have identified the man in the photos as Seurat. (b)(1)  
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	<p>French press reports indicate that three shiploads of French small arms and ammunition are headed toward Iran. French officials deny that Paris authorized a direct shipment, but they probably knew the shipment would go to Iran. (b)(3)</p>	<p>15 March 1986</p>	<p>Dr. Ra'd returns to Paris, claiming that he met with the kidnapers and (b)(3) "new proposals" from them.</p>
<p>12 March 1986</p>	<p>Hizballah spiritual leader Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah calls for the release of the TV crew, calling their kidnaping unjustified. (b)(3)</p>	<p>16 March 1986</p>	<p>The National Assembly elections in Paris bring a (b)(3) coalition to power.</p>
	<p>Iraqi President Saddam Husayn pardons Fawzi and Khayr al-Dina and says they are free (b)(3) back to France if they wish. (b)(3)</p>		<p>The Hizballah leadership releases a press communique denying any involvement in the French or other hostage affairs. The statement refutes Dr. Ra'd's claim that he reached a compromise with the radical Shias, claiming he never met with a Hizballah official. Fadlallah, however, admits that Dr. Ra'd visited him. (b)(3)</p>
<p>14 March 1986</p>	<p>Unidentified couriers deliver a videotape of hostages Kauffmann, Carton, and Fontaine to the Visnews Bureau in Beirut. The hostages address messages to their families and appeal for pressure to be brought upon the French Government to achieve their release. They also called on France to stop supporting Iraq. According to the US Embassy in Beirut, the hostages all appear physically and (b)(3) psychologically worn down. (b)(3)</p>	<p>17 March 1986</p>	<p>Syrian businessman Omran Adham tells the press in Paris that he is Mitterrand's personal envoy to Syrian President Assad. Adham did meet with Assad in Damascus two days earlier, but apparently did not receive any firm commitment from Assad to take further action on the hostage issue. Adham criticized Dr. Ra'd for interfering and making "ill-considered" promises to the kidnapers. He says the hostages could be set free in "a few days," but that only Syria could guarantee their release. (b)(3)</p>
	<p>A statement delivered to a Western news agency in Beirut claims that the previously unknown "Organization of Revolutionary Justice" was responsible for kidnaping the French TV crew. This may be another covername for Hizballah elements, possibly acting without the approval of the Hizballah leadership. The statement, accompanied by photocopies of Hansen's identification card and Normandin's driver's license, criticized "French colonialism" in the Middle East. (b)(3)</p>		<p>(b)(3)</p>

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## Terrorism Against French Interests in 1985 (b)(3)

France experienced high levels of both domestic and international terrorism in 1985. Our data for last year record a total of 189 incidents involving French interests, causing 130 casualties: 27 fatalities, 97 wounded, and six victims of kidnappings. Indigenous groups were responsible for 144 attacks, and French personnel or property were targeted in 45 international incidents. France ranked a distant third overall as a target of international terrorist activity, behind Israel and the United States. (b)(3)

### The Setting

France must contend with terrorist attacks from several separatist factions—in such diverse locations as Corsica, New Caledonia, and the French Caribbean—as well as from Action Directe, an indigenous anarchist movement with an international faction. The French also are victimized by the Spanish Basque separatist organization Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and its French counterpart, Iparretarak. Moreover, international terrorist groups have targeted French in (b)(3)—elsewhere in Europe and in the Middle East. (b)(3)

Geographic, political, economic, and military factors combine to make France a particularly attractive setting for international terrorism. It is the geographic center of Western Europe, with six easily crossed international boundaries, and is readily accessible from Africa and the Middle East. The traditional French tolerance of political dissidents—as exemplified by its granting of asylum to persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activity—encouraged large numbers of radicals to take up residence there. France also has a large population of foreign students and immigrant workers, which terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), have used as a source for both recruiting new members and building support networks. Economic and military factors, such as arms sales to Iraq and the French military presence in Lebanon, also prompt anti-French terrorist attacks, particularly in the Middle East. (b)(3)

## Terrorism Against French Interests, 1985

	Indigenous	International	Totals
<b>Incidents</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>189</b>
<b>Casualties</b>			
Killed	10	17	27
Wounded	85	12	97
Kidnaped		6	6
<b>Groups responsible</b>			
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica	92		
Action Directe	17		
Anti-NATO		5	
Iparretarak	11		
New Caledonia related	9		
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance	1	1	
Spanish Basques/Anti-terrorist Liberation Group		25	
Hizballah		8	
LARF/ASALA		2	
Unknown/Miscellaneous	14	4	

(b)(3)

### Separatist Violence

Most anti-French terrorism is carried out by separatist groups attempting to win independence from France. One in particular, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC), accounted for 92 of the 144 indigenous incidents in 1985. The FLNC typically sets off multiple property bombs simultaneously during the night. While its attacks generally do not cause casualties, five persons were killed and four wounded last year. The group's operations in 1985 were sporadic and, for the fourth consecutive year, the number of FLNC attacks declined—a trend we expect to continue. (b)(3)

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Other separatist movements—Iparretarak, the New Caledonian Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance, and the Breton Revolutionary Army—were responsible for 24 incidents in 1985. Most of these were property bombings; they caused only one fatality and no reported injuries. (b)(3)

#### Action Directe

Action Directe probably poses the greatest problem for French authorities. What makes this group particularly troublesome is its possible links to other European terrorist groups. Action Directe was responsible for 17 attacks in France in 1985, including the assassination of Gen. Rene Audran—a Ministry of Defense official responsible for foreign arms sales—and the attempted assassination of a second general officer. Action Directe also issued a joint communique with the West German Red Army Faction (RAF) in January 1985 in which the two groups announced they were forming an “anti-imperialist front” in Western Europe. The French terrorists were apparently involved in two operations as part of this international movement. (b)(3)

We believe that Action Directe now has two factions. One of them—the “internationalists”—is made up of a few of the original AD leadership, and probably was active with both West German and Belgian terrorists in 1985. We suspect the second faction, the “domestic,” is larger and did not approve of the alliance with the RAF. Analysis of recent activity suggests that the members of the second faction—whose identities are unknown to the police—prefer to continue traditional AD operations; that is, bombing property targets in the middle of the night. These attacks usually do not cause casualties and are related to various domestic political issues, such as French involvement in South Africa and the resurgence of rightist political parties. (b)(3)

#### International Terrorism

The French must contend with international terrorism in three dimensions—that growing out of the Spanish Basque movement, the anti-NATO campaign by the anti-imperialist front, and attacks upon French interests in Lebanon. (b)(3)

France experienced 25 incidents related to Basque separatism in 1985. The lethal Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) carried out 11 attacks against ETA exiles in France, killing 10 persons and wounding eight others. The ETA attacked 14 French targets in Spain in retaliation for the GAL attacks and in protest against France's extradition of four ETA members to Spain. (b)(3)

French targets in Lebanon were attacked 10 times last year, resulting in five fatalities and six kidnappings. Hizballah was responsible for eight of these incidents, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the LARF each carried out one attack. At the end of the year, four Frenchmen were still being (b)(3) hostages by elements of Hizballah. (b)(3)

In addition to the assassination and attempted assassination of the two military officers by Action Directe, there were three anti-NATO incidents involving the French. A French-owned computer company in Cologne, West Germany, and the Central European Operating Agency (the NATO pipeline management office) in Versailles were bombed, and Action Directe took credit—along with the RAF—for the car bombing of the US Air Force base at Rhein-Main, West Germany. (b)(1) (b)(3)

Four serious bombings were carried out by unknown perpetrators in France in 1985. We suspect that Middle Eastern terrorists were responsible. Three of these attacks were against department stores, killing one person and wounding 59 others. The other incident—the bombing of a cinema featuring a Jewish film festival—resulted in the wounding of some 18 persons. (b)(3)

#### Outlook

Terrorist activity in France is likely to continue in 1986, although we suspect the patterns are changing:

- There probably will be more terrorist incidents in France carried out by Middle Eastern groups. In

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particular, radical Islamic fundamentalists are likely to strike French interests in both France and Lebanon as long as a French presence remains in Lebanon and France continues to provide weapons to Iraq. Libya also may stage attacks against French targets if Paris continues to actively support the Government of Chad.

- French police have had no recent success against Action Directe, and both its international and domestic factions appear to be capable of carrying out attacks at will.
- The Antiterrorist Liberation Group is likely to continue its deadly campaign against Spanish Basques in France, which may provoke ETA to retaliate against French targets in Spain. (b)(3)

On a more positive note, terrorist attacks by separatist groups against France probably will decline. The FLNC observed a self-imposed moratorium on violence from July 1985 through January 1986, but recently carried out several bombings. Iparretarak and the separatist movements in the French Caribbean and New Caledonia have been relatively quiet so far this year. Even if terrorist activity by the separatist groups declines, the new French Government still will have to contend with a formidable terrorist problem. In our view, France probably faces an increase in serious international terrorist activity that will more than offset the effects of reduced violence by separatist groups. (b)(3)

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## Syrian-Sponsored Terrorism in Western Europe (b)(3)

Syria sponsors terrorist attacks in Western Europe in a calculated effort to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. (b)(1)

(b)(3) Syria officially denounces terrorism, but we believe it considers these operations part of its national security strategy and that it distinguishes such operations from terrorist incidents perpetrated by other (b)(1) that receive Syrian support. (b)(3)

Syria has used its own agents and, since 1984, surrogate groups to execute operations. We believe Syria has increasingly employed surrogates in part because these groups can use their established cells in Western Europe—and the Palestinian and other Middle Eastern populations there—to support their operations. We also believe Syria facilitates these surrogate operations by using their diplomatic channels in Europe to transport operatives. Although Syria uses surrogates to shield itself from direct association with such operations, it runs the risk of being implicated in attacks that are carried out by Syrian-supported terrorist groups without Syrian endorsement. (b)(3)

### The Early Focus

Western Europe became a focus of Syrian-sponsored terrorism in the late 1970s when Syrian operatives pursued and executed anti-Assad dissidents there. Many Syrian dissidents, especially Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalists, had fled Syria to escape persecution and sought asylum in Western Europe. (b)(1)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Early attacks in Western Europe, believed to have been organized by Syrian intelligence and carried out by Syrian operatives to intimidate regime opponents, include:

- The assassination of former Prime Minister Salah al-Bitar in Paris on 21 July 1970. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

- The assassination attempt on Muslim Brotherhood leader Issam al-Attar in Aachen, West Germany, on 17 March 1981. The attack resulted in the death of Attar's wife (b)(1)

- The attempt on 19 December 1981 to bomb the pro-Iraqi Arabic-language weekly *Al Watan al Arabi* in Paris. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

There appeared to be a lull in Syrian operations in Western Europe in 1982 after the Assad regime subdued the Muslim Brotherhood at home. In addition, West European governments pressed Syria to end terrorist attacks on their territories. In early 1982, France obtained a Syrian pledge to request (b)(1) Nidal to refrain from attacks in France in exchange (b)(3) for an undisclosed French gesture. (b)(1) Before then, the Abu Nidal Group had been responsible for several terrorist operations in Western Europe directed against Syrian dissidents on behalf of Syria, (b)(1)

(b)(3)

~~Secret~~**Current Phase**

Syrian-sponsored terrorist incidents in Western Europe resumed in 1983 with attacks on pro-Arafat Palestinians and Jordanian diplomats. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Several attacks on Jordanian personnel and facilities by Abu Nidal representatives took place after Jordan renewed diplomatic relations with Egypt in September 1984 and allowed the Palestine National Council to meet in Amman the following November. Syria encouraged these attacks in order to bring pressure on the Jordanians not to proceed independently in Middle Eastern peace negotiations. Attacks against Jordanians in Western Europe, believed to have been sponsored by Syria as part of this drive, include:

- Attacks on 21 March 1985 on the offices of Alia—the Jordanian airline—in Rome, Athens, and Cyprus, claimed in the name of Black September, a covername used by the Abu Nidal Group.
- The rocket attack on 3 April 1985 against the Jordanian Embassy in Rome. The attack was (b)(1) claimed in the name of Black September. (b)(3) [redacted] (b)(3)
- The missile attack on 4 April 1985 against an Alia aircraft in Athens. The missile was fired at the aircraft as it took off from Athens airport. The warhead penetrated the fuselage but did not explode.
- The assassination on 18 September 1985 of Jordanian publisher Michel al-Nimairi in Athens. Nimairi was a personal friend of PLO leader Yasir Arafat and publisher of the Arab-language magazine *Al Nashra*. The attack was claimed by Black September. (b)(3)

**Syrian Use of Surrogates**

Syria increasingly uses Palestinian groups as surrogates to carry out operations in Western Europe, making it more difficult to implicate Syria in a particular incident. These surrogates often have cells in Europe that facilitate the coordination and execution of operations. Syria provides safehaven and training in facilities in Syria or Syrian-controlled territory in exchange for the surrogates' cooperation. (b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Although most of the Abu Nidal Group's attacks have served Syrian interests, the group has its own agenda, and we believe operations conducted in Western Europe by this group do not always have Syrian endorsement, particularly since the group's involvement with Libya has increased. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

We believe Syria uses its embassies in Europe to support terrorist operations. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Targets will continue to be chosen judiciously to prevent damaging Syria's relationship with West European states. A Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement may lead to fewer attacks against Jordanian personnel and facilities, but activity against pro-Arafat Palestinians will persist. In addition, activities conducted by Syrian-sponsored terrorist groups without Damascus' (b)(3) sement will continue to implicate Syria. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

Because Syria attempts to conduct its terrorist operations in Western Europe in a manner that will not jeopardize its relations with European countries, we believe Syria refrains from cooperating with or sponsoring European terrorist groups. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

**Outlook**

We believe there is a high risk that Damascus will enlist surrogate groups to strike at US personnel and facilities in Western Europe if the United States launches a military strike against Syrian targets. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

We believe Syria will continue to selectively sponsor terrorist attacks as a means of furthering both domestic and foreign policy objectives and that Western Europe will remain a prime locale for such attacks. Ease of travel and the accessibility of targets facilitate operations in Western Europe. In addition, Syria's increased use of surrogates for its terrorist operations complicates efforts to interrupt their plans and shields Syria from direct ties to the attacks. (b)(3)

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## **Terrorism in Asia in 1985— A Regional Profile** (b)(3)

International terrorism in Asia in 1985 generally followed the pattern of recent years, well below the level of activity in other regions of the world. Because most terrorist attacks in Asia continue to occur in the context of ongoing insurgencies, and because most Asian insurgent groups do not target foreigners or operate across national boundaries, terrorism in Asia tends to be predominantly domestic in character. Sikh terrorism was a notable exception to this pattern in 1985, in that it was international in scope, victimized foreigners, and maintained a high level of lethality. Other areas that we anticipated would be the sources of serious international terrorist problems in 1985—such as Sri Lanka's Tamils, Pakistan's Al-Zulfikar, and Japan's Chukaku-ha—were not. Isolated terrorist attacks occurred last year in such previously violence-free areas as Nepal and Singapore, but areas such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and New Caledonia did not experience as much terrorist-related violence as has been expected. (b)(3)

### **The Sikhs**

During 1985, Sikh political violence within India returned to the high level of early 1984. Sikh extremists have sought for several years to gain additional political rights, religious status, and territorial concessions from the central government (some seek to found an independent state). Violence peaked in early 1984 as radicals conducted near daily murders of Hindus and conservative Sikh rivals. After the Indian Army stormed the stronghold of the largest group of militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984, Sikh violence declined, but resentment over the attack ran deep. (b)(3)

The depth of Sikh anger was demonstrated most vividly in the October 1984 assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, but it was not expiated with her death. It was further fueled by the killing of more than 2,000 Sikhs in the aftermath of her death and carried over into 1985 in both domestic and international terrorist incidents. Sikh domestic terrorism reached its greatest intensity last year from

10 to 12 May in a series of bombings that left more than 85 persons dead and more than 150 wounded in Delhi and other cities in northern India. More than a dozen bombs, many of them boobytrapped portable radios, exploded in buses, bus stations, and other crowded areas. These attacks came just before the trial of the three Sikhs accused of murdering Mrs. Gandhi and represented the first massive outbreak of Sikh terrorism since that event (b)(3)

The majority of Sikh terrorist attacks have remained domestic in nature—bombings, shootings, and robberies. The frequency began to increase during the summer of 1985, following a political agreement between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and moderate Sikh leader Harchand Singh Longowal and leading up to statewide elections in Punjab last September. During this period, Sikh radicals assassinated Longowal and other important Sikh and Hindu political figures. It remains to be seen whether the current high rate of Sikh political violence within India will destroy the Punjab accords or lead to another crackdown there, but any attempt to implement the accords is apt to exacerbate the situation. (b)(3)

Sikh extremist activities outside India certainly had profound effects during 1985. Last year's most spectacular act of international terrorism was the downing of an Air India 747 over the North Atlantic on 23 June, probably by a bomb planted by Canadian-based Sikh extremists. This incident killed more people (329) than any other single terrorist attack we have recorded. The "Sikh Student Federation, 10th Regiment" claimed responsibility. The 10th, or Dashmesh, Regiment is a militant Sikh group responsible for many acts of terrorism and communal violence within India since 1981. On the same night, another bomb exploded in the baggage-handling area of Tokyo's Narita Airport, killing two Japanese

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workers. This incident is also believed to be the work of Canadian-based Sikhs who intended the bomb to explode aboard (b)(3) her Air India jet bound for India from the east. (b)(3)

Sikhs in the United States were among those living abroad who were outraged by the storming of the Golden Temple and by the killings of Sikhs that followed Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. In late 1984 a small group of Sikhs in the United States attempted to obtain weapons and training to enable them to conduct assassinations and to bomb theaters, bridges, hotels, industrial plants, and nuclear facilities in India. Their efforts came to the attention of the FBI, which began to monitor the group and gather information on its plans and members. In early April 1985, the group sought help from its undercover FBI contact in arranging the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during his June visit to the United States. The group also decided to attack the chief minister of the state of Haryana, whom they held responsible for the harassment of Sikhs in his state, while he was receiving medical treatment in New Orleans in May. The FBI acted before that attack could (b)(3) and arrested five of the conspirators. (b)(3)

These acts represented both a quantum leap in lethality for Sikh extremists and a geographic broadening of the Sikh separatist struggle. They were apparently carried out by small groups of outraged radicals who operated on an ad hoc basis, not on behalf of any established terrorist groups. Although there have been no comparable attacks outside India since mid-1985, Sikh radicals seeking control of temple management committees in the United Kingdom have attacked several Sikh moderates there since last November. (b)(3)

#### **The Tamil Insurgency**

Sri Lanka's Tamil separatist struggle simmered all year, moderated to some extent by a shaky cease-fire that began in June. Terrorist acts committed by the insurgents against noncombatants were few; most of the half-dozen major Tamil groups fighting for an independent state restricted their attacks to police and military forces. One notable exception was the bloodiest terrorist attack ever conducted up to that

time outside Lebanon—the machinegun massacre of more than 150 persons at the Buddhist (b)(3) of Anuradhapura on 14 May. (b)(3)

No group claimed "credit" for those killings, which included women, children, and Buddhist monks and nuns, and most of the guerrilla groups condemned the attack. No arrests were ever made in the case, but the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the most lethal of the separatist groups, was probably responsible. While the cease-fire—arranged by India and announced during meetings between government and guerrilla leaders in Nepal in June—soon afterward ensured that no further acts of that magnitude occurred, no substantial progress has been made toward resolving Tamil political demands and the potential remains high for future terrorist attacks. (b)(3)

In contrast to the kidnappings and bombing attacks against foreigners that occurred in 1984, there were no attacks against foreigners or US citizens in 1985. Viewed in retrospect, most Tamil groups probably saw those brief forays into international terrorism as having been counterproductive to their cause, although some groups may be tempted by the prospect of Western publicity. The climate of violence is such that further insurgent attacks against civilians are likely and may cause some foreign casualties if they take place in Colombo. (b)(3)

#### **Al-Zulfikar**

The Pakistani terrorist group Al-Zulfikar, which raised concerns in late 1983 and mid-1984 because it targeted Americans and other Westerners, appeared to have virtually collapsed during 1985. Aside from a few bombings within Pakistan early in the year,<sup>1</sup> the group has been totally inactive and has not carried out a successful international terrorist attack in more than two years. Al-Zulfikar appears never to have

<sup>1</sup> Most international terrorism in Pakistan has involved attacks on Afghan refugees and resistance groups. We believe these attacks were carried out either by agents of the Afghan security service or by members of other resistance groups. Agents of the Afghan service are also believed to have conducted some attacks against Pakistani targets and to have kidnaped Chinese and Australian aid personnel last year. (b)(3)

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recovered from its disastrous July 1984 attempt to seize foreign hostages in Vienna, and it suffered another severe blow in 1985 when one of its coleaders died in France. (b)(3)

Shahnawaz Bhutto, younger brother of Al-Zulfikar founder Murtaza Bhutto and son of executed former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for whom the group was named, was found dead in his Cannes apartment on 18 July. French police initially suspected a drug overdose as the cause of death, but later arrested Shahnawaz's wife on charges of having poisoned him. The combination of his death, disorganization following the Vienna attempt, Pakistani security forces' successes, and the late 1985 lifting of martial law made it difficult for Al-Zulfikar to recruit and operate at home, and it still lacks the sophistication to operate successfully abroad. All these factors, plus the presence in New Delhi of a new Indian government less inclined to support antiregime activities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, make it unlikely that the group will return to its high level of activity of 1981-82. (b)(3)

#### Japan

Terrorism in Japan, as in other countries in Asia, did not match anticipated levels in 1985, and international terrorism there actually declined. The most dangerous group, Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), started 1985 with a rocket attack on the US Consulate General in Kobe at 0600 hours on 1 January, when the building was unoccupied, but did not attack any foreign targets for the rest of the year. While that attack did no damage and caused no casualties, at least one of the three homemade rockets contained antipersonnel shrapnel. That fact, plus a rocket "factory" discovered later in January and threatening literature published by the group in February, raised concerns early in the year that Chukaku-ha was moving toward a revised targeting strategy that would include more attacks on US interests and that would produce casualties. Neither concern turned out to be justified, however. Although Chukaku-ha did mount more domestic attacks within Japan in 1985 than in most previous years, almost all of them were low-level attacks against property, primarily against the longtime favorite target, Narita Airport, in the first half of the year, and then against other transportation facilities on behalf of rail workers later in the year. (b)(3)

Chukaku-ha demonstrated its ability to conduct large-scale guerrilla-type operations. For example, the group was able to paralyze rail traffic in November. Although it has a limited capability to disrupt the coming economic summit in May,<sup>2</sup> as long as it seeks to avoid casualties and has no access to military weapons or high explosives, it poses more of a nuisance than a threat to Japanese national security. (b)(3)

The best known terrorist group in Asia, the *Japanese Red Army*, remained inactive in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Its last terrorist operation was in 1977 and its current strength is probably less than 20 members. The group's only public "appearance" in 1985 was to receive its released member Kozo Okamoto, who had been held by the Israelis since the Lod Airport massacre in 1972. By all accounts, Okamoto's release does not portend any increase in the group's capability or reflect any intention to become more active. The JRA probably retains some limited capability to conduct terrorist attacks if permitted to do so by its longtime patron, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, but is unlikely to act without PFLP approval and support. The JRA is the only known group that might target Japanese interests abroad. (b)(3)

#### The Philippines

The two major insurgent groups continued their attacks against the government infrastructure and the civilian population last year, but, once again, acts of international terrorism were rare in the Philippines. Hotel fires in Manila and Baguio in late 1984 and early 1985 left several American citizens dead and injured, but those fires that could be proved to be arson seemed to be labor related, rather than politically motivated. A grenade attack against a Peace Corps vehicle was later determined to have been directed at the Filipino driver by an angry business associate. (b)(3)

Even when the Communist *New People's Army* (NPA) killed an American citizen, that murder did not mark the abandonment of the group's policy of

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed examination of Chukaku-ha and the threat it poses to the economic summit, see the Focus article at the beginning of this issue. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**North Korea**

*North Korea is well known as a trainer and supplier of terrorist and insurgent groups in the 1970s and as a practitioner of international terrorism on its own behalf (the Rangoon incident of 1983), but P'yongyang apparently was not involved in terrorist incidents in 1985. Its major target has always been South Korea. During 1985 it continued efforts to recoup diplomatic ground lost in the aftermath of the Rangoon bombing and to present a more responsible image. Most of North Korea's weapons exports now go to Third World governments willing to pay for them, in contrast to its previous practice of arming insurgent groups. The arms it supplies to its primary customer, Iran, are used by Tehran's armed forces.*

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

restraint toward Americans. The victim was a former military officer born in the Philippines who had become a naturalized US citizen and then returned to the Philippines as a farmer. The motivation for the killing was his refusal to pay protection money, rather than his citizenship, which the guerrillas may well not have known. The NPA continued to carry out urban terrorism in provincial capitals, including the assassinations of governors and mayors and the frequent murders of ordinary citizens, but did not move their violence into Manila, even in the period leading up to the February presidential elections. The NPA is large, well equipped, and capable of attacks on US citizens or facilities at any time. <sup>but</sup> we have no indication that it plans to do so. (b)(3)

The *Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)* conducted only one act of international terrorism in 1985 when it kidnaped a Japanese photographer in January. The group had been holding an American and a West German since November 1984, but it released them in December 1985. The photographer was released in March 1986. The MNLF continues to conduct guerrilla warfare on the island of Mindanao, and, although it seizes foreign hostages from time to time, it is largely an insurgent group that occasionally uses terrorist tactics. (b)(3)

**Other Areas**

Other countries that appeared to have developing terrorist problems during 1984 likewise returned to a low level by the end of 1985. *Indonesia* had experienced a series of bombings and fires in late 1984 and early 1985 conducted by conservative Islamic groups upset over the government's secular policies. Indonesian authorities made a number of arrests in 1985—followed up with prosecution and stiff sentences. The level of significant incidents in the country <sup>dramatically</sup> dropped off sharply for the rest of the year. (b)(3)

Terrorist-like bombings and other political violence began in *New Caledonia* in late 1984 and persisted during 1985. The violence has been generated both by anti-independence French settlers and by members of the proindependence Kanak National Socialist Liberation Front. Although there have been no fatalities on the island attributable to acts of terrorism, mob violence has claimed several lives and Noumea's main courthouse was damaged by a bomb. The potential for further violence will likely be influenced by French decisions on the status of the territory. (b)(3)

**On the Horizon**

Besides the areas already mentioned, significant terrorist incidents occurred last year in two other Asian countries that were previously free of the phenomenon. Although these attacks were apparently isolated and not indicative of new trends toward violence, they show that no country is immune from acts of terrorism. On 17 March, a bomb exploded in front of a building housing the Israeli and Canadian Embassies in *Singapore*. Although no group claimed credit for the abortive attack (the Israeli Embassy is on the 11th floor and the Canadian on the eighth to 10th), the involvement of a foreign terrorist group cannot be ruled out. This was the first terrorist incident in Singapore in this decade, but we have no reason to believe that any further violence is likely from either domestic groups or foreign terrorists.<sup>3</sup> (b)(3)

<sup>3</sup> Almost all acts of international terrorism in Singapore have been "imported" rather than "homegrown"; the best known terrorist group to use Singapore as its stage was the Japanese Red Army in 1977. (b)(3)

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On 20 and 21 June, a series of bombings in Kathmandu and other nearby towns in *Nepal* killed several persons and wounded a dozen others. Because one of the fatalities was an Indian citizen, we counted one of those acts as Nepal's first international incident. The attacks were apparently committed by an antimonarchist group based in India. Although Nepalese authorities evidently had no success in rounding up the culprits, no other terrorist incidents occurred during the rest of the year. ☐ (b)(3)

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The Terrorism Diary for May (b)(3)

*Below is a compendium of May dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.* (b)(3)

**1 May** *Jewish world.* Last day of Passover.

**1 May 1888** *Socialist world.* May Day (commemorates labor violence in Chicago).

**1 May** *El Salvador.* The first week of May contains several dates of import to leftwing and rightwing elements; consequently, political violence tends to peak during this period.

**1 May 1980** *Peru.* The destruction of electoral material in Chuschi, Cangallo Province, marked the beginning of armed struggle by Sendero Luminoso; this anniversary is commemorated by acts of violence throughout the month.

**2 May 1953** *Jordan.* King Hussein assumes constitutional power.

**2 May 1982** *Argentina, United Kingdom.* Argentine cruiser Belgrano sunk by British submarine in Falklands war.

**4 May 1919** *China.* Student groups form Anti-Japanese Movement.

**4 May 1978** *Namibia.* Kassinga Day (commemorates raid by South African forces that left hundreds dead).

**4 May 1986** *Greek Orthodox world.* Easter Sunday.

**4 May 1986** *Japan.* Tokyo Economic Summit opens (closes 6 May).

**5 May 1862** *Mexico.* Cinco de Mayo (commemorates victory over forces of Napoleon III).

**5 May 1941** *Ethiopia.* Liberation Day.

**5 May 1945** *Netherlands.* Liberation Day.

**5 May 1954** *Paraguay.* Coup against elected government of President Federico Chavez by Gen. Alfredo Stroessner Mattiauda brought current regime to power.

**5 May 1955** *West Germany.* West Germany becomes member of NATO.

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<b>6 May 1900</b>	<b>Iran.</b> Birthday of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
<b>8 May 1945</b>	<b>Czechoslovakia.</b> Liberation Day.
<b>8 May 1945</b>	<b>East Germany.</b> Liberation Day.
<b>8 May 1945</b>	<b>West Germany.</b> Capitulation of the Third Reich.
<b>8 May 1979</b>	<b>El Salvador.</b> Police fired into a crowd on the steps of San Salvador cathedral demonstrating solidarity with leftwing activists who had occupied the French and Costa Rican Embassies; at least 25 demonstrators were killed.
<b>8 May 1984</b>	<b>Libya.</b> Armed dissidents attack President Mu'ammar Qadhafi's Azizziya barracks.
<b>9 May</b>	<b>Muslim world.</b> <i>Ramadan</i> (month of fasting) begins.
<b>9 May 1881</b>	<b>Romania.</b> Independence Day.
<b>9 May 1945</b>	<b>Albania.</b> Victory Day.
<b>9 May 1945</b>	<b>Poland.</b> Victory Day.
<b>9 May 1945</b>	<b>Soviet Union.</b> Victory Day.
<b>9 May 1945</b>	<b>Yugoslavia.</b> Victory Day.
<b>9 May 1976</b>	<b>West Germany.</b> Suicide in prison of Ulrike Meinhof, founding member of Red Army Faction (RAF).
<b>10 May</b>	<b>Jordan.</b> Arab Resistance Day.
<b>10 May 1985</b>	<b>India.</b> Night of Sikh bombings leaves 80 dead, 200 wounded in New Delhi, other cities.
<b>11 May 1983</b>	<b>Chile.</b> Anti-Pinochet demonstrations put down forcefully by government.
<b>11 May 1984</b>	<b>Chile.</b> Wave of bombings against government targets.
<b>13 May 1981</b>	<b>Vatican City.</b> Attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II by Mehmet Ali Agca.
<b>14 May 1811</b>	<b>Paraguay.</b> Independence Day.
<b>14 May 1948</b>	<b>Israel.</b> Republic Day (declaration of independence).
<b>14 May 1948</b>	<b>Middle East.</b> Beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war.

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**14 May 1985** *Sri Lanka.* Tamil separatists kill more than 150 in a machinegun attack on a Buddhist shrine at Anuradhapura.

**15 May 1948** *Palestinians.* Palestine Day (end of UN mandate); the 15 May Organization, founded in 1979 by a remnant of the Special Operations Group of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), takes its name from this event.

**16 May 1983** *Sudan.* Founding of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Liberation Movement (SPLM).

**16 May 1985** *Peru.* The Maoist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) marks its fifth anniversary with a wave of bombings, including attacks on the US Ambassador's residence and the Chinese Embassy.

**17 May 1814** *Norway.* Constitution Day (independence day).

**17 May 1983** *Lebanon, Israel.* Signing of the troop withdrawal accord (known as the 17 May agreement).

**18 May 1980** *South Korea.* Civilian uprising staged in Kwangju against military rule; this anniversary is usually marked by student demonstrations.

**18 May 1980** *Peru.* Beginning of Sendero Luminoso's armed struggle.

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**19 May 1890** *Vietnam.* Ho Chi Minh's birthday.

**19 May 1895** *Cuba.* Death of nationalist hero Jose Marti.

**20 May 1927** *Saudi Arabia.* Independence Day.

**20 May 1972** *Cameroon.* National Day (declaration of the republic).

**20 May 1973** *Western Sahara.* Polisario begins armed struggle.

**20 May 1978** *Japan.* Opening of New Tokyo International Airport (Narita); this anniversary is the focus of demonstrations and terrorist attacks.

**22 May 1972** *Sri Lanka.* Republic Day.

**23 May 1949** *West Germany.* Proclamation of the Federal Republic.

**23 May 1951** *China.* Tibet declared to be under Chinese sovereignty.

**24 May** *Buddhist world.* Birthday of Gautama Buddha.

**25 May 1810** *Argentina.* Beginning of the revolution against Spain.

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**25 May 1892** *Yugoslavia.* Birthday of Josip Broz Tito.

**25 May 1923** *Jordan.* Independence Day.

**25 May 1946** *Jordan.* Constitutional monarchy established.

**25 May 1963** *Africa.* African Freedom Day; Day of Africa (founding of the Organization of African Unity).

**25 May 1965** *Colombia.* Founding of the Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML), the now-defunct parent organization of the People's Liberation Army (EPL) terrorist group.

**25 May 1967** *Bermuda.* Bermuda Day (constitution adopted).

**25 May 1986** *Colombia.* Presidential election scheduled.

**26 May 1966** *Guyana.* Independence Day.

**28 May 1983** *France, French Caribbean.* Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC) surfaces with 17 coordinated bombings.

**30 May 1919** *Afghanistan.* Independence from Great Britain.

**30 May 1961** *Dominican Republic.* Liberty Day (assassination of Gen. Raphael Trujillo).

**30 May 1967** *Nigeria.* Declaration of independence by Biafra.

**30 May 1972** *Israel.* Massacre at Lod Airport by members of the Japanese Red Army.

**30 May 1981** *Bangladesh.* Assassination of Ziaur Rahman.

**31 May 1910** *South Africa.* Union Day (four provinces merged to form Union of South Africa).

**31 May 1961** *South Africa.* Proclamation of the republic.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1985 and 1986**  

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.* (b)(3)

**18 December 1985**

**New Caledonia: Bomb destroys vehicle of European member of Kanak Independence Movement.** The explosion occurred near the building housing the Australian Consulate General, and the building was damaged. There was no damage and no one has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**January 1986**

**Sweden: Authorities arrest PLO member employed by PLO office in Stockholm.** He reportedly was suspected of planning unspecified terrorist acts in Sweden, and the prosecutor recommended that he be expelled. (b)(3)

**1 January**

**South Africa: Mutilated bodies of two policemen found near Moutse.** They had been investigating an arson case that followed clashes between supporters and opponents of the district's incorporation into the Kwandebele homeland. (b)(3)

**3 January**

**Iraq: Unsuccessful assassination attempt against President Saddam Husayn in Baghdad.** An explosive-laden truck was discovered parked along the route of Husayn's motorcade, and his itinerary was changed. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

**15 January**

**Italy: Several gunmen wound director of Arab-language radio station in Rome.** The victim stated that he had received several threats because of his support for Libyan and other dissidents. He believes the Libyan Government was behind the attack. (b)(3)

**17 January**

**Angola: Car bomb explodes outside Invernopol Building in Luanda, damaging several Cuban offices.** The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**India: Police defuse parcel bomb left in New Delhi house.** The 4.5-kg bomb was fitted with a timer and remote control detonator. Police suspect Sikh extremists. (b)(3)

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20 January

**Pakistan: Lahore Court sentences three Sikh hijackers to death and seven others to life imprisonment; four were acquitted.** They hijacked an Indian Airlines Boeing 737 on 5 July 1984 to <sup>(b)(3)</sup>size a demand for a separate Sikh homeland in India's Punjab State. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

**Philippines: Two New People's Army members kill Human Settlements worker and his wife in Cebu.** He was the 19th Human Settlements community field-worker to be slain in the last three years. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

25 January

**Angola: UNITA claims responsibility for bomb attack on Bulgarian nationals in Benguela.** The explosion occurred in a housing area and caused extensive damage. The number of casualties is not known. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

26 January

**Pakistan: Police blame two recent bombings in Frontier Province on Afghan agents.** Twelve persons were injured in an explosion at a tea shop; in the second attack, three persons were killed and 29 others wounded in the offices of Pakistan International Airlines in Peshawar. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

27 January

**India: Two unidentified gunmen kill Congress-I Party district worker in auto ambush in Amritsar.** No one has claimed responsibility. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

29 January

**India: Bridge bombed in Tamil Nadu.** A second, unexploded bomb and handwritten posters were also found. Authorities suspect a group <sup>(b)(3)</sup> the "Kisan (Farmer) Liberation Front" is responsible for the incident. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

**Japan: Stolen trucks set ablaze under two railway overpasses in Tokyo.** No group has yet claimed responsibility, but police suspect the terrorist Chukaku-ha (Nucleu<sup>(b)(3)</sup>on), which has conducted other attacks in support of railway workers. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

31 January

**Canada: Police question militant Sikh leader about bomb found at Indian newspaper in Vancouver.** The homes of local militant leaders were raided, and <sup>(b)(3)</sup> unspecified quantities of weapons and explosives reportedly were confiscated. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

**UAE: Small bomb explodes at alcohol warehouse in Ajman.** <sup>(b)(3)</sup> were no casualties and no group has claimed responsibility. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

**Lebanon: Three local leaders of Armenian Dashnag Party assassinated in Beirut.** A caller claimed credit on behalf of the "Armenian Revolutionaries Union," which may be affiliated with the leftwing Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. No mention was made of a fourth Dashnag member who was also reported kidnapped. <sup>(b)(3)</sup>

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~~Secret~~**January-February**

**Sudan: Southern rebels fire on civilian planes.** Rebel fire narrowly missed both charter aircraft and UN planes during several incidents. Pilots are now reluctant to fly into southern Sudan, except to Juba. (b)(3)

**1 February**

**Italy: Bomb defused outside Desenzano railroad station.** The station is used by US Air Force personnel and their dependents, but there is no evidence that US personnel were specifically targeted. No one has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**2-3 February**

**Greece: Two homemade bombs explode in Patisia, causing minor damage, no injuries.** The first exploded in a trash can and the second at the entrance to an apartment building. No organization claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**3, 6 February**

**Greece: Powerful bombs destroyed (b)(3)s in Athens.** There were no injuries and no claims of responsibility. (b)(3)

**4 February**

**Spain: Car bomb in San Sebastian seriously injured (b)(3)erman and his daughter.** No group has claimed credit for the attack. (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

**Iraq: Eleven Iraqi dissidents and four Iranians executed for planning car bomb attacks.** (b)(3) the 15 terrorists were linked to four Syrian-trained saboteurs apprehended in late 1985. (b)(3)

**Ethiopia: West German released after being held for four months by Sudanese People's Liberation Army.** Before agreeing to hand the hostage over, SPLA negotiators declared they would continue to take foreigners found in contested areas into "protective custody." (b)(3)

**Japan: Police defuse firebomb found at Osaka office building.** The device consisted of a timer and two bags filled with a flammable liquid. No one has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Early February**

**France: Authorities release and expel two members of Abu Nidal Group jailed for assassination of PLO representative in Paris.** The two had served half of their sentences and were freed on parole before being expelled. (b)(3)

**6 February**

**India: Unknown assailants kill All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) president in Punjab.** No one has claimed responsibility for the shooting. Members of the previously outlawed AISSF were responsible for much of the Sikh-vs.-Sikh terrorism in the Punjab over the last five years. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**7 February**

**France: Bomb damages courthouse in Nice.** There were no casualties. Police found leaflets at the scene calling for "political status for Corsican patriots." (b)(3)

**8 February**

**France: Three gunmen wielding automatic weapons attack Bayonne bar.** Five persons, including a 3-year-old girl and three Basque refugees, were wounded. No group claimed responsibility (b)(3)

**9 February**

**Greece: Handgrenade attack in Glyfada damages car owned by Greek-American.** As in similar attacks, there has been no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

**11 February**

(b)(3)

**United Kingdom: Incendiary device explodes in south London store.** There were no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**12 February**

**Belgium: Brussels municipal officials close Iranian Cultural Center amid threats of retaliation from Iran.** Officials acted in response to fears that the center might become a focus for Iranian-sponsored terrorist activities in Western Europe. A similar cultural center was closed recently in Paris. (b)(3)

**France: Bomb explodes in French-Caribbean restaurant in Paris.** The bomb caused minor damage but no injuries. No one has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**West Germany: Police disarm bomb at South African Foundation office in Bonn.** The Revolutionary Cells terrorist group claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**13 February**

**France: Three gunmen with automatic weapons attack customers in bar in St. Jean de Luz.** Several people were wounded, including a Spanish Basque refugee, and one of the gunmen was arrested. (b)(3) terrorist Liberation Group claimed responsibility for the attack. (b)(3)

**14 February**

**Belgium: Homemade bomb defused at Soviet airline office in Brussels.** Aeroflot had received no threats or warnings, and no one claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Spain: Iraultza claims credit for bombing Citibank office in Vitoria.** The bomb caused some damage to the bank and adjacent buildings but no injuries. The communique claimed the action was carried out "on behalf of the anti-NATO movement." (b)(3)

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**Colombia: Terrorists on motorcycle murder Jewish businessman and his companion in downtown Bogota.** The victim had played a role in negotiating an end to the M-19 seizure of the Dominican Embassy in 1980 and had acted as an intermediary in negotiations with terrorist groups. No one claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

15 February

**Portugal: Director General of prison services assassinated near his home in Lisbon.** The terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April, several of whose members are currently imprisoned, claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Spain: Police arrest five alleged ETA members and detain four suspected informers in Bilbao.** The ETA members were charged with murdering a police chief in Munguia in 1979 and killing a civilian in Bilbao in 1984. (b)(3)

**France: Suspected ETA-M propaganda chief deported to Cape Verde Islands.** He was arrested in Biarritz on 25 November 1985 and originally given a three-month prison sentence on arms charges. Two other suspected ETA members had been deported to Cape Verde on 28 January. (b)(3)

16 February

**Portugal: Abu Nidal member released on conditional liberty and expelled.** The man was acquitted in the 1983 assassination of PLO representative Issam Sartawi, (b)(3) was convicted of using a false passport and was serving three years in prison.

**Luxembourg: Bomb destroys automobile in front of prominent notary's residence in suburb of Cents.** No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, the first since early December. (b)(3)

17 February

**Denmark: Gambian suspect in October 1985 murder of two Israelis in Barcelona arrested in Copenhagen.** (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

**France: Two gunmen in car murder 60-year-old man and 16-year-old girl in Biodarray.** Police suspect the terrorist Liberation Group mistook them for Basque sympathizers. (b)(3)

**Iran: Small parcel bomb explodes at bus station in south Tehran, killing one person and injuring two others.** A previously unknown anti-Khomeini group, the "Azadi (Freedom) Organization," claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

18 February

**Portugal: Bomb explodes in trunk of American-owned car at US Embassy in Lisbon.** There were no injuries and no major property damage. The Popular Forces of 25 April claimed responsibility for the attack. (b)(3)

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**23 February**

**Israel: Bomb explodes near Jerusalem's Jaffa Gate.** No casualties were reported. An unspecified number of suspects were detained for questioning. (b)(3)

**24 February**

**West Germany: Improvised explosive devices destroy telephone booths in Dusseldorf.** No one has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Israel: Bomb in Oirvat Mal'ahi discovered and detonated harmlessly.** An unspecified number of suspects, presumably Palestinians, were later detained for interrogation. (b)(3)

**New Caledonia: Ten-kilogram bomb destroys building housing tax offices in Noumea.** There were no injuries and no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

**25 February**

**France: Homemade bomb damages building in central Paris.** The bomb's target is not known; the building housed a military health insurance office and an employees cafeteria of the Banque Nationale de Paris. There have been no claims of responsibility. (b)(3)

**26 February**

**Italy: Italian Air Force sergeant, businessman arrested for spying for Libya.** The two were accused of handing over documents to Libya concerning a NATO base in Sicily. (b)(3)

**Lebanon: Car bomb explodes at entrance to Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon.** The blast, which killed the driver and injured seven other persons, came 10 minutes before hundreds of Palestinians were scheduled to assemble at the entrance for a demonstration. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Japan: Japanese Red Army member surrenders at Tokyo police station.** Yoshiaki Yamada had been jailed in 1974 for sabotaging a Singapore oil refinery and was freed in exchange for hostages taken by the JRA at the French Embassy in The Hague later that same year. Police do not know why or how he returned to Japan; he had been living with other JRA members in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. (b)(3)

**27 February**

**France: Bomb explodes outside Paris bookshop, causing slight damage but no injuries.** No one claimed credit for the attack. (b)(3)

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**West Germany: Incendiary device discovered under construction vehicle at NATO slipway construction site at Offenbach/Rumpenheim.** Inclement weather apparently prevented the device from detonating. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Spain: Three members of October the First Antifascist Resistance Group fail in attempt to rob Zaragoza savings bank.** The robbers took hostages during the attempt but subsequently released them. Three subjects were arrested immediately and a third was captured on 3 March. (b)(3)

**Israel: Two Arab terrorists get reduced sentences in bomb plantings.** They had been serving 25-year sentences and had successfully appealed for reduced sentences on the grounds that Jewish underground members had received lighter sentences. A military appeals court reduced their terms to 18 years each. (b)(3)

**28 February**

**Israel: Three infiltrators surprised going through fence on Lebanese border.** Two of them were killed, and the other surrendered. They wore Israeli Army uniforms over civilian clothes and had planned to take Israeli hostages to exchange for prisoners belonging to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (b)(3)

**2 March**

**Israel: Bomb explosion in East Jerusalem causes no damage or injuries.** The bomb went off near the Siloam Pool in Silwan. No one took credit for the incident. (b)(3)

**3 March**

**France: Iparretarak claims five bomb attacks in Basque region.** The bombs exploded within minutes of each other, causing little damage and no injuries. The targets were political offices in Biarritz and Anglet, the home and two policemen in Bayonne, and a private house in Sourjade. (b)(3)

**Dominican Republic: Bomb explodes at US-affiliated telephone company offices in San Cristobal.** The medium-size device, hurled by unidentified individuals who fled by car, caused considerable damage to the facade of the building but no casualties. The company, a subsidiary of General Telephone and Electronics, handles the country's entire telephone communications system. (b)(3)

**4 March**

**Colombia: M-19 guerrillas take seminarians and workers hostage, request to meet Pope during his July visit.** Members of the 19 April Movement occupied a seminary north of Bogota for 12 hours and briefly held captive 49 seminarians and 79 workers whom they kidnaped at their workplaces and bused to the seminary. (b)(3)

**5 March**

**South Africa: Police arrest white woman in connection with bombing incidents in Johannesburg.** Limpet mines of the type used by the African National Congress were found in her possession. (b)(3)

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6 March

**Spain: Police suspect Basque group Iraultza behind second bombing of US-affiliated company in Bilbao.** Damage was slight, and there were no injuries. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, the second such on the firm in a year. (b)(3)

7 March

**Colombia: Bomb thrown into restaurant kills two, wounds nine others.** A policeman and a civilian were killed. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, which occurred two days before national elections. (b)(3)

8 March

**France: Two hooded gunmen kidnap Seychelles Consul and daughter in their apartment in Marseilles.** The motive for the incident is not clear, but the gunmen (b)(3) surrendered to the police three hours later and released their hostages unharmed.

**Argentina: Bomb explodes at La Plata Catholic University in Buenos Aires.** Although there were no casualties, (b)(3) offices were destroyed. No one claimed responsibility for the attack. (b)(3)

9 March

**Guadeloupe: Four molotov cocktails thrown at political campaign rally in Capesterre-Belle Eau.** One person in the crowd of 400 was critically wounded. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, (b)(3) officials suspect the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe. (b)(3)

**Angola: Ten foreign kidnap victims escape from UNITA rebels in Andrada.** The citizens of Portugal, Canada, Sao Tome and Principe, and Angola had been workers of the Diamang Company and were being forced to march to rebel-controlled territories during the rainy season. They were among an estimated 175 foreign workers being held by guerrillas of the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola. (b)(3)

**Pakistan: Unsuccessful attempt made to bomb Iraqi Consul General's car in Karachi.** The bomb fell off the moving car and exploded in the road, causing no damage. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. (b)(3)

11 March

**Spain: ETA-M claims kidnaping of Basque industrialist.** The group reportedly has not made contact with the hostage's family. (b)(3)

13 March

**Colombia: Police kill top M-19 leader Alvaro Fayad in Bogota apartment.** Fayad, who took control of the guerrilla group in February 1985, is the third M-19 leader to die in the last three years. (b)(3)

**South Africa: UNITA frees two Portuguese nationals captured last year in Angola.** They arrived in Johannesburg on an International Red Cross plane. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**14 March**

(b)(3)

**Spain: Alleged ETA terrorists and one policeman**(b)(3)**shootout in San Sebastian.** One terrorist apparently escaped. (b)(3)

**Afghanistan: Bomb on bus kills eight, wounds nine in Herat.** The explosion occurred two days before the seventh anniversary of a 1979 rising in Herat. No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing. (b)(3)

**New Zealand: Police issue new arrest warrants for Rainbow Warrior suspects.** New Zealand police suspect three French Army officers of chartering a yacht to transport the explosives used in the Rainbow Warrior attack. Previous warrants for the officers' arrest were issued under aliases the men assumed for the mission. (b)(3)

**15 March**

(b)(3)

**France: Explosion destroys prefabricated building of Jeune Africa magazine in Paris.** There were no casualties. Claims of responsibility were made on behalf of the previously unknown "Groupe Oriach" and the Charles Martel Club, an extreme rightist group. (b)(3)

**16 March**

**Portugal: Anonymous bomb threat interrupts Social Democratic Party meeting in Lisbon.** The meeting was postponed until the following morning. (b)(3)

**17 March**

**Peru: Unidentified gunmen attack Argentine Consulate in Lima with submachineguns and two homemade bombs that fail to explode.** No injuries were reported, and there was no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

**18 March**

**Greece: Homemade bomb explodes at Hellenic American Union in Athens, causing little damage.** Police inspecting the area found and disposed of a second, similar bomb. The leftist (b)(3) Revolutionary People's Struggle has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**India: United Akali Dal leader murdered on railroad tracks in Punjab.** He was the elder stepbrother of Sikh leader Bhindranwale who was killed during the storming of the Golden Temple in June 1984. No one has claimed responsibility for the incident. (b)(3)

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**Japan: Moro National Liberation Front frees Japanese photographer in Manila.**  
He was kidnaped in January 1985. No ransom was paid, but Japanese officials reportedly promised to provide medical aid to the Muslim population of the Philippines. (b)(3) ☐

**20 March**

**West Germany: Stuttgart court sentences three alleged Red Army Faction members to lengthy prison terms.** Christa Eckes was sentenced to eight years; Ingrid Jacobsmeier to nine years; and Manuela Happe to 15 years' imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organization and attempted murder. (b)(3) ☐

**27 March**

**Australia: Car bomb explodes in front of Melbourne police station.** At least 22 persons were injured, four of them seriously, by the massive bomb. Police believe it may have been intended to protest the trial testimony of a Mafia figure. (b)(3) ☐

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Central Intelligence Agency



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FILE

13 JUL 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

SUBJECT: The Continuing Soviet Disinformation Blitz (b)(3)

1. At the request of Fritz Ermarth at the NSC, we have prepared a brief report describing recent Soviet disinformation activities. It illustrates that Moscow continues to publicize a wide range of anti-US allegations despite glasnost and other reforms currently under way within the Soviet Union. (b)(3)

2. This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues. Your comments or questions are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, (b)(3)

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Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center  
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Directorate of Intelligence

Attachment:

The Continuing Soviet Disinformation Blitz (b)(3)  
GI M 87-20122, July 1987, (b)(3)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

8 July 1987

The Continuing Soviet Disinformation Blitz

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Summary

Although Moscow claims to be reporting on its domestic problems with a new truthfulness, it continues to push a heavy agenda of anti-US disinformation at home and abroad. A major thrust of this effort--often comprised of crude, blatantly emotional appeals--has been to portray the United States as a practitioner of terrorism and subversion and a violator of human rights. Moscow also works hard at fostering opposition to US military bases and personnel overseas. The pace and scope of the USSR's disinformation activities--which have produced some benefits for Moscow--suggest that the Soviets will continue to take advantage of opportunities, particularly in the Third World.

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, OGI, [redacted]

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The Continuing Soviet Disinformation Blitz [REDACTED]

A Favorite Soviet Theme: US Destabilization of Foreign Countries. The Soviets have continued their campaign of many years that the United States is conspiring to destabilize foreign countries, particularly in the Third World, by sponsoring coups, assassinating political leaders, and conducting a variety of other subversive activities.

- o Shortly after the military coup in Fiji in May, Radio Moscow, TASS and Izvestia all began to play up rumors of US involvement. On 18 May, for example, Radio Moscow reported a statement by the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council--which cited a leftist British newspaper--that "former CIA Deputy Director" Walters was in Fiji when the plot was being planned and that US citizens participated in the event. Moscow stepped up its disinformation campaign on 1 June with a TASS story implicating the CIA and US Secret Service. This report was replayed the next day in Zimbabwe and on 3 June in Uruguay.
- o Since the February 1986 assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Moscow has made a concerted effort to implicate the United States in his death. In addition to numerous Soviet and Bloc press accounts alleging US complicity in Palme's murder, Moscow produced a television docu-drama entitled "Why Did They Kill Olof Palme?" The film, shown this year in Sweden and the USSR, included accusations of CIA involvement in the shooting.
- o The USSR also uses forgeries, rumors, anonymous mailings and other methods to conduct its disinformation campaign alleging CIA plans to destabilize Third World governments.

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[REDACTED] In addition, US Embassy [REDACTED]  
indicates that the KGB:

- Planted a rumor in the Congo this spring alleging that Zairian President Mobutu intended to use the CIA to assassinate Congo President Sassou-Nguesso.
- Circulated last year in India, Pakistan, Peru, Guyana and several African countries an unattributed pamphlet entitled "CIA Insider", which named alleged CIA agents and officers. (b)(3)

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Human Rights Counteroffensive. Long sensitive to Western criticism of its human rights record, Moscow has recently intensified its efforts to denigrate the performance of the West on this issue.

- o The Soviets this year issued a series of charges--based on a book published by Novosti--claiming that the CIA instigated the 1978 Jonestown massacre in order to prevent cult members from emigrating to the Soviet Union. Since the allegation was first publicized in the 30 January edition of Izvestia, it has been replayed in the pro-Soviet Indian press and in the Communist press of Uruguay and East Germany. Moreover, the Novosti book has been reviewed in the Finnish and Danish press, thereby adding credibility to the story.
- o The publicity given in Soviet Bloc media and in Soviet disinformation outlets overseas, leads us to believe that Moscow is behind a recent campaign alleging US trafficking in Central American children for the purpose of using them in organ transplant operations. This campaign appears to have considerable momentum: Since the beginning of the year, these charges have appeared not only in Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan and Yugoslav media, but also in the press of the Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Honduras and India.
- o In an effort to exploit the apartheid issue, the USSR is continuing to push allegations--begun in the early 1980s--that the United States and South Africa are conducting research on a so-called ethnic weapon--a biological weapon designed to kill people selectively on the basis of race. Radio Moscow again charged in February, for example, that the ethnic bomb "could kill blacks but "leave out the white race." (b)(3)

Targeting the US Military. The Soviets also have an aggressive disinformation program targeting the US military presence overseas.

- o In our view, a central element of this effort is Moscow's worldwide campaign, begun in October 1985, charging that AIDS is the result of US biological warfare experiments. During the past several months the USSR has repeatedly used the AIDS story as a means of heightening opposition to US military bases, troops, and port access rights around the globe:

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- In February, a Ukrainian paper claimed that the Japanese were panicking over the spread of AIDS by US servicemen in Japan and that restaurants, barber shops, and other businesses near US bases had barred Americans from entering.
- We suspect the Soviets were responsible for a forged press release surfaced in May in West Berlin in which a city health official purportedly announced that the US Army hospital there was overflowing with AIDS victims.
- o Moscow has also surfaced allegations that some existing US military facilities will be used in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and that the United States is attempting to acquire new bases in order to destabilize particular regions:
  - In March the Indian press ran an article on Soviet charges--attempting to play upon regional sensitivity about military use of Diego Garcia--that the United States produced SDI components there.
  - Soviet radio charged in April that joint US-Zaire military maneuvers reflected a US interest in using the Kamina air force base (b)(3) southern Zaire to destabilize the region.

In our view, several trends characterize recent Soviet disinformation activity.

- o **The Soviets are persistent.** In pushing a given theme, Soviet disinformation specialists apparently believe that repetition of even the most unbelievable stories pays off in the long run. Indeed, Soviet charges that AIDS was developed at Fort Detrick have been replayed in the press of over 60 countries. In April these allegations appeared in the official Indian armed forces journal "Sainik Samachar."
- o **The Soviets seize on opportunities quickly.** Within three days after the coup in Fiji, for example, Radio Moscow, Izvestia, and TASS all carried stories implying US involvement.
- o **Moscow targets much of its disinformation toward Third World audiences.** During the past year, we have seen a concerted Soviet effort--in part through forgeries and disinformation--to intensify anti-US sentiment within the Nonaligned Movement, whose criticism of the United States and backing of many Soviet positions Moscow believes is a major political asset. There is also evidence that the Soviets are working hard to exploit growing political and

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- economic tensions in southern Africa, using forgeries as their primary vehicle. Through this mechanism, Moscow has alleged US coup plotting against several black African states; US-South African cooperation; and US circumvention of the arms embargo against South Africa.
- o **Soviet disinformation is often crude.** Despite glasnost at home and an increasingly sophisticated use of propaganda and public diplomacy, much Soviet disinformation continues to be comprised of crude, blatantly emotional appeals. As evidenced by the AIDS and baby trafficking campaigns, Moscow is apparently convinced that this approach can be effective, particularly in the Third World.
  - o **The level of activity appears to be increasing.** While difficult to gauge, the level of Soviet disinformation activity appears to be on the rise, as evidenced by the number of known or suspected Soviet forgeries that have publicly surfaced in the past 18 months. Typically in the past we have seen about 10-15 of such forgeries each year, but for the 1986-87 period we are seeing a rate of about 20 per year. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Although the impact of Soviet disinformation cannot be measured precisely, we believe Moscow has reaped some benefits.

- o US officials have been forced to protest a barrage of anti-US AIDS disinformation stories throughout the Third World.
- o In India, where Moscow's most common theme alleges that the United States is conspiring to destabilize the country by supporting the Sikh and other separatist movements, Indians overwhelmingly believe that Washington is the single largest promoter of international terrorism, according to public opinion data from 1985.
- o According to press reporting, the ousted prime minister of Fiji said in a June interview in Washington that he had "strong suspicions" of US involvement in the coup and called for a Congressional inquiry.
- o Moscow's anti-CIA program--particularly the lists of alleged CIA officers and agents--has intimidated and cast suspicion on many people. For example, the US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that an editor of a Zairean newspaper who was a contact of USIS feared that the government's security service would interrogate him after his name appeared on a list of CIA agents. (b)(3)

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SUBJECT: The Continuing Disinformation Blitz (b)(3)

OGI/FSIC/AM (b)(3) (8 Jul 87)

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# Leadership Review

(b)(3)

July 1988

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
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Sweden: Carlsson Under Fire

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Sweden

Carlsson Under Fire

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As the campaign for Sweden's 18 September general election heats up, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson finds himself in a much more precarious position than most observers would have predicted a few months ago. A series of missteps has plagued Carlsson's tenure and clouded his future. The latest involves revelations that former Justice Minister Anna-Greta Leijon used her position to support a privately financed secret investigation of the assassination of former Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. By authorizing the investigation, Leijon (one of Carlsson's most popular ministers) seemingly placed herself above the law in a country that holds the legal system sacrosanct. (b)(3)

Although Leijon was cleared of criminal wrongdoing by the Justice Chancellor, a parliamentary committee has decided to pursue the matter. The committee will be the final arbiter of the incident, and its unprecedented decision to hold hearings during a parliamentary recess guarantees the scandal front page coverage until the election. A recent poll shows that roughly 50 percent of the electorate continues to regard Leijon as an experienced politician whose actions, albeit misguided, were part of a genuine effort to fight terrorism. Nevertheless, the opposition nonsocialist party leaders are almost certain to try to capitalize on the unfolding investigation. (b)(3)

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No matter how the investigation proceeds, the affair has divided the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and raises serious questions about Carlsson's leadership. For example, Finance Ministry official and SDP member Birgitta von Otter—wife of Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt, the party's second-most-influential leader after Carlsson—sharply chastised Carlsson for playing down the affair in order to protect Leijon. [redacted] her fierce attack was supported by other senior and middle-ranking party officials, although not by her husband. [redacted] (b)(3)

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[redacted] while Carlsson has been generally praised for giving Cabinet ministers more maneuvering room than did Palme, his open style now seems to have contributed to some of the government's problems. In particular, the Leijon incident makes the government seem clumsy, undermining Carlsson's claim that the SDP, which has governed for 50 of the last 56 years, is the only party able to govern. Until recently, voters have bought Carlsson's argument, primarily because the internecine squabbling that has characterized the nonsocialist parties—both in government (1976-82) and in opposition—made them appear inept. Although fluctuating, polls now indicate that the nonsocialist parties' combined votes in the general election could unseat the SDP. [redacted] (b)(3)

The latest scandal comes on the heels of a series of shocks that have shaken popular belief in Sweden's immunity to the corruption and crime of other Western democracies.

- The Palme assassination raised the specter of international terrorism.
- Revelations about secret arms deals and the resultant numerous investigations exposed the hypocritical practices of both business and political leaders who wittingly circumvented regulations in an effort to boost the domestic arms industry.
- Last autumn's escape of Sweden's most celebrated spy during a conjugal visit home, made the government appear ridiculous and led to the subsequent resignation of former Justice Minister Sten Wickbom. [redacted] (b)(3)

As the election campaign heats up, opposition leaders may well make Carlsson's lack of control over the Cabinet their rallying point, but they have formidable obstacles to overcome if they are to convert their standing in the polls into an electoral victory. For one thing, their own personal rivalries and policy differences make it difficult for opposition leaders to take advantage of Carlsson's vulnerability. For another, Carlsson—though weakened—is still the leading contender. He continues to outdistance his opponents in "trustworthiness" ratings, and he combines a folksy image with highly developed political skills—traits that are likely to help him convince Swedish voters to go with a known, if faulty, choice rather than gamble on the divisive nonsocialists. [redacted] (b)(3)

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
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**Terrorism Review**

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DI TR 87-003  
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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

12 February 1987

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12 February 1987

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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

12 February 1987

**Focus****Lebanon—The New Hostages** (b)(3)

The arrest of a terrorist important to the radical Shia group Hizballah has launched a new round of kidnappings in Lebanon. The terrorist, Muhammad Hammadi—also one of the hijackers of TWA Flight 847—was arrested at Frankfurt airport on 13 January, as he attempted to smuggle liquid explosives into West Germany. Since then, gunmen have seized at least 12 foreigners in West Beirut. We believe that most of the new hostages were taken by elements of the Iranian-backed Hizballah, of which Hammadi is a member. A brother in Lebanon, Abd al-Hadi Hammadi, probably instigated the kidnapping of two West Germans, while other elements probably related to Hizballah have claimed responsibility for the abduction of several other foreigners, including three Americans. The new group of hostages also includes Terry Waite, the Anglican Church envoy who has been trying to negotiate the release of foreign hostages in Lebanon since the fall of 1985. (b)(3)

**Who is Responsible?**

Within four days of Hammadi's arrest, terrorists had seized their first hostage, a West German businessman named Rudolf Cordes. A second German, Alfred Schmidt, was taken three days later. Schmidt, a technician, had been installing equipment at Beirut University Hospital. On 24 January, Shia extremists kidnapped four professors—among them three American citizens—from Beirut University College. This brings to nine the number of American nationals now held hostage in Lebanon. The fourth professor, an Indian national, has resident alien status and carries a US passport. The terrorists apparently number him among the Americans. (b)(3)

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We believe that the recent kidnappings were carried out by elements of Hizballah. (b)(3) two of the Hammadi brothers masterminded the recent operations in Lebanon with the help of several close associates. These men are longtime associates of Imad Mughniyah, leader of the Hizballah cell that controls US and other hostages in Lebanon. At least one of the Hammadis—Abd al-Hadi—is a security chief for Hizballah and oversaw the retaliatory kidnappings of the two Germans. Muhammad Hammadi was one of the hijackers of the TWA flight in June 1985 and is responsible for the death of an American serviceman and the detention of several dozen Americans. A third brother, Ali Abbas, was arrested in West Germany on 26 January. He apparently confessed to successfully smuggling liquid explosives into West Germany on the same flight as Muhammad. (b)(3)

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**Table 1**  
**Western Hostages Currently Held in Lebanon <sup>a</sup>**

Name/Occupation	Date/Place	Claimant Group	Status
<b>US Hostages</b>			
William Buckley Diplomat	16 March 1984	Islamic Jihad	Presumed dead since June 1985
Terry Anderson Journalist	16 March 1985	Islamic Jihad	Held by Hizballah
Thomas Sutherland Dean, American University of Beirut	10 June 1985	Islamic Jihad	Held by Hizballah
Frank Reed Adviser to Lebanese International School	9 September 1986	Claimed by Islamic Jihad, later denied; Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Probably held by Hizballah
Joseph Cicippio Deputy Comptroller, American University of Beirut	12 September 1986	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Probably held by Hizballah
Edward Tracy Itinerant writer	21 October 1986	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	
Alan Steen Professor, Beirut University College	24 January 1987	Organization of the Oppressed on Earth	Probably held by Hizballah
Robert Polhill Professor, Beirut University College	24 January 1987	Same	Same
John (Jesse) Turner Professor, Beirut University College	24 January 1987	Same	Same
Mithileshwar Singh Chairman Business Studies, Beirut University College; Indian national who has resident alien status	24 January 1987	Same	Same
<b>French Hostages</b>			
Marcel Carton Diplomat	22 March 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad, Khaybar Brigades	Probably held by Hizballah
Marcel Fontaine Diplomat	22 March 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad, Khaybar Brigades	Probably held by Hizballah
Jean Paul Kaufmann Journalist	22 May 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad	Probably held by Hizballah
Michel Seurat Researcher	22 May 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad	Reportedly killed 6 March 1986
Jean-Louis Normandin Television Technician	8 March 1986	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Probably held by Hizballah
Roger Auque Journalist	13 January 1987	No claimant	Hizballah suspected

<sup>a</sup> We believe "Islamic Jihad" is a covername used by a cell of Hizballah, led by Imad Mughniyah, to claim credit for terrorist operations and to threaten attacks. Its claims are usually accompanied by a photograph of a hostage for authentication. Other pro-Iranian factions outside Lebanon also use the term, which means

Islamic Holy War in Arabic. Other factions within Hizballah are involved in terrorism and use covernames—such as Revolutionary Justice Organization or Organization of the Oppressed on Earth—to mask their true identities and to provide plausible deniability to Hizballah leaders and Iran (b)(3)

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Name/Occupation	Date/Place	Claimant Group	Status
<b>German Hostages</b>			
Rudolf Cordes Businessmen	17 January 1987	No claimant	Held by Hizballah
Alfred Schmidt Engineer	20 January 1987	No claimant	Held by Hizballah
<b>British Hostages</b>			
Alec Collett Journalist	25 March 1985		Execution announced April 1986 by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (Abu Nidal); body never found.
John McCarthy Journalist	17 April 1986	No claimant	Unknown
Terry Waite Anglican Church envoy	20 January 1987	No claimant	Disappeared from Beirut during his effort to mediate hostage crisis
<b>Other Hostages</b>			
Brian Keenan Irish teacher	11 April 1985	No claimant	Unknown
Alberto Molinari Italian businessman	11 September 1985 West Beirut	No claimant	Unknown
Chae Do-sung South Korean diplomat	31 January 1986	Fighting Revolutionary Cells	Unknown
Bakr Damanhuri Saudi diplomat/businessman	12 January 1987	No claimant	Unknown
Khalid Dib Saudi businessman	26 January 1987	Partisans of Islamic Jihad	Probable reason for abduction was to dissuade Saudis from attending Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait
Two English-speakers, possibly Romanian	26 January 1987	No claimant	Taken from store
Two Lebanese Armenians	23 January 1987	No claimant	Probably mistaken for West Germans

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Two groups have claimed responsibility for the kidnappings at Beirut University College. Shortly after the abductions, a caller claiming to speak for the Organization for the Oppressed on Earth said it had the hostages, and threatened to kill one if Hammadi is not released, and the US continues to support Iraq in its war with Iran. We believe this is another covername for elements of Hizballah; the name has been used since late 1985, mostly in connection with the kidnapping and murder of several Lebanese Jews. As recently as last month, the group claimed it executed more of these Jewish hostages. [redacted] (b)(3)

A second group—the “Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine” (IJLP)—claimed in late January that it had kidnaped the Americans. Just as with the more familiar Islamic Jihad covername, communiques have been accompanied by photographs of the hostages for authentication. The IJLP said it would murder all four hostages within a week if 400 Palestinian prisoners—many of them Shia Muslims—held in Israeli jails were not released and Muhammad Hammadi was not freed. It also threatened to kill the hostages if the United States tried to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Little is known about the group, which claims to be composed of Muslim Palestinian youths, but a group using a similar name—the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed responsibility for the grenade attack at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem last October. [redacted] (b)(3)

We believe that these organizations are covernames for Mughniyah's apparatus or other closely related elements of Hizballah. The sophistication of the recent abductions suggests that the terrorists are organized and have good intelligence on the movements of foreigners into and around Beirut, as well as on international flights. The professors abducted from Beirut University College believed that the terrorists were a security force sent to protect them. Rudolf Cordes, the first German taken captive, was picked up just after arriving at Beirut airport. The second German hostage, Alfred Schmidt, was seized at his hotel. [redacted] (b)(3)

#### Where is Terry Waite?

We believe Terry Waite is now being detained by the Hizballah elements holding the US hostages. The Anglican envoy has not been seen since 20 January, when he left his hotel and Druze militia protection. Rumors circulated in Beirut that he had gone to the Bekaa Valley or to southern Beirut to negotiate with elements of Hizballah for the release of Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland. Claiming it had reassurances from the Druze and other sources in Lebanon, the Anglican Church continued through the end of January to hold out hope for Waite's mission. In early February a senior Druze official told the US Embassy in Beirut that Waite had joined other hostages being held by Mughniyah. [redacted] (b)(3)

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We believe Terry Waite has become a victim of his own initiatives. He evidently believed his peaceful mission and role as a mediator would protect him, but these Hizballah leaders were undeterred by Islamic hospitality. Those who decided to detain him probably believe they can pressure the British Government to press their demands, particularly Hizballah's unwavering goal of the release of 17 Dawa Party terrorists held in Kuwait, who were convicted in the bombings of the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations in 1983. (b)(3)

#### Other Hostages

It is unlikely that all the recent hostage takings are related to the arrest of Muhammad Hammadi. Two Saudis abducted in mid-January, for instance, probably were seized as part of Iran's attempt to dissuade the Saudis from attending the Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait. A French journalist, Roger Auque, also was seized in January as he covered Terry Waite's mission, but no claims have been made yet on his behalf. At least two and possibly four blond English- or German-speaking males were kidnaped while they were shopping in West Beirut in late January. Various press accounts describe them as Armenians, East Europeans, or Scandinavians. They probably were mistaken for German or American nationals, but they have not been released, and no organization has taken credit for their abductions. (b)(3)

#### Outlook

In our judgment, prospects for the early release of these hostages—including Terry Waite—are not good. We are almost certain that the captors represent Shia extremist elements. Some of the recent operations could have been financially motivated, done by freelance terrorists who hoped to ransom Westerners to the highest bidders. (b)(3)

Regardless of who initially seized them, we believe decisions on the fate of the hostages will be made by Hizballah's leaders, probably with some reference to Iran. Tehran apparently was not involved in the recent abductions, but probably has been in contact with Hizballah leaders and could play an intermediary role. Despite Iran's considerable support to Hizballah and shared ideological objectives, however, Tehran does not control the hostage holders. (b)(3)

Syrian or Lebanese pressure to release them is unlikely to sway Hizballah. Damascus currently has only marginal influence with Hizballah, and President Assad has been unwilling to confront Hizballah directly. In our view, the growth of the organization and the number of hostages it is hiding in crowded West Beirut have outstripped Assad's ability to intervene forcibly. Walid Junblatt's Druze militia was responsible for Waite's safety, and Junblatt probably feels his offer to trade places with Waite and to fight Hizballah will help salvage his credibility. Nevertheless, Druze threats are even less likely to force Hizballah to release the Anglican envoy. (b)(3)

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Hizballah probably will make further demands before agreeing to release Waite or the others, but we believe the basic objective remains the release of the Dawa Party prisoners in Kuwait. One of the terrorists under death sentence there is the brother-in-law of Imad Mugniyah. The release of the Hammadi brothers—at minimum preventing the extradition of Muhammad Hammadi to the United States—also is an important objective, because the Hammadis are so closely tied to Hizballah. Other statements may press for guarantees that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Israel will refrain from military retaliation in Lebanon, and perhaps even demand compensation in weapons and money (b)(3)

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Highlights (b)(3)

#### Significant Developments

#### Western Europe

##### Italy

#### Suspected Hizballah Terrorist Arrested in Milan

Italian customs police arrested a Lebanese national, Bashir Khudr, on 12 January at Milan airport after they discovered explosives and detonators concealed in his luggage. Nearly 11 kilograms (kg) of explosives were hidden in two bas-relief paintings and various sizes of tinfoil-wrapped chocolate Easter eggs. The detonators were hidden inside batteries placed in a portable radio. Airport security guards had stopped Khudr as part of standing instructions (b)(3) seen closely all arrivals with passports from Arab countries. (b)(3)

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Khudr is believed to be a member of Hizballah, and Italian authorities suspect that the explosives were to be used against Israeli targets in Rome. Initially, questions were raised about Khudr's possible association with Fatah's Colonel Hawari. Moroccan authorities arrested four Hawari operatives last August after they discovered that two of them were carrying pottery objects composed of explosive materials. Subsequent technical evidence indicates there is little similarity between the (b)(3) Khudr carried and those carried by Hawari operatives. (b)(3)

There is no evidence at this time to link Khudr to Mohammad Hammadi, the suspected Hizballah member arrested on 13 January in Frankfurt while he was attempting to smuggle weapons into West Germany. Khudr has been linked, however, to the "Ladispoli Seven,"—seven Lebanese Shia arrested in Italy in November 1984, believed to be planning an attack against the US Embassy in Rome (b)(3)

##### Portugal

#### Members of Anti-ETA Vigilante Group Arrested

Four Portuguese members of the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL)—the first time that Portuguese nationals have been known to be involved with this group—were arrested in Lisbon on 4 January. GAL terrorizes members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty separatist group (ETA). Portuguese authorities also arrested Jean-Philippe Labade, the suspected leader of GAL, who—along with the four Portuguese—is believed to have attacked and wounded six ETA supporters in two separate actions in the French Basque region in February 1986. French authorities reportedly arrested Labade in 1984 for killing ETA leader Tomas Perez Revilla, but he was released on a technicality. (b)(3)

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There are almost certainly other Portuguese members of the group, and Portuguese authorities will continue trying to identify them. Portuguese involvement is more likely to be financially, rather than politically, motivated: we believe GAL members are sometimes paid for their attacks on ETA. According to rumors widely circulated in the Spanish press, GAL members may be paid indirectly by the Spanish Government. (b)(3)

## Spain

### Nine Members of ETA Unit Arrested

The violent "Madrid Commando" unit of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty separatist group (ETA) suffered a major setback when Spanish police, acting in cooperation with French security services, arrested nine members on 16 and 17 January. According to the press, those arrested are linked to nine major attacks in the past 18 months that resulted in 26 deaths, including those of 17 civil guards and two military officials. At the time of arrest, the group reportedly was planning a major attack on a French-built shopping center. The arrests led to the discovery in El Escorial, north of Madrid, of (b)(3) safehouses containing weapons and plans for future operations. (b)(3)

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(b)(3) the commando unit is divided into three groups: gunmen residing in southern France who cross the border to stage attacks; information units that select and plan attacks and escapes; and infrastructure units permanently located in Madrid that set up the resources needed. (b)(3) the damage to the infrastructure and manpower of the group will impair its operational capabilities for at least the near future, but that the group could be ready to resume activities within several weeks of the arrests. (b)(3)

Although the roundup is hailed by Spanish police and the press as a major counterterrorist success, we believe that those captured are rank-and-file members, not leaders. The group has long been known to rebound from setbacks, and five members were able to escape arrest. Retaliatory attacks are likely to be made after the unit regroups. A major car bomb attack on 30 January—killing two persons and injuring 37 others, including 22 Army officers—probably was an attempt to show strength in another region. (b)(3)

## Middle East

### Israel

#### Tourism and Terrorism

Major terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East in the last year and a half have left searing marks on Israel's tourism industry. The hijacking of a TWA airliner in June 1985, the seizing of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985, the attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in December 1985, the attack on an Istanbul synagogue in September 1986, and the grenade attack in mid-October 1986 near the Western (Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem—an especially popular area for tourists—each generated a flurry of telexes from US travel agencies to Israeli hotels and tour offices canceling scheduled visits (b)(3)

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During and immediately following major terrorist incidents, Israeli tour operators typically estimate a cancellation rate as high as 70 percent. Hotel industry officials expected the overall decline in visitors to reach 30 percent by the end of 1986, mainly because of reduced US tourist arrivals. The number of American tourists visiting Israel dropped by 47 percent in the first eight months of 1986—the latest available figures—compared with the same period in 1985. (b)(3)

Cruise ship tourism appears to have been particularly hard hit by the Achille Lauro hijacking. During the first eight months of 1986, total cruise ship arrivals were down over 48 percent from the same period in 1985. The most severe drop—a 64-percent decline in the first quarter of 1986 as compared with the same period in 1985—was in the number of American tourists coming to Israel via cruise ships. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)**Kuwait****Shia Terrorists Arrested for Oil Installations Bombings**

Kuwaiti authorities arrested 11 suspects on 19 January for the bombings of oil installations in June 1986 and January 1987. (b)(3)

(b)(3) the suspects were in possession of arms and explosives. The arms caches included Israeli, US, and Soviet arms, silencers, handgrenades, dynamite sticks, machineguns, ammunition, and timing devices for bombs. Five more suspects are still being sought. Virtually all the suspects are Kuwaiti Shia, some from the country's most prominent families and with ethnic ties to Iran. (b)(3)

Kuwaiti officials have long suspected that local terrorists, backed by Iran, were responsible for the five explosions that seriously damaged oil facilities in June 1986 and for the series of smaller blasts timed to disrupt the Islamic Summit conference held in Kuwait in late January. According to the Embassy, Kuwaiti authorities broke the terrorist ring shortly before the summit started but withheld news of the arrests and the arms caches until the foreign delegations and journalists had left the country. The Embassy also says there are unconfirmed reports that several police were wounded in a shootout with the terrorists. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Libya****New Antidissident Terrorist Campaign?**

Libya may be preparing to launch another of its periodic antidissident campaigns. Two gunmen murdered a 37-year-old Libyan businessman carrying a false Kuwaiti passport as he dined in an Athens restaurant on 7 January. A friend of the victim escaped unharmed. The killing was the first murder of a Libyan opponent of the Qadhafi regime since a Libyan industrialist was murdered in France last June. (b)(3)

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**Latin America****El Salvador****Guerrillas Kidnap Three Mayors**

Leftist guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) kidnaped three mayors in various parts of El Salvador in early January. The abductions were part of the guerrillas' announced subversive campaign known as "Heroic January: Farabundo Marti Lives." These kidnappings may have been an attempt to intimidate local mayors, and the group may try more such kidnappings. The FMLN abducted 27 smalltown officials in a similar campaign in 1985. (b)(3)

**Colombia****New Terrorist Organization**

An armed clandestine wing of "Causa Caribe"—a nonviolent legal organization—reportedly has come to light. The group is said to have conducted kidnappings, robberies, and other terrorist and criminal acts in the northern coast cities of Santa Marta and Barranquilla. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

It is possible this group may have conducted a bus bombing in Barranquilla on 13 January that killed 13 persons. The M-19—the obvious suspects—claim not to have been involved. We believe the majority of Causa Caribe members have come from the Camilo Torres organization, a small, leftist youth group that is active in many parts of Colombia. It previously has not been associated with terrorist attacks. (b)(3)

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## Alfaro Vive, Carajo! A Current Assessment (b)(3)

The Ecuadorean Government has scored impressive gains against the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) terrorist group over the course of 1986. Making use of foreign counterterrorist training and apparently applying good police tactics, the security forces have been able to penetrate and undermine the terrorist organization. Sensing that the AVC may be in disarray following the losses of several key leaders, we believe President Febres-Cordero—particularly in the wake of the recent coup attempt—will drive ahead with his counterterrorist program. Febres-Cordero will press the advantage to prevent the terrorists from recouping their losses and resurfacing as a major challenge during his remaining two years in office. Nevertheless, if the government falters in its commitment, the AVC could gain the necessary respite to reorganize and stage operations, although probably only at a low level (b)(3)

### Origins of the Group

Information concerning the origins of the AVC is sketchy and at times conflicting. The group may have been formed as early as 1980, although it first surfaced publicly in 1983 when it stole the sword of Eloy Alfaro, a turn-of-the-century revolutionary leader, from a Quito museum. (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) the group's first activities in the early 1980s were their efforts in the Oriente region of Ecuador to propagandize farmers and establish peasant organizations. (b)(3)

The group was created when dissension in the early 1980s broke the radical leftist political organization known as the Ecuadorean Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) into three factions. Two of the splinters remained within the mainline MIR framework; the third broke away entirely. The Political-Military Organization (OPM) was formed from this group, and consolidated under the direct influence of the late Colombian M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. (b)(1)

(b)(3)



Figure 1. M-19 leader Carlos Pizarro Leon Gomez (bearded, on right) with AVC members. (b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

The "independents" group, under Jarrin, adopted the name of Eloy Alfaro and went underground as AVC. (b)(3)

### Links to the M-19

Colombia's 19th of April Movement (M-19) has played a significant role in the life of the AVC, although the M-19's view that AVC is a branch of the M-19 is exaggerated. Nevertheless, the two groups share a nationalist ideology, and have continued, since the AVC's creation, a formal relationship that extends to operational support and military training.

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M-19 members also have backed AVC terrorists in important operations. For example, eight M-19 members and two AVC terrorists apparently worked together to kidnap a prominent Guayaquil banker in August 1985. (b)(1) (b)(3)

The operation was aborted, however, when security forces stormed the hideout, killing the banker and several terrorists. (b)(3)

In return for such assistance, the AVC sent some 30 members to fight alongside the M-19 in the "America Battalion"—a multinational rural guerrilla organization operating in southern Colombia. This demonstration of solidarity, however, ultimately led to strains, because the AVC wishes to recall its members to beef up its depleted ranks. (b)(1) (b)(3)

#### Other Foreign Ties

(b)(1) (b)(3) individual AVC members also have received guerrilla training in El Salvador, Libya, and Nicaragua. The AVC reportedly sent several members to El Salvador for training because of a guarantee that they would participate in live-fire situations. In Nicaragua, small groups of AVC members reportedly have patrolled with Sandinista Army units searching for (b)(3) guerrilla insurgents (b)(3)

Libya also has trained AVC members. Between October 1983 and January 1984, approximately 20 AVC members accompanied an M-19 group to Libya and received guerrilla training at camp (b)(1) Tripoli. (b)(3)

The AVC reportedly has a specialized unit that establishes and maintains contacts with international terrorist groups and foreign governments. As of May 1986, Rosa Mireya Cardenas, an AVC member living in Managua, was in charge of this external front (see inset). She reportedly had contacted and received

#### Rosa Mireya CARDENAS Hernandez



Member of the AVC  
Central Command

Rosa Cardenas Hernandez, 27, is one of the founding members of the *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* (AVC) group. She was arrested in Costa Rica in August 1984 while trying to return to Ecuador from Nicaragua and Panama. She is currently residing in Managua and directs the AVC's external front organization from there. She is known to have participated in bank robberies and is suspected of having acted behind the scenes in other AVC operations. Following the deaths of several leaders, Cardenas is a possible contender for AVC chief. Certainly she will have considerable influence on the selection of a new AVC chief. (b)(3)

promises of assistance from the Vietnamese, Syrian, and Cuban Embassies, as well as PLO representatives in Managua:

- Cuba has pledged intelligence and security training, as well as assistance in building guerrilla hospitals in rural areas.
- Vietnam will provide training in jungle warfare and mountain camouflage.
- Syria reportedly will give the AVC an unspecified amount of money and arms.
- The PLO allegedly offered arms and training in exchange for the "detection of Jews living in America," and propaganda support of the PLO.

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
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Figure 2. AVC propaganda material.

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Nevertheless, the group seems interested in broadening its foreign contacts,

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(b)(3)

#### The AVC and the Left

During its early period, when the group was registering successes, the AVC developed an ambitious revolutionary program that included leading a united left against President Febres-Cordero, while carrying out even more daring terrorist operations. The AVC reportedly believed that the conservative government in Ecuador made for ideal conditions in which to forge such a front.

(b)(3)

The legal Ecuadorean left has consistently rejected the AVC's call to form a united front, thus isolating the terrorist group, and thwarting its more grandiose ambitions. Most of the leftist parties fear that association with the group's illegal terrorist activity will lead to government reprisals and alienate such electoral backing as they have received.

(b)(3)

#### Government Successes

Government security forces have combined penetrations with good use of intelligence to exploit AVC weaknesses and deal the terrorist group decisive blows. Over the past year, Ecuador's security forces have raided numerous safehouses and captured or killed dozens of terrorists—including several of the group's top leaders. Quito also has begun to work with Bogota to crack down on the M-19.

(b)(3)

President Febres-Cordero has reorganized the security forces—initially inexperienced and lacking in resources—and consolidated counterterrorism responsibility under the direction of Government Minister Robles. He secured training and assistance

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Figure 3. AVC weapons taken from safehouse in Quito.

(b)(3)

for the security forces from the United States and other governments and encouraged them to focus on good police practices. Most important, Febres-Cordero fully supports his counterterrorist forces and has shown the political will to back them against attacks from opposition political parties. His aggressive approach has occasionally resulted in abuses, but it has also improved the confidence and overall effectiveness of the security service. (b)(3)

#### Outlook

We believe the AVC will find it difficult to recover from its current state of disarray. The government has demonstrated the political will to press its advantage and to prevent the group from surfacing as a major threat in the near future. The killings of several key AVC leaders over the past year have not only demoralized the group but have also provoked a leadership crisis. These blows have destroyed the AVC as a national organization, and reduced it to groups of isolated cells working haphazardly. In fact, some members of the group have called for a national dialogue with the government to be mediated by the church. We believe that, like its forerunners, the

group will divide over the issue of continued militancy versus a more clearly defined political agenda. Some elements of the AVC then might attempt to integrate into one or more of the established radical leftist parties, leaving the remaining AVC militants per (b)(3) more violent than before. (b)(3)

Despite the group's overall decline, some members are still active and, according to press accounts, staged brief takeovers of a radio station in December. Incidents of this kind signal that the group can still mount limited operations, and may be able to stage a limited comeback if the government fails to press its hard-won gains. (b)(3)

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## Overview of Asian Terrorism in 1986 (b)(3)

International terrorism—generally not a major problem in Asia—heated up in 1986 as the number of international incidents jumped 50 percent over 1985. We recorded some 66 incidents in the region last year as compared with 41 in 1985—still far below the hundreds of incidents that occurred in the Middle East and Latin America. Much of the terrorism in Asia is domestic rather than international (b)(3)

Pakistan accounted for most of the increase in international terrorism last year: there were twice as many incidents last year as there were in 1985. We believe Afghan and Soviet agents terrorizing civilian targets in the North-West Frontier Province accounts for the bulk of the increase in Pakistan. Palestinian terrorists stormed a Pan Am airliner in Karachi last September, killing 22 persons and injuring as many as 100 others. Most Asian countries did not reflect any real increase in international attacks during the year, and Sikh extremists overseas—who downed an Air India 747 jet and killed over 300 p(b)(3) in 1985—were relatively quiet during 1986.

### Pakistan: Karachi Heats Up

Terrorist attacks sponsored by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the Pakistani-Afghan border area accounted for the marked increase in Pakistani terrorism during 1986. These agents—usually KHAD, the Afghan secret police—conducted a terrorist bombing campaign in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to erode Pakistani support for Afghan insurgents, and to sow dissension between Afghan refugees and Pakistani civilians in the area. These attacks were usually bombings and generally targeted bridges, railways, power transmission lines, shops, restaurants, and hospitals. We expect such bombings to continue in 1987. (b)(3)

The most daring and brutal terrorist attack in Asia last year occurred in September, when four armed Palestinian gunmen stormed a Pan Am aircraft in Karachi. The attack eventually left 22 persons dead and nearly 100 others wounded. After initially killing

one American, the hijackers threatened to kill a passenger every 10 minutes unless they were provided a flightcrew and were flown to Cyprus. The deadlines passed without incident, but when the aircraft lighting failed, the terrorists opened fire on the passengers. The four gunmen, along with a fifth conspirator arrested later in Islamabad, were taken into Pakistani custody. They have given varying accounts of their origins and goals. Several groups claimed responsibility for the hijacking, although we believe the Abu Nidal Group was responsible, and Libya probably knew of and provided logistic (b)(3) to the operation.

Another incident that involved Libya occurred when a bomb exploded at the Pakistan-Libyan Holding Company in Karachi last March. The company was founded as a joint venture, allegedly to invest in small- and medium-sized companies. An unidentified man reportedly planted a briefcase that exploded in the company's reception area. One person was killed and several others injured in the ensuing fire, which destroyed most of the first and second floors of the building. When Pakistani authorities detained a Libyan executive of the company, he admitted to being a Libyan intelligence agent and said he bombed the company to prevent its financial records from falling into the hands of the local authorities. The Pakistani Government suspected that the Libyan was involved in a plot to undermine F(b)(3) Zia and expelled him.

Also in Karachi, a series of four bombs exploded in a 15-minute period during last July at four separate locations, killing a local security guard and wounding two other persons. The targets included the cargo office of Pan American Airlines and three offices of Saudia Airlines. Although no group has claimed credit for the blasts, the police suspect Iranian

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involvement. Iranians previously had been involved in antigovernment and anti-US terrorist attacks in Pakistan. In the summer of 1985, Iranian officials were believed to have been responsible for an attack on the American Center in Lahore, the placement of a bomb outside the Pan Am office in Karachi, and antigovernment Shia demonstrations in Quetta, Baluchistan, that left at least 60 persons dead.

(b)(3)

The Pakistani terrorist group Al-Zulfikar, which raised concerns in 1983 and 1984 because it targeted Americans and other Westerners, was inactive for a second year. It apparently never recovered from its attempt in July 1984 to seize foreign hostages in Vienna—during which nine operatives were taken into Austrian custody—and the death a year later of one of its top leaders in France. Islamabad is still concerned about the ability of Al-Zulfikar to threaten the lives of Pakistani political leaders, but apparently does not currently regard it as a serious threat.

(b)(3)

#### Domestic Terrorism in Japan

Radical leftist groups in Japan, particularly the Chukaku-ha, caused most of the terrorism that occurred in 1986. They mounted several operations in opposition to the Tokyo Economic Summit, held last May—three in March before the summit and one during the May summit. All of the attacks were designed to obtain maximum publicity and embarrass the government. On 25 March, Senki Ara-ha (Battle Flag ARA Faction) fired homemade incendiary rockets from a parked car onto the grounds of the US Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese Imperial Palace. Three days later the Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) fired three incendiary rockets from a van at an Osaka police headquarters. On 31 March the radical Hazama-ha faction launched three rockets from a parked truck onto the grounds of the State Guest House, where summit meetings were to be held.

(b)(3)

As with most such attacks, there were no casualties and little damage in any of these incidents. The only attack that took place during the Tokyo summit occurred on 4 May when Chukaku-ha fired five homemade rockets at the State Guest House where heads of foreign governments were arriving. All of the rockets missed their target and struck the street,

sidewalks, and a building near the Canadian Embassy. Even though there were no casualties or damage, the incident was embarrassing to the Nakasone government, which had laid on unprecedented security for the conference. We believe Chukaku-ha realized that the attack would be unsuccessful but went ahead to embarrass the Nakasone government. The incident received worldwide attention.

In addition to attempts to disrupt the summit, radical leftist groups continued their campaign against Narita airport, the railway system, and Japanese Government buildings throughout the year. Attacks caused disruption, minor damage, and few injuries.

(b)(3)

#### Resurgence of the JRA?

An incident in Jakarta after the Tokyo Economic Summit led to speculation that the Japanese Red Army (JRA) might be active again. Two homemade projectiles were fired at the US and Japanese Embassies in Jakarta but both failed to explode. An hour later, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Canadian Embassy and destroyed at least six cars. The previously unknown "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade" claimed responsibility for the attacks in retaliation for the antiterrorism declaration of the Tokyo Economic Summit.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

The JRA made no claim concerning the incident, although it had previously claimed credit for the attacks it carried out in the 1970s. Japanese authorities believe that Shirotsuki may have acted independently, or that he may be part of a faction that broke away from the JRA in February. If the JRA was involved in this incident, it would be the group's first act of terrorism since September 1977, when the group hijacked a Japan Airlines jetliner in Bombay and landed in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In that incident the hijackers demanded the release of six persons

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incarcerated in Japanese prisons in exchange for the passengers. Shiroso (b)(3) one of the six released.

#### **Antigovernment Activity in the Philippines**

Insurgents in the Philippines continued to engage in terrorism to embarrass the Aquino government and win support for their causes. Communist rebels expanded their control over the countryside during the year. The New People's Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines regularly attacked government targets, conducted assassinations and kidnappings, and extorted funds during 1986. The NPA generally avoided attacks against US and other foreign facilities, but in March NPA guerrillas in Kalinga-Apayo Province held nine US servicemen for more than 24 hours. The Americans, who accidentally entered NPA territory, were interrogated and then released unharmed. In the coming year the ability to contain the threat from the left will depend on President Aquino's development of a coherent counterinsurgency program and her ability to deal with the senior military command. (b)(3)

The Muslim insurgency heated up slightly in 1986; most attacks were conducted against traditional police, army, and local political targets. In June and July the Moro National Liberation Front—the largest faction in the insurgency—kidnaped an American missionary, a Filipino-American child, 10 Filipino nuns, and a Swiss businessman and his local female companion. Ransom was paid in several cases and all were released unharmed. (b)(3)

#### **The Tamils in Sri Lanka**

Two spectacular attacks during 1986 represented a new level of violence for Sri Lanka. In early May a bomb blew the tail off an Air Lanka passenger jet preparing to take off from Colombo for the Maldives, killing 16 persons and injuring 41 others. In our judgment the bomb exploded prematurely. It probably was intended to go off shortly after takeoff, while the plane was over Sri Lankan territory, in order to cause maximum casualties. If the plane had been airborne when the bomb went off as many as 150 persons could have been killed. (b)(3)

A few days later a bomb exploded in the Central Telegraph Office in downtown Colombo, killing at least 11 persons and wounding some 100 others. Police sources believe the bomb consisted of 10 pounds of gelignite, which exploded near a crowded public area inside the building, causing parts of two floors to collapse into the employees' canteen in the basement. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—the most powerful and hardline insurgent group—most likely were responsible for both terrorist attacks. (b)(3)

These bombings occurred just after an Indian Government delegation had arrived in Colombo to explore ways of restarting stalled talks on Tamil grievances. We believe the attacks were intended to embarrass the government, provoke violence in the capital, and torpedo the Indian-brokered peace talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil insurgents. Major Tamil groups in the future probably will continue their attacks against Sinhalese civilians, economic installations, and may target foreign installations or individuals to foment instability and force government concessions on Tamil autonomy. (b)(3)

#### **India's Sikh Cauldron Still Boiling**

Sikh militants proved throughout the year that they intend to pursue terrorism to press their case for an independent state. Militants continued to target Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, other Sikh moderates, Hindus, and government security forces. When approximately 600 Sikh extremists occupied the Golden Temple in Amritsar early in the year, the Punjab state government successfully assaulted the Temple and drove them out. Extremists staged a machinegun attack in a crowded market in May as well as two vicious bus hijackings in July and November that ended with the murders of all the Hindu passengers. In October a Sikh gunman tried to assassinate Prime Minister Gandhi during his visit to the grave of Mahatma Gandhi. Six persons, including two members of the Prime Minister's party were slightly wounded, but Gandhi was unscathed.

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The extensive overseas Sikh network was responsible for several spectacular terrorist attacks or plots in 1985—the downing of an Air India airliner off the Irish coast, the bomb explosion at Narita airport, and the arrest of American Sikhs for conspiring to kill Rajiv Gandhi. During 1986 there were no significant terrorist attacks inside India by Sikh expatriates. We believe Sikh militants will continue to rely on violence, and may turn to increasingly spectacular acts such as mass killings of Hindus, assassinations of senior Indian officials, and attacks on Indian civil aviation. (b)(3)

#### **Terrorism Elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific**

Isolated acts of international terrorism worthy of mention occurred in other areas of Asia and the Pacific last year. Two terrorist attacks occurred in Thailand in April, an attack at South Korea's Kimpo Airport left five persons dead last September, and a car bomb exploded at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne, Australia, in December. (b)(3)

In Thailand, a time bomb filled with nails exploded near the entrance of the Erawan Hotel in Bangkok shortly before Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was to attend a banquet. One Thai was killed and two others wounded. There was no claim of responsibility. A few weeks later a bomb exploded inside the compound of the US Consulate in Songkhla. The bomb was thrown from a passing car and caused minor property damage and no casualties. Thai authorities believe the attack was carried out by members of the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), a group long-funded by Libya, but only sporadically (b)(3) in the last 10 years.

In Korea, on the eve of the Asian Games, a bomb exploded in a trash can near a crowded arrival terminal at Kimpo Airport, killing five persons and injuring 29. An anonymous caller told police that radical South Korean students were responsible for the incident. Seoul has claimed the explosion was a North Korean-engineered attempt to disrupt the Asian Games, but South Korean investigators have been unable to turn up evidence that North Korea was behind the bombing (b)(3)

In Australia a rare terrorist incident occurred in December. A car bomb exploded under the Turkish Consulate building in Melbourne, killing one person and injuring another. The entire floor housing the Consulate was completely destroyed. A previously unknown group, the "Greek-Bulgarian-Armenian Front," claimed responsibility for the attack. The suspects may be connected with a rightwing Armenian terrorist group. This group assassinated the Turkish Consul General in Sydney in 1980, but has been inactive since 1985. (b)(3)

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## Emerging Terrorist Threat to Scandinavia (b)(3)

The Scandinavian countries—Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark—have been relatively free of terrorist activity, compared with Central Europe, and likely will remain so for the near future. However, recent trends in terrorist operations suggest that, in the longer term, Scandinavia could well face a significantly increased threat from terrorists. We expect the threat will vary among the countries, with Sweden and Denmark the most likely to experience terrorism. Moreover, we expect that any increase in terrorism probably would be related to causes external to Scandinavia—principally the spillover of Middle Eastern issues—rather than terrorism b(3)ected against local Scandinavian targets. (b)(3)

Terrorists from outside the region have struck in Scandinavia on several occasions in recent years. For example, a US airline office and a Jewish synagogue in Copenhagen, Denmark, were bombed in July 1985. In 1986 two embassies were attacked: the Soviet Embassy was bombed in December, and radicals seized the Peruvian Embassy for several hours last April. Also last April, a small bomb exploded outside a US airline office in Stockholm, and the African National Congress office there was bombed last September. The most dramatic example of the region's vulnerability to terrorism was the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme on 28 February 1986; the perpetrator and their nationality are still unknown. (b)(3)

Terrorist-related activities have recently prompted more action from authorities. A Swedish national of Middle East origin was one of six persons arrested in October 1986 in London for plotting to kill the Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain. The Swede reportedly was a courier for the Abu Nidal organization. London deported him to Sweden without prosecuting him. Stockholm ordered the expulsion of the deputy chief of the PLO Information Office last December because Swedish security officials believed she had widespread contacts with terrorist groups, possibly including Abu Nidal. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Other groups have ties to Scandinavia as well. Norwegian radical leftist groups may have links to the Irish Republican Army. Members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) reside in Denmark, and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) is active in Sweden and Denmark. Dissension within the PKK apparently sparked three attacks on Kurds in Sweden and Denmark last year that left two persons dead and one wounded. PKK activity has been especially unsettling to Stockholm since there is some evidence the group may have been involved in Olaf Palme's assassination. The Stockholm police have pursued the possible connection aggressively but have failed to develop compelling evidence. Several Kurds were arrested in January 1987 but (b)(3) subsequently were released. (b)(3)

Since 1984 the Scandinavian countries have experienced an influx of immigrants from the Middle East who could be tapped for support of terrorist operations. (b)(1)

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In Norway the arrival of as many as 100,000 immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia has hindered the performance of background checks by authorities. Denmark has accepted approximately 6,000 Middle Eastern immigrants since 1985. Although no figures are available, Sweden, and possibly Finland, may have experienced a similar influx. (b)(3)

Improved counterterrorist efforts elsewhere in Western Europe may force terrorist groups to look for fresh ground for their activities. Terrorists may find Scandinavia an inviting option because it has less

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stringent security than in most of the rest of Europe, and it houses the same range of targets as elsewhere: synagogues, airline offices, mass transportation terminals, embassies, and tourist attractions. Other West European countries have stepped up security at government facilities and airports, and American diplomatic and military installations also (b)(3) upgraded their security. [redacted]

In the face of these efforts, some terrorist groups may have begun to seek out more hospitable loc (b)(1) for planning their terrorist operations. [redacted] Hawari terrorist organization, which is tied to Palestinian Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat, reportedly has begun to look at Asia and Africa because Europe had been too difficult for recruitment and obtaining logistic support. There are as yet no indications that such terrorists are turning to Scandinavia as fertile ground, but, in time, the region could become as attractive as other areas outside central Europe. [redacted] (b)(3)

If terrorist groups significantly expand their activities in the Nordic region, we expect they will move in several stages. Initially, Scandinavia could be used as an entry point to the rest of Western Europe. The recent arrests of several terrorists arriving in Europe from the Middle East, such as Mohammad Hammadi, one of the TWA Flight 847 hijackers, may signal Middle Eastern terrorist groups that central Europe is becoming more dangerous as a transit point and make Scandinavia more attractive. Eastern Europe has been used in this fashion by Middle Eastern terrorists, but some of the countries have taken steps to monitor more closely, and in some cases curb, the flow. [redacted]

[redacted] several Iranians allegedly traveled through Denmark and Sweden to carry out attacks against Arab airlines operating in Western Europe. Scandinavian security authorities have expressed concern that they cannot adequately monitor the movement of persons they suspect may be connected with terrorist activities [redacted] (b)(3)

Terrorist groups also could find Scandinavia convenient as a logistic base for their operations. Weapons and explosives stolen from an unguarded military ammunition storage bunker in Sweden last

November have been sold to Middle Eastern terrorists operating in France. [redacted]

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Terrorists probably would select American, Israeli, or Jewish interests in Scandinavia as primary targets. Nordic governments generally have been sympathetic to Arab concerns, and attacks on Scandinavians could jeopardize that good will. There are no US military installations in Scandinavia, although there are NATO-associated facilities in Norway and Denmark. Numerous US businesses are represented in the region, which is also popular with American tourists, providing a variety of potential targets. Police foiled an attempt last September against a passenger ferry running between Stockholm and Helsinki after a phone caller reported the ferry would be sunk to [redacted] (b)(1) the many Americans who were aboard [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] an Arab terrorist team was in Stockholm to attack the American or Israeli Embassies or other US civil [redacted] (b)(3) targets there, but no attacks occurred. [redacted]

[redacted] international [redacted] (b)(1) terrorist groups have as yet focused on Scandinavia. [redacted] (b)(3) Nevertheless, government officials throughout the region have indicated an increasing awareness of the potential threat, forcefully brought home to them by Olaf Palme's assassination. The greatest threat in Scandinavia appears to be in Sweden and Denmark where terrorists have carried out the majority of attacks. [redacted] (b)(3)

Scandinavian officials have voiced fears that lax physical security at airports, government facilities, and around their political leaders, combined with their limited ability to track individuals traveling in the region, could make Scandinavia an inviting area to terrorists. Sweden's expulsion of a PLO official reportedly signaled Stockholm's resolve not to allow terrorists to use Sweden as a staging area, and the

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government is planning additional steps to reinforce that perception. The other countries in the region have taken such steps as increasing funds earmarked for counterterrorist efforts and providing additional training for security forces, but these efforts are relatively modest and may not be adequate for even the limited threat currently facing the region.

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# **Fatah Official Implicated in TWA Flight 840 Attack** (b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) [redacted] a Palestinian group that is a part of Fatah was responsible for the TWA Flight 840 attack on 2 April 1986. The explosion occurred shortly before the aircraft was to land in Athens and killed four Americans. [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] a Lebanese Christian, May Mansour, as the perpetrator. [redacted]

that she was working on behalf of Fatah's Colonel Hawari. Hawari, a close confidant of PLO chief Yasir Arafat, heads a special Fatah security unit. May Mansour—who also had ties to a Syrian-backed group—reportedly was recruited by a Hawari operative to serve as a courier. Mansour reportedly received the explosives to place aboard the aircraft from Hawari operatives in Cairo. The explosion ripped a hole in the fuselage and killed the four—including a 9-month-old baby—when they were sucked out of the aircraft. [redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(1) Moroccan authorities arrested four Hawari  
(b)(3) operatives—two Palestinians and two Tunisians—last August who were carrying explosive devices and false passports [redacted] one of the Palestinians revealed Mansour's involvement in the attack and also identified her as one of 14 Hawari operatives responsible for bomb attacks. The technology of the bombing device used on TWA 840 resembled that used by the radical Palestinian 15 May Organization, whose former operatives have been working with the Hawari group. [redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(1) The arrest of the four Hawari operatives in Morocco  
(b)(3) fueled intense debate within Fatah over Hawari's operations and raised questions concerning Arafat's knowledge of these operations. [redacted]

[redacted] The arrests also caused friction between the PLO and Tunisia after it was discovered that Hawari maintained a covert office in Tunis. Tunisia reportedly expelled Hawari and his apparatus from Tunisia shortly after the arrests in Morocco. The PLO also apparently was forced to reduce its presence in Tunisia [redacted] (b)(3)

After Hawari's expulsion from Tunisia, he reportedly returned to Baghdad, Iraq, where he also maintains a home and an office. His activities were reportedly temporarily suspended, probably because of pressure from angered Fatah and PLO officials. In late December, however, Hawari reportedly returned to work in his Baghdad office and resumed the position as head of his organization. [redacted] (b)(3)

In early January, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat reportedly ordered Colonel Hawari to suspend foreign terrorist operations. The group's resources were to be used instead against Amal and Syrian forces in Lebanon. Arafat reportedly is willing, however, to allow Hawari's group to help the radical Shi. (b)(1) Hizballah conduct foreign terrorist operation (b)(3)

Arafat's order probably does not mean that Hawari has been taken out of the terrorism business but more likely reflects the importance the PLO places on the war of the camps in Lebanon and Arafat's strong commitment to reestablishing a PLO presence in Lebanon. Syria and Israel may become the short-term focus of Hawari's operations—probably in an effort to further the PLO's goals in Lebanon. The group's willingness to assist Hizballah in foreign terrorist operations, however, means operations could focus on Western targets [redacted] (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

**The Terrorism Diary for March** 

*Below is a compendium of March dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.*  (b)(3)

<b>1 March 1878</b>	<b>Bulgaria.</b> Independence Day.
<b>2 March 1956</b>	<b>Morocco.</b> Independence Day. Termination of Treaty of Fez.
<b>2 March 1972</b>	<b>El Salvador.</b> Founding of People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).
<b>2 March 1977</b>	<b>Libya.</b> Establishment of Jamahiriyah (masses' state).
<b>3 March 1961</b>	<b>Morocco.</b> Accession of King Hassan to throne.
<b>4 March 1982</b>	<b>Colombia and United States.</b> Effective date of extradition treaty aimed at narcotics traffickers.
<b>6 March 1957</b>	<b>Ghana.</b> Independence Day.
<b>6 March 1975</b>	<b>Kurdish regions.</b> Algerian accord between Iran and Iraq, abandoning support of the Kurds.
<b>10 March 1979</b>	<b>Kurdish regions.</b> Death of Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani.
<b>11 March 1966</b>	<b>Indonesia.</b> President Sukarno turns over power to Soeharto.
<b>12 March</b>	<b>Gabon.</b> National Day.
<b>12 March 1880</b>	<b>Turkey.</b> Birthday of Kemal Ataturk.
<b>12 March 1968</b>	<b>Mauritius.</b> Independence Day.
<b>13 March 1979</b>	<b>Grenada.</b> National Day. Commemorates coup d'etat by Maurice Bishop.
<b>14 March 1975</b>	<b>Japan.</b> Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) Secretary General Honda assassinated by rival radical group.
<b>15 March 1962</b>	<b>Angola.</b> Founding of National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).
<b>16 March 1921</b>	<b>Armenians.</b> Signing of Soviet-Turkish border treaty that ended Armenian hopes of establishing a separate, independent state.
<b>17 March</b>	<b>Ireland.</b> St. Patrick's Day. Ireland's National Day.

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**20 March 1981** *Colombia.* Death of M-19 terrorist Carmenza Londono ("La Chiqui").

**21 March** *Kurdish regions.* Kurdish New Year.

**21 March** *Palestinians.* "International Day of Solidarity With the Struggle of the Arab People of Palestine Against Israeli Aggressors."

**21 March 1960** *South Africa.* Sharpeville Massacre of black demonstrators by security forces.

**22 March 1945** *Middle East.* Founding of Arab League. Original members: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

**23 March 1956** *Pakistan.* Pakistan Day. Founding of Islamic republic.

**24 March 1972** *Northern Ireland.* Beginning of direct rule by British Government.

**24 March 1976** *Argentina.* President Isabel Peron ousted by Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla.

**24 March 1980** *El Salvador.* Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero assassinated by rightists.

**24 March 1986** *Libya and United States.* US naval forces cross "line of death" in Gulf of Sidra and engage Libyan forces. Four Libyan patrol boats sunk or damaged and an SA-5 radar site crippled.

**25 March 1821** *Greece.* Greek Revolution Memorial Day. Commemorates independence from Turkey.

**25 March 1975** *Saudi Arabia.* Assassination of King Faisal and accession of King Khalid.

**25 March 1980** *El Salvador.* US Embassy attacked by Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in response to assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero the previous day; since then, FPL attacks have been relatively more frequent between 25 March and 6 April than during rest of year.

**26 March 1971** *Bangladesh.* Independence Day.

**26 March 1978** *Egypt and Israel.* Peace agreement ratified.

**28 March** *Palestinians.* National Day.

**28 March 1970** *Libya.* UK Evacuation Day. Day British forces turned over bases and departed.

**28 March 1980** *El Salvador.* Government expropriates plantations; Salvation Movement of 28 March (MS-28) takes its name from this event.

**28 March 1980** *Italy.* Four members of Red Brigades die in shootout with Carabinieri in Genoa.

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~~Secret~~**29 March 1969****Philippines.** Founding of New People's Army, military arm of Communist Party of the Philippines.**30 March 1976****Palestinians.** Day of the Homeland.**30 March 1986****France.** Andre Olivier, cofounder of Action Directe, arrested in Lyon.**31 March****Malta.** National Day.

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## Chronology of Terrorism—1986/1987 (b)(3)

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that (b)(3) already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.*

**17 September**

**Spain: Spanish Interior and Justice Ministers testify about their defiance in 1984 of court orders in a Bilbao police brutality trial.** A criminal judge had ordered 90 civil guards to appear for possible identification by a Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization-Military Wing (ETA-M) member, who alleged he had been tortured. The Ministers argued that the appearance of (b)(3) in open court could expose them to retaliation by ETA-M. (b)(3)

**18 September**

**Spain: In Vitoria a bomb explodes at bank, causing minor damage and no injuries; another bomb is safely defused.** No group claimed responsibility, but authorities attribute the bombing to Iraultza, because of factors consistent with the group's activities. (b)(3)

**19 September**

**Spain: Police arrest two suspected Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization members in San Sebastian; seize small weapons cache.** Both men were detained under an antiterrorist law allowing suspects to be held incommunicado for up to 10 days. (b)(3)

**22 September**

**Portugal: American International School in Lisbon receives bomb threat.** A search was conducted with negative results. (b)(3)

**December**

**Iraq: Military factory blows up.** The Iraqi Mujahedin claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**7 and 15 December**

**Italy: Two Red Brigades members recaptured in Milan and Forli Province.** Calagero Diana and Giuseppe di Cecco had escaped from a Novara hospital on 22 September. Both had been transferred (b)(3) maximum security prison to the hospital during a hunger strike. (b)(3)

**12 December**

**France: Paris court sentences founder of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia-Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM) to six years imprisonment.** Monte Melkonian was convicted on 28 November 1986. In its justification the court placed particular emphasis on Melkonian's leading role in ASALA-RM. (b)(3)

**13 December**

**Netherlands: Police arrest three members of the Red Revolutionary Front (RRF).** The extreme leftist action group, believed to be composed of four to six members in The Hague area, has claimed responsibility for four bombing incidents this year. Police believe these arrests have effectively neutralized the RRF. (b)(3)

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- 17 December** *France: Hendaye border police hand over suspected Basque Fatherland and Liberty member to Spanish authorities.* Jose-Maria Olabarrieta-Olabarrieta, alias "Toxema," was the 26th Spanish Basque expelled by France since July 1986. (b)(3)
- 18 December** *Guadeloupe: French police arrest suspected terrorist member in Point-a-Pitre.* Jean-Charles Laporal is believed to be a member of Affiche Rouge, a branch of the better known Action Directe terrorist group. He is believed to have committed armed robberies at various branches of the Bank of Lyon in France in 1981 and 1982. (b)(3)
- 21 December** *Corsica: Fifteen bombs explode in Bastia, damaging houses, apartments, and automobiles but causing no injuries.* Another eight bombs were defused or failed to explode. The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica claimed responsibility for the blasts. (b)(3)
- 27 December** *Corsica: Nine bomb explosions damage various French-owned targets but cause no injuries.* No one claimed responsibility but police suspect the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica. (b)(3)
- Iran: Blast destroys weapons depot.* Over 500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reported killed. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)
- January** *Jordan: Authorities arrest 11 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).* Among them was the most senior PFLP member operating in Jordan. Some of the group were charged with "security offenses." (b)(3)
- Kuwait: Police arrest 11 suspected in oilfield fires of 19 January.* The suspects were in possession of arms and explosives. Five Kuwaiti citizens are still being sought. (b)(3)
- Guadeloupe: Radical independence group member receives five-year prison sentence for 1983 police station bombing in Basse-Terre.* Leila Cassubie turned herself in to French authorities in October. She is the first fugitive to take advantage of an amnesty program for Guadeloupean terrorists. (b)(3)
- Early January** *Turkey: Police arrest five suspected members of a separatist group in Malatya.* Officials believe the five were engaged in recruiting an illegal organization. They were writing to potential members. (b)(3)
- 1 January** *Israel: Small bomb explodes at bus stop in Kefar Sava.* There were no injuries. (b)(3)
- West Bank: Explosive charge discovered in Nablus.* Police detonated the bomb without incident. (b)(3)
- 2 January** *Spain: Two bombs explode at Navacerrada ski resort hotel, causing extensive damage but no injuries.* Shortly before the blasts, a caller warned of the bombs, claiming responsibility in the name of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization. (b)(3)

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- Spain: Suspected Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization guerrillas burn French Peugeot car showroom in Mondragon.** Police reported the blaze may have been caused by a bomb. There was no claim for the attack. (b)(3)
- 4 January** **France: Smoke grenade detonates under US Embassy vehicle near residential compound at Boulange.** (b)(3) were no injuries or damage. No group claimed responsibility. (b)(3)
- 5 January** **West Bank: Molotov cocktail smashes windshield of an Israeli bus near Ramallah.** No one was hurt. (b)(3)
- 6 January** **Israel: Katyusha rockets cause slight damage in Galilee.** The rockets were fired from Lebanon. (b)(3)
- West Bank: Molotov cocktail thrown at man guarding parking of Israeli bus company.** The firebomb ignited but caused no damage. (b)(3)
- 7 January** **Spain: Small bomb explodes at French car dealership in Bilbao, causing minor damage to cars in showroom.** There was no claim for the attack, but police believe the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization was responsible. (b)(3)
- West Bank: Molotov cocktail thrown at Israeli bus in Nablus.** No injuries or damages were reported. (b)(3)
- 8 January** **Israel: Bomb destroys car in Kiryat Malachi, south of Tel Aviv.** There were no casualties. (b)(3)
- 10 January** **Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktail thrown at Israeli car.** The car was destroyed but no one was hurt. (b)(3)
- 10 January** **West Bank: Arab mayor of Bethlehem gives threats.** He was warned against continuing ties to Jordan. (b)(3)
- 10-11 January** **Netherlands: Arson attack against Amsterdam supermarket causes extensive damage but no injuries.** The previously unknown "Revolutionary Racist Action Group" (RARA) claimed responsibility. (b)(3)
- 11 January** **Lebanon: Two Nepalese UNIFIL soldiers are shot and wounded in southern Lebanon.** The incident occurred when several Shi'ites tried to force their way through a UNIFIL position. (b)(3)
- 12 January** **Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktails thrown at Israeli cars in Gaza and Rafah.** The firebombs failed to ignite. (b)(3)
- Lebanon: Bomb explosion in West Beirut government building damages Ministry of Tourism offices and Beirut Radio.** There has been no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

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13 January

**Lebanon: Israeli aircraft attack Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon.** The proximity of the facilities to Syrian-controlled areas suggests that Israel may have been warning Damascus as well. (b)(3)

14 January

**Lebanon: Three bombs explode at gate of Ghazzah Hospital in West Beirut, killing four Amal members and injuring three others.** The "Forces of the Free Men of Beirut," a previously unknown group, has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Firebombs damage an Israeli bus near refugee camp.** There were no casualties. (b)(3)

Mid-January

**Turkey: Adana military court sentences rightist militants.** Two members of the Ulkucu Youth Association (UGD) were sentenced to death for killing 22 persons in Adana in September 1980. The court also sentenced two other members of the group to life imprisonment, while 11 others received prison terms ranging from two to 36 years. (b)(3)

**Turkey: Three Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) members sentenced to death by Adana military court.** The court upheld its earlier decision which had been reversed by the military high appeals court. (b)(3)

**Turkey: Eight persons arrested for the sabotage of an ammunition factory last summer.** The Turkish Communist Party Union (TKP-B) took credit for the incident. (b)(3)

15 January

**West Bank: Men throw stones attack Israeli vehicles and an IDF post.** There were no injuries. (b)(3)

16 January

**Turkey: Separatists attack a village in Mardin, wounding 11 persons.** The militants clashed with village guards and then fled. (b)(3)

**West Germany: Former pilot for Iranian Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani assassinated.** The victim had defected to Iraq in the summer of 1986. His assailants escaped, but they are almost certainly Iranian Government agents. (b)(3)

**Lebanon: Boobytrapped car explodes in Al-Hadath, injuring a child.** The car had been rigged with an explosive charge weighing 500 kilograms. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

17 January

**Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktail thrown at Israeli car.** The firebomb exploded on the road and caused no damage. (b)(3)

**Israel: Israeli brothers stabbed in Jerusalem.** One youth was seriously wounded. The PLO and Abu Nidal both claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Israel: Youths attack Arab boy in Jewish neighborhood of Jerusalem.** The boy required medical treatment. This attack was probably retaliation for stabbing of Jewish youths on the same day. (b)(3)

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**Lebanon: Hizballah car bomb, intended for use against Iraqi Embassy or American Ambassador, detonates prematurely while being rigged in garage.** The explosion, which occurred in the town of Brital in the Bekaa Valley, destroyed the car and the garage and injured four Hizballah members [redacted] (b)(3)

**20 January**

**Turkey: Diyarbakir martial law court sentences four Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members to life imprisonment.** Seven of the remaining defendants were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 10 to 20 years, while seven others were acquitted [redacted] (b)(3)

**Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktails thrown at Israeli car.** The [redacted] missed the target. Several suspects were detained for questioning [redacted] (b)(3)

**Chile: Authorities announce that a doctor and a nurse have been arrested in connection with an attempt on the life of President Augusto Pinochet last September.** The two are [redacted] (b)(3) ed members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front [redacted]

**21 January**

**Belgium: Suspected terrorist released after year in custody on charges of criminal conspiracy.** Luc van Acker was arrested in January 1986 during a police raid on a Communist Combatant Cells safehouse in Brussels. At the time of his arrest, he [redacted] (b)(3) was linked to another group, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action. [redacted]

**21 and 24 January**

**Kuwait: Missiles launched at Kuwaiti island.** Authorities reportedly believe they were Iranian-directed and intended to disrupt the Islamic Conference summit meetings in Kuwait. [redacted] (b)(3)

**22 January**

**Italy: Three suspected Red Brigades members captured after Rome shootout.** Two of the terrorists were injured and a fourth suspect escaped. A passerby was also wounded. Paolo Cassetta, the best known of the three, had been sought by the police for over a year. [redacted] (b)(3)

**Turkey: Eight villagers killed by guerri [redacted] (b)(3) Uludere attack.** The Kurdish Workers Party is suspected. [redacted]

**Iraq: Unconfirmed rumors report Saddam Husayn injured in assassination attempt.** Some circumstantial evidence supports the report. [redacted] (b)(3)

**Colombia: Norwegian police said that Colombia's Ambassador to Norway, Nazly Lozano Eljure, has been placed under heavy police guard at her request, after the shooting of Colombia's Ambassador in Budapest in early January.** In the past, Lozano has strongly supported a strong stance against drug traffickers and was posted at the Oslo Embassy in September 1986 to ensure her safety. [redacted] (b)(3)

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23 January

**France: In Bastia, Corsica, a bomb explodes outside the apartment of the French Interior Minister's niece, hours after he dissolved the Corsican Movement for Self-Defense (MCA) at a Cabinet meeting.** No one was injured in the blast. The French Interior Minister, also a Corsican, has renewed a crackdown on the group, which is considered a front for the outlawed Corsican National Liberation Front.

(b)(3)

**West Bank: Explosive charge discovered at Sha'arei Hatikva settlement.** The bomb was safely dismantled. (b)(3)

24 January

**Turkey: Suspected Kurdish Workers Party separatists attack two houses near Midyat with firearms and handgrenades, killing 10 villagers and injuring six others.** All were members of two families. Six of the dead were children. (b)(3)

**Kuwait: Bomb explodes near hotel in Salhia District.** The bomb, which was placed under a car, caused no casualties. The "Revolutionary (b)(3) Forces of the Prophet Mohammad" claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

25 January

**France: Three bombs found in Basque country police stations.** One device exploded in Espelette, causing no damage or injuries. The other two unexploded devices were found nearby, in Ustaritz and Bayonne. No group claimed responsibility for the bombs, although Iparretarak is suspected. (b)(3)

**Peru: Fifteen bombs explode in town of Huancayo, east of Lima, causing blackouts and serious damage.** The targets included stores, banks, and homes of local government (b)(3) officials. Sendero Luminoso terrorists probably are responsible. (b)(3)

26 January

**Lebanon: Bomb explodes at Channel 7 television station in West Beirut, causing a number of casualties and material damage.** The Lebanese Liberation (b)(3) organization has claimed responsibility for the explosion of the 6-kilogram bomb. (b)(3)

**Peru: Sendero Luminoso terrorists attack Indian Embassy in Lima, killing three police officers.** The eight-man group approached the Embassy in daylight, both by vehicle and disguised as street vendors. The attack probably was intended to protest President Garcia's recent official trip to India. (b)(3)

**Peru: Sendero Luminoso terrorists simultaneously take over the Cuban Prensa Latina and Britain's Reuter news agency offices in Lima.** The terrorists issued statements denouncing President Garcia's trip to India and his efforts to assume third world leadership. No injuries were reported. (b)(3)

27 January

**Spain: Parcel bomb explodes in Pamplona store, killing the owner and injuring seven others.** The blast destroyed the store and damaged adjacent apartments and nearby cars. No one claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

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**Colombia: Terrorists bomb offices of National Tax Administration in Bogota, causing one injury but little damage.** The terrorists probably are taking advantage of popular dissatisfaction with the country's recent tax reform law, believed by many to discriminate in favor of the upper classes. (b)(3)

**28 January**

**West Bank: Package bomb dismantled; intended for Mayor Froil of Bethlehem.** Two Sunni Muslim suspects have been arrested. (b)(3)

**30 January**

**Gaza: Israeli border police fire on young Gazan demonstrators.** Three youths were injured, one 14-year-old died from his wounds. (b)(3)

**Late January**

**Turkey: Diyarbakir court tries 28 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members for attacks in Uludere.** The military prosecutor has demanded the death penalty for one of the accused. The suspect may have been involved in the PKK attack that provoked a Turkish air raid on PKK camps in Iraq last August. The prosecutor requested four years' imprisonment for each of the remaining 27 defendants. (b)(3)

**1 February**

**Israel: Bomb explodes on Israeli bus traveling from Haifa to Jerusalem.** Nine persons were injured, one seriously (b)(3)

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## Terrorism Review

(b)(3)

26 February 1987

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DI TR 87-004  
26 February 1987

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Information****Unauthorized Disclosure  
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NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

26 February 1987

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**Terrorism Review**

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26 February 1987


**Focus****Anti-American Terrorism on the Rise  
in the Andean Region**

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The Andean region has become one of the most dangerous areas in the world for businesses and facilities associated with the United States. Although most of the violence in the region continues to be directed against domestic targets, the steady rise in anti-US attacks over the past five years refutes the traditional view of Latin American terrorism as being sporadic and cyclical. A further increase in attacks—particularly if bombings become more lethal and American citizens are victims—could hinder the transaction of US business, both diplomatic and commercial and undercut the trend toward more open government:

- In 1986, Latin America—and specifically the Andean countries—replaced Western Europe as the second-most popular location of international terrorist attacks. Only in the Middle East did more such attacks occur.

**Figure 1**  
**Anti-US Attacks in Andean Region,**  
**1980-86**

*Number of attacks*

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
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- Nearly half of all terrorist incidents worldwide that involved US citizens or property occurred in Latin America. US interests were favorite targets in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, where American banks and US-affiliated petroleum companies were the primary targets.
- In Peru and Colombia, moreover, attacks against US businesses nearly doubled.
- Anti-US violence in the Andean region has increased consistently over the past five years. In 1982, for example, there were only 12 anti-American attacks, compared with about 80 incidents in 1986. (b)(3)

We believe that Andean terrorists are increasingly selecting US targets in an effort to attract international media attention to their local causes. Some terrorist groups, however, genuinely want to compel the withdrawal of US official and commercial interests. This stems in part from anti-American sentiment that goes back at least a century in South America and perceives the United States as a heavyhanded external influence in the region. The terrorists also hope that their anti-American attacks will win them favor—and ultimately assistance—from such state sponsors of terrorism as Cuba and Libya. (b)(3)

Governments in the region find themselves confronting growing threats with ill-prepared security forces. Some of the democratic governments in the Andean

**Figure 2**  
**Anti-US Attacks, by Country,**  
**1985-86**



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countries, unlike the military dictatorships that dealt with terrorism in the southern countries in the 1960s and 1970s, are in a tenuous position. The nature of those new governments—open and pluralistic—probably makes them more susceptible to terrorist violence. Many of the security forces are poorly trained, especially in the use of terrorist penetrations and crisis management. The civilian governments, moreover, sometimes are reluctant to admit that they face a national security problem. (b)(3)

#### **Colombia**

Anti-US terrorist incidents in Colombia increased by nearly 70 percent in 1986—from 21 in 1985 to 35 last year—making it the country with the highest number of anti-US terrorist incidents in the world. Some 90 percent of all anti-US attacks were directed against US business interests, mostly harassment bombings. Terrorists concentrated on the Colombian petroleum industry—in which US companies are heavily involved—and staged numerous bombings of a major oil pipeline. The bombings have been taking place for three years, but they were so severe in 1986 that \$50 million in damages resulted. In fact, Occidental Petroleum was unable to fulfill its oil production goal for 1986 because of these attacks.

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#### **Peru**

Anti-US terrorism in Peru increased from 12 incidents in 1985 to last year's high of about 30 incidents. Many of these incidents—mostly low-level bombings that caused little damage—were directed against US financial institutions, which symbolize imperialism to the two main terrorist groups—Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). Unlike previous years, SL terrorists staged fewer attacks in the rural highlands. Government counterterrorist successes in the rural areas may have forced some of the terrorists into the cities, but we believe these urban attacks are part of a broader strategy to attract more attention to Sendero Luminoso's terrorist campaign. In late December the MRTA attacked seven US affiliated facilities over three days, and we expect such attacks to continue. (b)(3)

#### **Chile**

There was a slight decline in terrorist activity in Chile last year, yet the 1986 figure remains the second highest of the past five years. We believe the discovery of a large arms cache last August and internal disputes within the radical leftist opposition were factors. We expect terrorist attacks to pick up in 1987, especially if progress is made on a democratic transition of power from Pinochet to another president. In that event, the Communist Party probably would launch a terrorist campaign aimed at provoking the regime into more ruthless repression, in an attempt to undercut the transition process. Some attacks may be directed against US businesses to internationalize the struggle and create economic and political uncertainty, but the bulk of terrorist actions will be directed at domestic targets.

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~~Secret~~**Outlook**


We do not expect the pace of anti-US attacks in the Andean region to slacken in the next several years. Most incidents probably will continue to be harassment attacks directed against property—rather than persons—particularly American businesses. This continuous barrage may have the same overall effect as more lethal attacks—a drawdown in both the official US presence and the American business community. Businesses are likely to reduce their presence before the American embassies do, however, because they cannot afford the same degree of protection as the United States Government can. [redacted]

We have no information that such outside sponsors as Cuba or Nicaragua have backed anti-US terrorist operations in the Andean region. Many Andean groups, however, receive varying degrees of general support—from propaganda to weapons supply—from state supporters. We believe the type of attacks undertaken by these groups would change little, even if state sponsors stepped up their assistance. In many cases, the Cubans are [redacted] (b)(3) to encourage anti-US violence for fear of American retaliation. [redacted]

Andean groups are displaying more brazen and sophisticated techniques such as daylight attacks and simultaneous bombings. This adds to the frustration of the local security forces, which often are unable to protect potential targets.

**Figure 3**  
**Attacks Against US Businesses,**  
**1980-86**

Percent



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Peruvian President Alan Garcia has informed foreign embassies in Lima, including the US Embassy, that the Peruvian security forces cannot protect them. In Colombia the military would be severely strained if all four major guerrilla groups joined forces in a full-scale insurgency. Despite some successes, the counterterrorist forces in Colombia, Peru, and Chile have been unable to successfully penetrate terrorist groups and prevent them from striking will. As a result, police action is reactive, rather than preventive. (b)(3)

The threat from Andean terrorist groups, while still controllable, has grown far more rapidly than was predicted in the early 1980s, and the portents for the second half of the decade are even more troubling. Acting alone, Andean terrorist groups do not have the potential to pose a serious threat to the stability of their host governments. Both domestic security and US interests, however, would be severely challenged if a convergence of interests among the terrorists, insurgents, and drug traffickers led them to launch a unified campaign of violence. Such a union could undermine democratic institutions by provoking a return to authoritarian methods. Moreover, a series of escalating international attacks could subvert the economic base of many of these countries by prompting American disinvestment. Should US counterterrorist and counternarcotics assistance to the host governments increase, the existing tacit cooperation among traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists may evolve into a formal alliance against a perceived common enemy—the United States. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Secret~~**Highlights** (b)(3)**Alert Item****France****Abdallah Conviction May Lead to Anti-US Attacks**

Georges Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), was convicted on 28 February of complicity in the murders of an American attache and an Israeli diplomat in 1982 and an attempt on the US Consul General in 1984 in Strasbourg, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and the harsh sentence came as a surprise after the prosecutor had asked for a term of less than 10 years in order to spare France another wave of terrorism like the LARF bombing campaigns of March and September 1986. Paris is braced for new violence: more than 1,000 policemen brought into the capital for the trial have been kept on duty. LARF leaders vowed before the trial swift retaliation for any sentence and may move quickly against French interests and perhaps even US targets, since the United States was a highly visible civil party during the trial. We cannot assess the current capability of LARF or its allies—most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—Special Command and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—to stage indiscriminate bombings like those of last September, but if LARF cannot strike quickly in Europe, it may target French or US interest in Lebanon. (b)(3)

**Significant Developments****Western Europe****Belgium****Belgian Plans for Trevi Terrorism Policy**

Belgium assumed the six-month presidency of Europe's Trevi counterterrorism panel in January, and Justice Minister Jean Gol announced that his government's priorities would include: a permanent administrative structure, better information exchange among European Community countries, and closer coordination of political actions. He said that Trevi had formed an ad hoc group to work on the issues of illegal immigration, abuse of political asylum, and possibly international narcotics trafficking. Gol will be coming to the United States in early March for discussions before the next Trevi meeting on 28 April. (b)(3)

**Finland****Government Rejects More Arab Refugees**

After high-level discussions, Helsinki decided in January to resist pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees to allow more refugees from Iran and the Arab world into its country. President Koivisto and Prime Minister Sorsa agreed with a government assessment that frictions generated by the influx of additional refugees from these areas would create a threat of terrorist activity

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the government would have difficulty handling. In 1986, as a result of their perception of an increased threat from international terrorism, the Finnish Parliament increased funding for the security police for 1986 and 1988—omitting 1987. This recent assessment suggests the threat has overtaken the financial initiatives originally proposed to deal with it. Finland's Nordic neighbors also have taken steps to curtail the increasing movement of refugees into the region. Their efforts, however, have sprung principally from a desire to control the economic, social, and administrative problems created by the immigrants, rather than fear of a rising terrorist threat. (b)(3)

**France****Muslim Brotherhood Arms Cache Uncovered**

On 18 December, agents of the internal security service, DST, raided the home of a Lebanese citizen and recovered a large cache of weapons and explosives belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The owner of the house had left the country two weeks earlier, but his Syrian wife, two other Syrians, three Jordanians, a naturalized French citizen, and his Lebanese brother were taken into custody. Seized in the raid were 30 kilograms of a plastic explosive, 51 detonators, four Soviet-type handgrenades, and ammunition and small arms of various kinds. The suspects denied any knowledge of the cache, admitting only that they belonged to an Islamic student association in Toulouse. (b)(3)

**Ties Among Three European Terrorist Groups?**

On 24 December, Paris police arrested three Italian terrorists after investigating an arms cache of the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing (ETA-M). Police were following a suspected Action Directe (AD) member when he met with three Italians from the largely inactive Prima Linea group. The arrests were made as the trio prepared to leave France with materials for ETA-M's Madrid Commando. Police recovered an electronic scanner, false passports, and more than \$10,000 in six European currencies. (b)(3)

Spanish authorities believe that the Madrid Commando—hurt by Spanish police sweeps late last year—was attempting to find new sources of money and weapons. Similarly, AD is under great pressure from French police and may have hoped to trade the seized items to ETA-M in exchange for safehaven or a support base in Spain. We do not yet know how Prima Linea is involved. AD has links to West German and Belgian groups, but there is no evidence as yet to suggest that the arrests were part of a larger "Euroterrorist" framework. (b)(3)

**Italy****Early Release of Terrorist Suspects May Slow**

A new law passed late last year to combat organized crime may have beneficial effects on Italy's war on terrorism as well. The law was enacted in reaction to an earlier statute that allowed dangerous suspects to go free before their trials came up. Over 40 terrorists took advantage of the early release program and disappeared before trial. The new law would allow 18 months of pretrial confinement for certain crimes and another 18 months during a trial. Acquitted suspects could continue to be held for a year during appeals. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Sweden****Kurdish Arrests for Palme Killing Prove To Be False Alarm**

Swedish officials investigating the assassination in February 1986 of Prime Minister Olof Palme detained over 20 Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) members on 12 December 1986 and 20 January 1987. This latest in a number of PKK roundups, however, again failed to reveal evidence linking the group to the killing. Three of the Kurds arrested in December are being held for possible complicity in the murder of a PKK defector in November 1985; the rest were released. [redacted] (b)(3)

So far, only circumstantial evidence links the PKK, a violent Kurdish separatist group, to the assassination. Clashes between Stockholm Police Chief Hans Holmer and Government Prosecutor Claes Zeime over the conduct of the investigation have been detrimental to the progress of the case: Holmer has been obsessed with the PKK at the expense of other leads. As a result, he was removed from the case on 4 February when the Swedish Government announced that responsibility for the investigation would be moved to the national level. [redacted] (b)(3)

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**West Germany****Kurdish Terrorist Suspect Released**

Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) member Faruk Bozkurt's release from pretrial confinement on 27 November 1986 is an indication that charges against him probably have been dropped. German officials had information that the PKK was planning to bomb the Turkish Consulate in Hamburg last August and believed Bozkurt was linked to the plot. Freeing Bozkurt may enable West Germany to

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avoid possible retaliation from the PKK, which has a sizable presence there. The PKK staged demonstrations in Germany, the Netherlands, and France last fall protesting the Kurd's detention. [redacted] (b)(3)

## Middle East

### Kuwait

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In late January and early February, Kuwait announced the arrests of 12 suspects and the discovery of several arms caches. Kuwaiti officials claim that some of the weapons—which included Soviet, Israeli, and US weapons, and devices for time bombs—can be traced to Iran. They also say that some of those arrested had traveled frequently to Iran [redacted]

This is the first evidence that Iran was directly involved in the Kuwait bombings.

(b)(1)

The assistance also demonstrates Iran's continued willingness to use selected acts of terrorism to support its foreign policy objectives—in this case to undermine the Islamic summit held in Kuwait in January. Iran has other terrorist assets in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf that it could use to further the export of the Islamic revolution or the destabilization of the Sunni Gulf regimes. [redacted] (b)(3)

Kuwait is unlikely to break relations with Iran over the incident, but it could withdraw its representative from Tehran to protest Iran's blatant support for terrorism. The arrests are likely to heighten sectarian tensions in Kuwait, where Shias constitute one-third of the native population. [redacted] (b)(3)

### Lebanon

#### Hizballah Center Target of Car Bombing

A car bomb exploded on 9 February in the Rweis district of West Beirut, killing 15 persons and injuring 80 others. The blast was timed to coincide with students leaving school and employees leaving their offices, when the area was crowded with lunch-hour traffic. An automobile packed with 165 pounds of TNT mixed with hexogen, a highly explosive liquefied gas, detonated near Hizballah's main center in the area. Bodies were charred and mutilated by the explosion, which started fires, damaged shops and apartments in a 500-yard radius, and left a twisted wreckage of 10 cars. The Shia Amal militia has accused PLO leader Yasir Arafat of engineering the bombing. [redacted] (b)(3)

#### Aide to Gemayel Kidnaped and Released

Jean Ubayd, a prominent Lebanese Christian aide to President Gemayel, was kidnaped 12 February in West Beirut by nine armed gunmen. Ubayd's driver was

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wounded in the attack. Ubayd, who had ties to Syria at least until recently, apparently considers himself a successor to <sup>Em</sup>Amayel when the Lebanese President's term expires next year. (b)(3)

Islamic Jihad, a covername usually used by Hizballah elements in Lebanon, claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened to kill Ubayd. He was released on 16 February, after Syria reportedly intervened against the clan that kidnaped him in an interfamily Lebanese dispute. (b)(3)

## South/East Asia

### Australia

#### Melbourne Consulate Bombing: Additional Details

Australian officials reportedly doubt the existence of the so-called Greek-Bulgarian-Armenian Front that took credit for a car bomb attack on the Turkish Consulate General in Melbourne, Australia, on 23 November 1986. All the prime suspects in the case reportedly have ties to the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), a rightwing Armenian terrorist group; nevertheless, Australian officials still believe the bombing was carried out independently from JCAG's command structure. Authorities have uncovered the following details concerning the attack, which killed the bomber—later identified as an Armenian—and damaged the building housing the consulate:

- The suspect being held for the bombing, an Armenian named Levon Demirian, was interrogated in connection with the assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Sydney in 1980, for which JCAG claimed responsibility.
- Australian authorities believe that Levon's brother, Hovannes "Jano" Demirian—an explosives expert—could have built the Melbourne bomb, but so far they have not connected him to either the car bomb or to the explosives found in the Demirian family's restaurant in a police raid after the attack. (b)(3)

## Africa

### Somalia

#### Somali Dissidents To Continue Kidnaping Foreigners?

On 7 February Ethiopia handed over to French authorities 10 French aid workers who were kidnaped by Somali rebels. The doctors and nurses, who worked for the French relief organization Medecins Sans Frontieres, were kidnaped in January by members of the Somali National Movement (SNM) at an Ethiopian refugee camp in northwestern Somalia. The SNM took its French hostages across the border into Ethiopia, where it subsequently released them to authorities there. An SNM press release stated that the Somali refugee camps are used as a "recruiting ground" for the Somali military and security agencies. The press release stated further that international assistance given to the refugees in these camps is used to finance terror and oppression against the civilian population. It warned that foreigners remaining in Somalia cannot be guaranteed security. The US Embassy in Mogadishu believes it would not be difficult for the SNM to continue kidnaping foreign workers at refugee camps in Somalia because these workers are often reluctant to take security measures, probably in the belief that the humanitarian nature of their work protects them. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Technical Trends****Worldwide****Detecting Liquid Explosives**

The January arrest of a Lebanese terrorist in West Germany has highlighted the potential use of liquid explosives by terrorists. Although some liquid explosives must be rendered into a solid state for most effective use, some stable liquids can be used as the main charge of an explosive device. Like other explosives, these liquids can be set off by a detonator and any search which yields a detonator should not overlook any liquids carried by the same person or found at the same site. Some liquid explosives, however, may also detonate spontaneously at high temperatures, under severe shock, or if acid is added. (b)(3)

The following guidelines are offered for the inspection of suspicious liquids:

- Compare the color, transparency, and viscosity of the fluid to the properties of the liquid normally found in the container.
- Check for tampering with the wrapping, cap, or seal of the container.
- If possible, X-ray an opaque container.
- Chemically test the liquid if a sample can be obtained. This last step may be difficult if the container or its seal needs to remain intact for operational or evidentiary reasons. (b)(3)

**Gas Enhanced Explosives**

Recent testing has reconfirmed earlier findings that the placement of liquefied petroleum (LP) gas bottles with an explosive device does not materially increase or enhance the blast effects. Although the thermal effect of such a blast is increased, tests of explosives augmented by LP bottles and an equal amount of unaugmented material showed that a greater blast effect (and ~~greater~~ damage) results in the latter case, a device using explosives alone. (b)(3)

The addition of LP gas to an explosive device may appeal to terrorists who want to make a greater visual impression with the resulting fireball. The blast wave of such an explosion, however, lacks the brisance of high explosives. Generally, the use of LP gas instead of explosives has been an indicator that the perpetrator may not have had access to conventional high explosives. (b)(3)

If a bomb is intended solely to start a fire, however, flammable fluids make better accelerators than LP gas. The gaseous LP released in an explosion is consumed very rapidly (one to two seconds—not long enough to kindle wooden furniture, for instance). In contrast, a fire started by an explosive and a flammable liquid will burn for many minutes, which is ideal for incendiary uses. Among groups known to have used some form of bottled gas with explosive devices are the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Puerto Rican FALN, and the Iraqi Dawa, which attacked the US and French Embassies in Kuwait in December 1983. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**United Kingdom****New X-Ray Machine Procedures**

A London newspaper has reported that the United Kingdom is developing an airport security system that will give a three-dimensional view of luggage. The binocular stereoscopic system is expected to be in production by midyear. Until that time, operators of existing equipment are being retrained to spot plastic weapons and explosives and more sensitive detectors that use multiimaging against metal and plastic are being introduced. (b)(3)

In an effort to curb the abuse of diplomatic pouches by state sponsors of terrorism, Italy and Turkey separately announced plans late last year to X-ray pouches for arms, explosives, and other contraband. Both countries announced broad-based applicability that would avoid the need to single out the pouches of Libya, Syria, and Iran, but in the face of protests by allied countries, they had not implemented their plans as of early 1987. (b)(3)

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## Peru: The Terrorist Threat to Americans (b)(3)

Over the last two years Peru, and particularly Lima, has experienced some of the highest rates of terrorism in the world. Most attacks by Peru's two active insurgent groups, the fanatically ethnocentric Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the urban-based Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), have been directed at official Peruvian targets. During 1986, however, there was a fourfold increase in the number of attacks against foreign official and international business facilities. Given these trends, we believe the likelihood of American casualties—even if incurred incidentally—is rising. No Americans have been killed by terrorists in Lima but, because of the large American resident and tourist presence in the capital, we believe they could become victims when government, commercial, or tourist sites are bombed or come under strafing attack. The danger to Americans is almost as great in the countryside, where two Americans were killed last year when guerrillas bombed the popular Cusco-to-Machupicchu tourist train. (b)(3)

### Peru's Terrorist Groups

Guerrilla and terrorist violence in Peru has escalated dramatically in recent years and poses increasingly serious security problems for Americans. The largest and most dangerous insurgent group is the SL, whose 4,000 to 5,000 armed guerrillas are waging both an increasingly active urban terrorist campaign in Lima and a low intensity rural insurrection throughout the country. Since it initiated armed struggle in 1980, the SL has developed into the second-largest guerrilla movement in South America—behind the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—and is probably the most brutal movement ever to appear in the region. SL's violent tactics aim at the total elimination of the influence of Peru's whites and mestizos, and the (b)(3) reviles foreign influences of any kind in Peru. (b)(3)

Peru's other terrorist group, the MRTA, is a small, Lima-based movement of several hundred activists at most. In contrast with SL, the MRTA is a Castroite,

pro-Nicaragua Marxist group that more narrowly focuses its attacks against foreign targets, particularly US and Japanese facilities. Unlike the SL, the MRTA has generally used political violence to draw attention to its political program, so far has attacked property far more than people, and has been quick to take credit for its attacks. (b)(3)

### Rising Urban Terrorism

The main terrorist threat to US citizens is in Lima. Despite some tougher antiterrorist measures, violent attacks in Lima are increasing in both number and lethality. Our data base indicates that since the beginning of 1985 some 300 serious incidents have occurred in the Lima metropolitan area. Forty persons—all Peruvians—have been killed in Lima during that period, including nine who were innocent bystanders. Police reports indicate that the SL has been overwhelmingly responsible for the deaths. (b)(3)

Our review of SL attacks during 1986 indicates that it is still hitting hardest at Peruvian targets. Indeed, 31 of the 40 persons killed in Lima since early 1985 were engaged in counterterrorism or local police duties. The assassinations last year in Lima of two Peruvian Navy admirals, moreover, received international press coverage, heightening the perception at home and abroad of growing political instability and personal insecurity in Peru. (b)(3)

Terrorist attacks in Lima during 1986 also show, however, a dramatic four-fold increase over the 1985 levels of strikes against foreign targets. In February 1986 the SL bombed six foreign diplomatic missions, including the US Embassy. SL, being generally antforeign rather than specifically anti-American, also struck at the Soviet Embassy twice last year and wounded six Soviet sailors in a terrorist attack last August. For its part, the MRTA attacked the US

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**Major Terrorist Attacks in Peru Against Foreign Interests, 1986**

21 December	<i>The US Information Agency building in Lima was bombed, probably by the MRTA. No injuries were reported.</i>
18 December	<i>Six organizations in Lima with links to the United States were bombed, including two binational cultural centers, IBM and AID warehouses, the Summer Institute of Linguistics, and a Goodyear facility. MRTA claimed responsibility for the bombings, in which several persons were injured.</i>
10 November	<i>The US Information Agency Binational Center in Trujillo was bombed probably by the MRTA. There were no injuries.</i>
24 October	<i>The Peruvian manager of the Pepsi-Cola plant in Huanuco, was murdered. No group claimed responsibility, but the SL was the likely perpetrator.</i>
18 September	<i>The MRTA attacked the Chilean Embassy in Lima with dynamite, causing no injuries.</i>
26 August	<i>The Bolivian Embassy in Lima is bombed by a splinter group of the MRTA in protest of the US military presence in Bolivia and involvement in operations against drug traffickers. No injuries were reported.</i>
27 July	<i>Terrorists, probably SL, set off firebombs at three major business and tourist hotels in Lima. There were no injuries.</i>
22 July	<i>Unknown terrorists bombed the Eastern Airlines office in Lima and a Mercedes-Benz car dealership, causing no injuries.</i>
4 July	<i>The SL was probably responsible for bombings of the Chinese and Italian Embassies in Lima, as well as the Peruvian-Soviet Cultural Institute.</i>
25 June	<i>SL terrorists bombed a tourist train traveling from Cusco to the Machupicchu ruins, killing eight persons including two Americans. A number of other US citizens were wounded.</i>

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23 June                      *Tupac Amaru terrorists simultaneously seized the offices of four foreign news agencies, forcing station personnel to transmit antigovernment messages.*

22 June                      *MRTA terrorists bombed the Honduran Embassy, causing considerable damage but no injuries.*

27 May                       *Unknown terrorists bombed the North American-Peruvian Cultural Institute in Trujillo. Two Peruvian students were injured.*

21 April                     *MRTA members exploded a car bomb outside the residence of the US Ambassador, blowing a hole in the concrete wall surrounding the home but causing no injuries.*

11 April                     *MRTA terrorists bombed five US targets in Lima, including an AID warehouse, a branch office of Citibank, Eastman-Kodak's Peruvian headquarters, the offices of Diner's Club, and the Summer Institute of Linguistics. No injuries resulted.*

3 April                      *Synchronized attacks were carried out by MRTA terrorists against foreign facilities, including the US-Peruvian Binational Center, two Citibank offices, an IBM warehouse, Sears-Roebuck, and the Colombian Embassy.*

17 March                    *Presumed SL terrorists strafed the Argentine Embassy in Lima with machinegun fire. There were no injuries.*

21 February                *The SL carried out a series of bombings against the Embassies of the United States, Spain, China, West Germany, Argentina, and India. One guard at the Indian Embassy was killed.*

22 January                 *Unknown terrorists bombed the Sears-Roebuck store in downtown Lima, as well as several other stores and shopping centers around the city. No injuries were reported.*

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Ambassador's residence in 1986, bombed the Lima headquarters of Citibank and Texaco, and hit other targets that the group associates with "Yanqui imperialism," including several Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises in 1985 and a Sears Roebuck store. In late December 1986 the MRTA went on a bombing rampage over three days, attacking seven US-affiliated facilities, including the United States Information Agency building. The Tupac Amaru also regards Japan as a principal "imperialist" power and we believe it is responsible for a majority of the attacks on Japanese business interests in Lin(b)(3)

#### The Threat to Americans

Despite the increasing number of attacks against US facilities, to our knowledge no US citizen has been the object of a deliberate personal attack by terrorists and, aside from the US Ambassador's home, no other American residence has been targeted. To help combat the growing urban terrorism, the Peruvian Government has maintained a state of emergency and a curfew in the Lima metropolitan area since early February 1986, and police and military personnel armed with shoulder-fired weapons routinely patrol the streets. (b)(3)

Nonetheless, Peruvian authorities admit their inability to provide full protection to diplomatic missions, and we believe it is increasingly likely that American citizens in Lima will be either deliberately targeted by terrorists or injured incidentally in an attack. According to the US Embassy, some 9,000 Americans reside in Lima, including approximately 400 US Government personnel and their dependents. Moreover, an estimated 200 to 250 American tourists are likely to be visiting Lima on any day of the year. Both terrorist groups are now actively targeting sites in neighborhoods where Americans live and places where tourists congregate, such as hotels and restaurants. The popular Plaza de Armas, for example, upon which the National Palace and other important governmental and historical buildings face, has been the site of repeated car bombings. (b)(3)

In the countryside, the situation is likely to be nearly as dangerous as in Lima because of the widespread SL insurgency. Additional security has been provided(b)(3) for the tourist train to Machupicchu that was (b)(1) bombed earlier this year, but the (b)(3) continues to be concerned about safety on the line because of the extreme difficulty of protecting the track. US citizens visiting Peru also would be particularly advised to avoid travel in the areas designated by the Peruvian Government as emergency zones because of insurgent activities and narcotics related violence. SL cadres move (b)(3) and operate at will in these areas. (b)(3)

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## International Terrorism (b)(3) in Western Europe, 1986

Terrorists were active in Western Europe last year, but for the first time in the 1980s, the number of international terrorist attacks there declined.<sup>1</sup> There were changes in the venues, victims, and perpetrators of attacks: Spain became a principal location of international attacks, with France and Germany in second and third place. French interests were most often targeted, followed by US and, more distantly, Spanish interests. Western Europe remained the most dangerous place for Americans abroad, although most US casualties occurred as a result of attacks, not by European but rather by Middle Eastern groups. (b)(3)

Most West European groups continued to concentrate their attacks against domestic government facilities, the police and security forces, and businesses. Surprisingly, the group that committed the most international attacks in 1986 was the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA-M), responsible for 36 attacks, mostly harassment bombings of French businesses and privately owned automobiles. By contrast, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF)—the second most active group after ETA-M—conducted only four international attacks last year, but it was very active against West German targets.<sup>2</sup> (b)(3)

### West Germany: The RAF

Euroterrorism, the much-touted phenomenon of the mid-1980s, appears to have dwindled in 1986 to little more than rhetorical pronouncements. The RAF—the key proponent of a united terrorist front—was inactive until midyear, and none of its attacks bore

the marks of any foreign involvement. The RAF issued some documents in the name of the “anti-imperialist front”—and the French group Action Directe (AD) echoed some of this rhetoric—but there was no evidence the groups coordinated any of their operations. (b)(3)

There were innovations in RAF attacks last year, and a new element within the RAF gained prominence for its bombing activities. The innovations included the use of a remote-control ambush bomb, the selection of a target because of his connections to the nuclear issue and the US Strategic Defense Initiative, and the pointblank assassination of a Foreign Ministry official. The recently invigorated RAF “illegal militant” level bombed at least 10 targets following the general theme of assassinations conducted by the “hardcore” members. The bombings were directed against government and associated facilities, including security and police installations, and businesses associated with weapons production and nuclear power. (b)(3)

At a conference of terrorist support groups last winter, the RAF acknowledged it erred in attacking Rhein-Main Airbase in 1985 and killing an American serviceman. The RAF modified its tactics during the year to avoid unintended casualties when it attacked symbolic targets. The illegal militants, for example, carried out their bombings at night and provided warnings. The RAF also concentrated its efforts on attacking West German interests and largely ignored US and NATO targets. (b)(3)

West German police scored two noteworthy successes against the RAF last year, but the pace of attacks throughout the fall indicated these arrests had no immediate impact on the group’s effectiveness. The RAF probably will continue to be among Western Europe’s most active and lethal homegrown terrorist groups. (b)(3)

<sup>1</sup> Much of this decline (140 incidents in 1986 compared with over 200 in 1985) probably is attributable to a falloff in attacks by Middle Eastern terrorists that have spilled over into Western Europe. Attacks of this type will be treated separately in a later issue. (b)(3)

<sup>2</sup> Although events and trends in domestic terrorism (such as attacks by French groups on French targets in France) form a large part of this annual review, our statistical conclusions refer only to international incidents. Our data base on indigenous terrorism is generally less complete. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**The RZ**

West Germany's other major terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), carried out eight attacks in 1986 in its campaign against Bonn's new restrictions on applicants for political asylum. The group attacked Harald Hollenberg, chief of the West Berlin Foreigners Registry Office, in October. This marked only the second attack against a government official the group has undertaken. The RZ normally attempts to avoid personal injury in its attacks—mostly bombings—and we do not believe that the Hollenberg attack signals a change in strategy. (b)(3)

**France: Action Directe**

The French group Action Directe (AD)—the other component of the Euroterrorist front—continued to operate as two subgroups that had split earlier, in part over the issue of cooperating with the RAF. The “internationalist” wing attempted to assassinate an industrialist in April and killed the chairman of Renault in November, the latter attack reminiscent of a recent RAF murder. This wing advocates closer coordination with other European groups—sharing weapons, explosives, and possibly lodgings—but is less likely than the RAF to attack US and NATO targets. (b)(3)

The other subgroup—the “domesticist” wing—operates independently, bombs unoccupied buildings, and attacks only French targets, especially those it refers to as the “organs of repression.” The domestic wing became more lethal after its leader was arrested last March. We believe it was responsible for the bombing of a police station where a senior officer was killed, as well as for the attempted murder of the rightist mayor of Provins and another attempted murder in early 1987. The domestic wing also carried out bombings of firms doing business with South Africa, and may be linked to the “Black War” group that bombed similar targets. AD took responsibility for similar bombings of other South African businesses. (b)(3)

AD activity also took its toll on the French legal system. An AD terrorist on trial in December forced a postponement when he threatened the judge and jury. The government revised a recent counterterrorism

law, allowing such cases to be heard by a panel of judges after over half the jurors sought release from the jury. (b)(3)

**Indigenous French Groups**

Terrorism by other French groups declined from previous years. Attacks by separatists of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) were down for the fifth year in a row. French rightists attacked North African immigrant targets four times, but a leader and three members of one such group were killed in Toulon later in the year while transporting a bomb. The anti-Basque Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) was much less active last year than in 1985. This rightwing vigilante group conducted only three attacks, in February 1986, after which the French Government began to deport suspected Basque terrorists, halting the group's activities. (b)(3)

**Quiet in Spain Outside the Pyrenees**

Apart from the Basque region, there was little terrorism in Spain in 1986. The Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty—Military Wing (ETA-M) remained active. Last year, ETA-M even expanded its attacks to French targets in retaliation for closer French-Spanish police cooperation.<sup>3</sup> Iraultza, the small anti-NATO terrorist group composed of radical elements of the extremist Spanish Basque Communist movement, conducted eight bombings in 1986, up from four the year before. The group primarily targets American companies in the Basque region near Bilbao, setting off bombs late at night that cause only property damage. The Maoist urban guerrillas First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) remained virtually inactive for the second consecutive year after massive arrests in January 1985. (b)(3)

**Lull in Portugal**

Just across the border, the Portuguese terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) staged only two

<sup>3</sup> See the article “Basque Fatherland and Liberty Terrorism in 1986” on page 23.

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international attacks, compared with 10 the previous year. FP-25 detonated a car bomb at the US Embassy on 18 February—the only attack on US diplomatic facilities in Western Europe last year. On 17 May the group fired a mortar round at the Iberian Atlantic Command facility. Neither incident caused any casualties. (b)(3)

FP-25 was more active on the domestic front, attacking Portugal's tourist industry during the summer and fall by setting off bombs in the Algarve resort area. The trials of FP-25's leader, who has become a national folk hero, and 56 of its members continued throughout 1986. Late in the year, the group reportedly spawned an offshoot called the Armed Revolutionary Organization (ORA) that has yet to carry out any attacks because it is less well organized and less capable than FP-25. (b)(3)

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#### Greece

Radical leftist terrorists expressed their growing disapproval of the Papandreou government's domestic and foreign policies with more attacks on government targets in 1986. A bombing campaign against government buildings in October was claimed by both the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. The 17 November group typically commits assassinations—including that of a Greek businessman last April—making these bombings a new tactic for the group. Greek terrorists attacked US citizens less often in 1986, perhaps in part because the Greek Government

made US military personnel less visible by issuing them ordinary license plates. The only two arson attacks against US-owned vehicles last year occurred when the distinctive official license plates were still in use. (b)(3)

#### Turkey

The most serious new development in anti-Turkish terrorism last year was the escalating violence of the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) after Ankara launched an airstrike against the group's camps in Iraq in August. By October the PKK had expanded its list of targets to include NATO when it attacked a radar site in the southeast with rockets and automatic weapons. The group also carried its campaign to other West European countries, where it targeted Turkish officials:

- A young PKK member was arrested in West Germany in August as he opened a train station locker containing explosives, weapons, and ammunition. He apparently planned to attack the Turkish Consulate General in Hamburg.
- Dutch officials apprehended in late August a PKK activist who planned to attack a Turkish consulate in the Netherlands. He was carrying weapons and explosives at the time of his arrest.

We believe PKK violence will continue this year in Turkey and abroad as the group continues its struggle for an independent Kurdish state. Turkish authorities also continued to arrest members of other indigenous groups, which probably accounted for their low level of activity. (b)(3)

#### Italy

By all accounts, 1986 was the quietest year for terrorism in Italy since 1969. The best-known group, the Red Brigades (BR), in decline since 1982, conducted only two attacks last year. The BR murdered a former mayor of Florence but bungled an attempt on the life of a government adviser. Last year, courts convicted hundreds of old-line BR members—including leaders like Barbara Balzarani and

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**Armenian Terrorism in 1986**

*There were few Armenian terrorist attacks last year. Most Armenian violence during 1986, moreover, was internecine and probably stemmed from the longstanding rivalry between the conservative Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnag Party) and the leftwing terrorist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Several Dashnag members were killed or kidnaped in Beirut in 1986 by a group calling itself the "Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Revolutionary Movement," probably a covername for ASALA.*

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*Armenians were active elsewhere. ASALA may have cooperated with the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction in two major bombing campaigns in Paris. Farther afield, a car bomb that exploded at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne, Australia, in December seriously damaged the building. The suicide bomber and an accomplice arrested later had ties to the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), a rightwing terrorist group linked to the Dashnag Party. The Melbourne car bombing may indicate that Armenian terrorists will renew their terrorist campaign to gain an Armenian homeland.*

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*Several trials of Armenian terrorists for attacks earlier in the decade concluded in 1986. US courts in Philadelphia and Los Angeles sentenced six JCAG members for anti-Turkish bombings and one murder. In November, Monte Melkonian, the leader of the ASALA-Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM), received a six-year sentence in Paris after being convicted of forgery and possession of weapons and explosives.*

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Giovanni Senzani—for crimes committed earlier in the decade. There are now fewer professional terrorists on the outside, and jailed leaders are no longer able to order attacks from prison, leaving the Red Brigades in a weakened position but still capable of launching sporadic attacks. (b)(3)

**The Benelux Nations**

Terrorist activity in Belgium dropped off in 1986. Arrests of virtually the entire infrastructure of the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) in December 1985, followed by raids on safehouses the next month, set the tone for 1986 and halted the CCC's 15-month reign of terror. There have been no further attacks by the group, and the upcoming trials of the CCC members probably will serve to keep a lid on terrorism in Belgium for the rest of this year. (b)(3)

There is no cohesive leftwing terrorist movement in the Netherlands, but there were seven international terrorist attacks there last year. Most of these were committed by Middle Eastern groups or new groups opposed to business ties to South Africa. (b)(3)

**Scandinavia**

There has been no indigenous terrorism in Scandinavia, but Olaf Palme's murder heightened the sense of vulnerability in the region to such attacks. The assassination in February 1986 of the Swedish Prime Minister has not been linked firmly to a terrorist group, but Stockholm police have aggressively pursued the possible involvement of the Kurdish Workers' Party. Otherwise, the region experienced only a few instances of Middle Eastern-sponsored terrorism. (b)(3)

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## Basque Fatherland and Liberty Terrorism in 1986 (b)(3)

The Military Wing of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty separatist group (ETA-M) remains adaptable, dedicated, and resourceful in waging its 18-year campaign to establish an independent Basque state. The capture of a major ETA arsenal and hideout in southern France, coupled with the arrests of several "Madrid Commando" terrorists, however, was an unexpected blow to the group's morale and operational capabilities. Nevertheless, we think these setbacks are temporary, and fully expect the group to resume its campaign of terrorist violence against Madrid and Paris, Spain's new ally in the struggle against Basque terrorism. (b)(3)

### Overview

In 1986, ETA-M was the most active terrorist group in Western Europe, with 36 international attacks. Adding attacks against Spanish domestic targets brings the group's total to 56 incidents last year. ETA-M has always targeted the Spanish Government, especially the military and police forces, but in 1986 it also began to attack French interests in Spain. This accounted for the unusually high number of international incidents attributed to the group and gave ETA the lion's share of all international terrorist acts committed in Spain last year. ETA-M's tactics changed little in 1986: bombings comprised over two-thirds of its attacks, and the group also conducted armed attacks and committed arson. ETA continued to use kidnaping, theft, and extortion to fill its coffers and intimidate the local populace. (b)(3)

ETA-M extended its operational reach beyond the Basque provinces, Madrid, and Mediterranean resort areas to include other cities:

- On 13 September 1986, ETA-M detonated a car bomb near a civil guard patrol in Barcelona, injuring three guards and a passerby. The attack occurred shortly before Barcelona was selected as host city for the 1992 Olympics.

- On 2 February 1987, ETA-M staged a successful car-bomb attack against a military bus in Zaragoza, killing two persons and wounding 40 others in its first attack in that city.

The broadening of operations, however, does not appear to have diluted its efforts elsewhere. ETA-M's activity was especially deadly in Madrid, where 22 persons died. The majority of ETA-M's international attacks, however, still occurred on the group's home turf in the Basque region. (b)(3)

### Setbacks for ETA-M

ETA-M was hurt by the active and successful campaign waged by Spanish and French police, who cooperated more closely last year than ever before. Moreover, the group's more violent tactics may be tarnishing its image among the Basque people. A Spanish amnesty program has been highly successful: nearly 200 ETA members have taken advantage of the program, which pardons terrorists who have not been involved in blood crimes and who renounce violence. ETA-M's leaders attempted to forestall further defections by assassinating a former leader, a young mother of two, who joined the amnesty program. The brutal murder—gunmen shot her in front of her children at a festival—may have lost ETA-M popular support and, at least temporarily, affected its ability to recruit new members. (b)(3)

Better Spanish-French counterterrorist cooperation dealt the group major blows last year. ETA-M previously used France as a sanctuary from which the group conducted operations across the border into Spain. French security services last year cracked down on the group's activities in southern France, turning over 30 terrorists to Spain for prosecution and expelling others of the 200 members who had been active there. (b)(3)


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# International Terrorist Incidents by ETA-M in 1986



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ETA-M bombing of Civil Guard bus in Madrid,  
14 July 1986 (u)

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Joint cooperation, moreover, led to the discovery of a major ETA-M arms cache in southern France, last November, and the arrests of several ETA-M leaders. Police confiscated large amounts of cash, weapons, explosives, and documents detailing the group's finances, structure, and operational plans. Spanish officials hailed the raid as the single most important (b)(3) against ETA in the group's 18-year history.

#### The Madrid Commando

The Spanish national police scored an important victory when they arrested nine of the estimated 12 members of the violent Madrid Commando unit on 16 January 1987. The Commando, active since the early 1980s, was responsible for some of the most spectacular terrorist operations of ETA-M last year. The police acted on information gained from the November raid and on careful Spanish and French intelligence work during the past months:

- Spanish officials believe the Commando carried out a rocket attack on the Spanish Defense Ministry building last summer.
- Police believe the unit was also responsible for two attacks on Civil Guard vehicles that killed 18 guards and for murdering three military officers in 1986.
- The Madrid Commando staged an abortive attempt on the life of the Spanish Judiciary Council President Hernandez-Gil (b)(3)

The police raid apparently foiled ETA plans to attack a French-built shopping center in Spain. The police reportedly uncovered information on ETA-M's operational plans, targets, safehouses, weapons, and explosives. It is too early to tell if the Madrid Commando is in total disarray. We believe rank-and-file members—rather than key leaders—were arrested in the roundup, leaving the possibility that the Madrid group may still be able to stage attacks.

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#### ETA Strikes Back

In retaliation for the French crackdown last year, ETA began a wave of terrorist attacks against French property in Spain. French trucks were machine-gunned during the winter and spring, and French-registered vehicles were burned almost daily during the summer and early fall. French car showrooms were also hit. After the November raid, ETA-M began to attack larger businesses, causing numerous injuries and one death. ETA-M also focused the attacks on French beach resorts, and late last year planted bombs at ski resorts hotels that are partially French owned. (b)(3)

#### Prospects

ETA-M must struggle if it is to regain the momentum it had in 1983. That year ETA-M was responsible for 165 attacks—international and domestic—almost triple the 1986 level. The group has demonstrated enormous staying power over the years, however, and almost certainly will remain a challenge to Spanish and French police. French-Spanish cooperation against ETA-M is likely to continue, moreover, and could spur more indiscriminate and lethal attacks against both French and Spanish interests. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Selected Chronology of ETA-M  
International Terrorist Incidents in 1986** (b)(3)

<b>20 April</b>	Police defuse a bomb at US-owned building in Bilbao. Building housed Spanish-American Cultural Association.
<b>15 May</b>	Bomb explodes at Renault car dealership in Eibar, near Bilbao, destroying two cars.
<b>17 May</b>	Basque separatists machine-gun French truck near San Sebastian.
<b>19 June</b>	Bomb explodes in Sevilla hotel, injuring one person. Two other hotels were evacuated after receiving bomb threats. This was the ninth bomb in ETA-M's campaign to disrupt the tourist season.
<b>20 July</b>	Three cars with French license plates and an Army jeep burned in San Sebastian. No injuries reported.
<b>22 July</b>	French-registered vehicle burned in San Sebastian.
<b>16 August</b>	French car burned in San Sebastian.
<b>18 August</b>	Showroom of French firm Peugeot-Talbot firebombed in Navarre area.
<b>30 August</b>	ETA-M firebombs French-registered vehicle in Bilbao.
<b>31 August</b>	ETA-M burns three French-registered vehicles in San Sebastian. The attack followed the burning of two vehicles belonging to ETA-M sympathizers in nearby Renteria the previous night.
<b>3 October</b>	Bomb attack outside French car showroom in San Sebastian causes some property damage but no injuries. ETA suspected.
<b>9 October</b>	French car showroom bombed in San Sebastian, shattering windows but causing no injuries.
<b>18 October</b>	Bombs explode in five French-owned car showrooms in Bilbao, slightly injuring four persons including a policeman. Explosions caused extensive property damage.
<b>19 October</b>	Bomb explodes at French-owned sporting goods firm in Manresa, near Barcelona, causing slight damage but no injuries.
<b>20 October</b>	Two bombs explode simultaneously at French-owned electronics firm in Barcelona, causing some damage but no injuries. ETA-M is suspected.

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**23 October** Two bombs explode at French-owned brewery warehouse in San Sebastian, causing extensive damage but no injuries. ETA-M is suspected.

**5 November** French police raid ETA-M hideout in southern France, arresting two key members, and seizing extensive records of group's activities, membership, and extortionist fundraising.

**10 November** French car showroom bombed in Zarauz, causing damage but no injuries.

**25 November** Bomb explodes at Peugeot-Talbot car showroom in Bilbao, causing widespread damage but no injuries.

**29 November** French car showroom in San Sebastian bombed on eve of Basque elections. The explosion damaged the Peugeot showroom but no one was injured.

**11 December** Explosive device damages Citroen car showroom in Barcelona, injuring four people.

**12 December** Bomb explodes at Renault car showroom in Zarauz, seriously injuring one woman.

**16 December** Two bombs explode outside French businesses in Barcelona, injuring 28 people and causing considerable damage.

**19 December** Incendiary bomb explodes at French factory in Bilbao, completely destroying the facility.

**24 December** Spanish civil guard killed while disarming an explosive planted in a French-owned supermarket near San Sebastian.

**25 December** ETA-M plants GOMA-2 bomb that explodes at French-owned hotel in Madrid. The explosion caused substantial property damage but no injuries.

**28 December** ETA-M claims responsibility for bomb explosion at French car dealership in Basque region that seriously injures one woman and causes property damage. This was the only holiday attack not preceded by a warning phone call.

**29 December** ETA-M bomb explodes at ski resort in the Pyrenees while King Juan Carlos and his family are vacationing at nearby private lodge. French skiers frequent the resort.

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~~Secret~~**Chronology of Terrorism—1986/1987** (b)(3)

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.* (b)(3)

**December**

**Portugal: Prime Minister signs decree streamlining counterterrorism effort.** Greater cooperation among the various agencies in the fight against terrorism is anticipated. The armed forces were not given a direct role although they will share intelligence. (b)(3)

**4 and 5 December**

**Italy: Disgruntled Communist Revolutionary Committee (CCR) member arrested in Ventimiglia.** Emanuele Greco was arrested as he attempted to enter the country with false identification. He then led police to a weapons cache. The CCR is one of several Red Brigades splinter groups. (b)(3)

**31 December**

**West Germany: Arson attack on police vehicle and police station in Bielefeld causes about \$250,000 in damages.** There were no injuries. A previously unknown group called "Wooli" claimed responsibility for the incident. (b)(3)

**Early January**

**Denmark: Police arrest two Danish nationals for the bombing of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen last December.** The youths, aged 16 and 18, confessed to the bombing and are implicated in other incidents in which explosive devices were left in playgrounds. The 18-year-old male, an activist in the conservative party youth wing, wanted to call attention to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. (b)(3)

**2 January**

**West Germany: Bomb detonates outside British military airport in West Berlin, causing some damage but no injuries.** Environmentalists have focused on the airport since tree cutting to clear the runway approaches began last summer. No one, however, claimed responsibility for the bombing. (b)(3)

**3 January**

**West Germany: Arsonists attack Free Democratic Party (FDB) offices in Wiesbaden.** The fire caused about \$100,000 in damages but no injuries. Two unidentified youths were seen running from the scene. There has been no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

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**Iraq: Islamic Action Organization claims it destroyed munitions convoy in Baghdad.** A large number of Iraqi military were reportedly killed in the explosion.

**South Africa: Two limpet mines explode almost simultaneously at a central Johannesburg department store.** The explosion caused extensive damage but no casualties. Management at the store had been involved in a bitter wage dispute with black workers. The African National Congress claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

13 January

**Portugal: Nine grenades found at University of Lisbon.** The university is located approximately 1 kilometer from the US Embassy. No one took credit for the devices. (b)(3)

16 January

**West Germany: Suspected rightwing militant killed while testing bomb in Göttingen apartment.** Police found large quantities of weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and rightwing and Nazi literature in the apartment. (b)(3)

17 January

**Philippines: Suspected New Peoples Army (NPA) guerrillas attack radio station.** NPA guerrillas detonated a grenade and opened fire inside a popular radio station in the southern Philippines, injuring three persons. (b)(3)

18 January

**Pakistan: A bomb explodes in a bus carrying Afghan refugees to the University of Peshawar, wounding 11 persons.** Police said a 2-kilogram bomb had been placed in a lunchbox among the passengers' luggage and exploded just after the vehicle left the city's bus station. Authorities suspect that the Afghan secret police was responsible. (b)(3)

**Sri Lanka: A parcel bomb explodes on a crowded public bus near the town of Badulla, killing seven persons and wounding at least 50 others.** Although no group has claimed responsibility, this attack is similar to a number of incidents perpetrated by the Tamil separatist group called the "Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students." (b)(3)

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**Italy: Twenty persons go on trial for 1980 Bologna railway station bombing.** The defendants, members of rightwing terrorist groups, are charged with subversive activity, conspiracy to commit mass murder, and membership of an armed gang. The bombing killed more than 80 persons in Italy's most lethal terrorist incident. (b)(3)

**Japan: Three projectiles are fired from a parked car at a Tokyo police station.** The building sustained minor damage, and there were no injuries. Based on the construction of the projectiles, police strongly suspect the leftist radical Chukakuha. (b)(3)

**21 January**

**Argentina: Bomb damages Intransigent Party Headquarters in the Flores District in Buenos Aires, causing extensive damage.** There were no reported injuries and no group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**24 January**

**Italy: Small bombs explode outside two politicians' homes in Bolzano, causing slight damage but no injuries.** Two suspected members of the South Tyrol separatist movement "Heimatbund" were arrested. (b)(3)

**Spain: Several thousand people rally in Bilbao, demanding amnesty for suspected terrorists living in France.** The marchers also were protesting recent French expulsions of Spanish Basque refugees. The National Committee of the radical nationalist party, Herri Batasuna, was one of the organizers of the peaceful march. (b)(3)

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**27 January**

**France: Bomb explodes in offices of magazine L'Asie Afrique in Paris.** There were no injuries and no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

**Italy: Supreme Appellate Court issues final ruling on the 1969 Milan bank bombing known as the Piazza Fontana massacre.** The court upheld the acquittals of three neofascists and an anarchist accused of planting a bomb, which killed 16 persons and injured 88 others. (b)(3)

**27 January**

**French Guiana: Bomb explodes in Cayenne at the French Government's Forestry Administration building, causing structural damage but no injuries.** No group has claimed responsibility, although radical separatists may be behind the bombing. (b)(3)

**29 January**

**West Bank: Jewish extremists vandalize Arab cars in East Jerusalem.** The tires of 25 cars were slashed. (b)(3)

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30 January

**Italy: Leaders of Sardinian Armed Movement (MAS) arrested after shootout in Mamoiada.** Annino Mele was carrying a gun and five handgrenades at the time of his arrest. MAS has been linked to the Red Brigades. (b)(3)

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**Spain: Car bomb attack on military bus in Zaragoza kills two persons, injures 41 others.** The Basque group Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing claimed responsibility for the incident as part of its operation to harass the Spanish Army. (b)(3)

**France: Car explodes in front of school in Marseille, killing its two occupants.** The cause of the explosion is unknown. A similar explosion last summer in Nice killed four members of a rightwing ~~group~~ on their way to bomb a target connected to North African immigrants. (b)(3)

**France: Another suspected Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization member is expelled.** French police handed Ignacio Irastra <sup>Martin</sup> over to Spanish authorities at the border in Hendaye, France. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

1 February

**Italy: Two Jordanians arrested in June 1986 released from Genoa prison because of lack of evidence.** Awni Hindawi was accused of belonging to an armed band after his cousin, Nezar Hindawi, was arrested for trying to blow up an El Al airliner in London last year. Also released was arms dealer Adnan Rousan, who probably fled the country shortly thereafter. He failed to keep a probationary appointment on 13 February. (b)(3)

**Afghanistan: A car bomb explodes near an office of the Ministry of State Security in Kabul, killing at least four persons and injuring some 20 others.** Windows within 500 meters of the explosion were blown out. Included in the area affected by the blast were the Consular Office of the Indian Embassy, a major Soviet military hospital, the Ministry of Interior, the Indonesian Charge's residence and the residence of the US Charge. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**3 February**

**Spain: Bomb explodes at Swiss pharmaceutical corporation in Bilbao.** The blast caused material damage but no injuries. The same day, police defuse a bomb at a Renault office in Baracaldo. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty Military wing probably was responsible. (b)(3)

**Four Basque Fatherland and Liberty suspects moved from Pau prison to jails in the Paris region.** The four are awaiting extradition to Spain. (b)(3)

**4 February**

**Belgium: Authorities in Mons arrest two women who are suspected members of an Italian leftist terrorist group.** They are believed to be members of the Combatant Communist Unit that committed terrorist acts in the early 1980s. (b)(3)

**5 February**

**Spain: Galician separatists detonate bombs in seven northwestern towns, causing little damage to regional banks and no injuries.** The Galician Free People's Army claimed responsibility protesting the detention of three members of the group. (b)(3)

**South Africa: A bomb explodes in a bus shelter near an estate frequented by South African President P. W. Botha and senior members of his Cabinet.** Police suspect that a limpet mine planted by the African National Congress was responsible. One woman was slightly injured. (b)(3)

**6 February**

**Austria: Arab and Palestinian students occupy Arab League Mission in Vienna to protest attacks on refugee camps in Lebanon.** The takeover was accomplished peacefully. (b)(3)

**West Germany: Bomb explodes at Asylum Seekers' registration office in West Berlin.** There were no injuries and only slight damage. The Revolutionary Cells (RZ) claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**El Salvador: Armed terrorists hijack San Salvador bus.** The hijackers left subversive literature and fled following a brief firefight. No injuries were reported. (b)(3)

**7 February**

**Belgium: Molotov cocktails thrown at Syrian Embassy.** An anonymous caller claimed the firebombs were thrown in revenge for besieged Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and to protest the Assad regime. (b)(3)

**Italy: Two Italians, kidnaped by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army in December, returned home.** The Italians said they were treated well by their captors. Several Ethiopians captured with them were also freed. (b)(3)

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**9 February**

**West Bank: Riots at Balatah Refugee Camp result in injuries to seven Arab** (b)(3)  
**two Israelis.** Nine youths were ordered detained for three to six months.

**Colombia: Leftist guerrillas bomb three pipelines in Colombia.** The bombings interrupted the flow of oil from the country's largest oil field. The attacks, largely directed against foreign firms, have caused \$50 million in damage since 1984. (b)(3)

**10 February**

**Italy: Parliament approves bill for reducing jail sentences for reformed terrorists.** The new law, aimed at guerrillas who have renounced violence and severed ties with terrorist groups, cuts life sentences to 30 years and other sentences by 25 percent. The law (b)(3) not apply to those convicted for attacks that have killed several persons.

**11 February**

**West Bank: Five Molotov cocktails damage Israeli bus in Galandiyah.** There were no injuries. (b)(3)

**13 February**

**West Bank: Israeli authorities charge Arab truck drivers with smuggling weapons** (b)(3)  
**and explosives from Jordan.** Bridges were closed for two days to tighten security.

**15 February**

**Israel: Car bomb explodes pre** (b)(3) **ly in Kfar Sava injuring two Arabs.** The PLO claimed responsibility.

**16 February**

**Colombia: Police kill a commander of the leftist Popular Liberation Army (EPL),** **Jairo de Jesus Calvo, during a gunbattle.** The EPL has bombed Colombian Government and military facilities, including several in Bogota during January 1984. (b)(3)

**17 February**

**Iran: Mujahedin-e Khalq assassinates Education Ministry official.** The victim (b)(3)  
was the personal representative of Ayatollah Khomeini in the city of Kerman.

**Iran: Bombing in Mashhad wounds President Khamenei's brother.** The Mujahedin-e Khalq claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

**26 March 1987.**

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**Terrorism Review** [redacted]

26 March 1987

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*This review is published biweekly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor* [redacted]

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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

26 March 1987

Focus

**France—What Will LARF Do Now?** (b)(3)

A panel of judges found France's most wanted terrorist, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), guilty of complicity in two murders and one attempted murder of US and Israeli diplomats. In a surprise move, he was sentenced to life in prison, even after government prosecutors asked for a 10-year sentence. French public opinion greeted the tough sentence and guilty verdict on all three counts with approval. Both President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac have publicly stated (b)(3) Abdallah will not be pardoned, an act that is now his last legal recourse. (b)(3)

The citizens of Paris braced for retaliatory bombings like those of February, March, and September of 1986, conducted by followers of Abdallah seeking his release. Over 1,000 policemen were brought into Paris during the trial. So far the group's threats have not materialized, and observers are wondering (b)(3) how much longer LARF will refrain from terrorist attacks in France. (b)(3)

French security officials see a combination of three reasons for the calm during March: LARF also was surprised by the trial's outcome and is building a network for future attacks; the group has been deterred somewhat by the additional security in Paris; and Syria has been pressuring LARF not to attack French targets. Each of these factors probably has some validity:

- LARF's current capability to act in Western Europe is uncertain, but the group probably was just as surprised by the verdict as more seasoned observers and may, in fact, be weighing its options while at the same time rebuilding its infrastructure in France.
- Paris is, indeed, better prepared to handle another bombing campaign like those of last year, but it is by no means certain that the group will conduct another such campaign—and the current high level of security cannot be sustained indefinitely.
- Syrian pressure on the group may have figured in the March calm and will become even more important in the coming months. (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)**Syria—The Key Player**

(b)(3) France explored many avenues to halt the bombings in September 1986, and Syria probably played a key role in restraining LARF. Damascus controls the area of northern Lebanon where the Abdallah family and other clans with LARF members are located, and Syrian officials have told LARF leaders that they would not tolerate further attacks on French soil. There were none in the six months preceding the trial. Syrian President Assad may

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have been motivated initially by international condemnation of the Syrian role in well-publicized terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and West Germany in 1986. Since the fall of 1986, other factors probably have bolstered Syria's stake in better relations with Paris. Several months of negotiations for badly needed French wheat apparently resulted in a sizable grain deal in mid-March, and Damascus may hope that old French-Lebanese ties can be invoked to keep Maronite Christians from opposing Syrian efforts in Beirut. It is by no means certain that Syria can restrain LARF indefinitely. (b)(3)

LARF's family-based structure was a major asset during its operations in Europe in the early 1980s—most members were from a handful of families in two villages in northern Lebanon. The resulting security kept the group safe from penetrations. That strength has become a disadvantage, however, because to augment its ranks LARF would have to turn to nonfamily members for recruits. The group's reliance on a network of extended families, and the concentration of their financial and property holdings in a small area of Lebanon, make LARF a virtual hostage to Syrian pressure. Abdallah family leaders reportedly are chafing under Syrian restrictions. (b)(3)

Yet some of the most dangerous members of LARF are not family members and may be able to operate more freely. Jacqueline Esbir—Georges Abdallah's girlfriend and the suspected assassin of Israeli diplomat Barsimantov in Paris in 1982—and Salim al-Khuri, Abdallah's key aide in earlier years, are at large and may be planning some action. They reportedly are currently in Western Europe and probably were the driving force behind the massive bombing campaigns in 1986 that killed and wounded scores of French citizens. (b)(3)

#### **LARF's Next Moves**

LARF may believe a presidential amnesty following the May 1988 French election to be the earliest practical opportunity for Abdallah's release. Because of the publicity the trial received, it is highly unlikely that he would be pardoned before then. If the group has been told an eventual pardon may be forthcoming, it may refrain from attacks against French interests for the next 14 months. (b)(3)

LARF not want to wait for an uncertain future pardon, the group could turn to other venues, such as Lebanon, in which to stage attacks. An operation in France—or elsewhere—could be launched more quickly if the LARF's longtime Palestinian ally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—Special Command (PFLP-SC), were to provide logistic and weapons support, as it probably did during the bombings of 1986. In fact, the PFLP-SC may have been responsible for the 18 March bombing of a restaurant in Djibouti that left 11 persons (four of them French military personnel) dead. The choice of venue, target, and victims suggests the group, based in nearby Aden, may have acted on LARF's behalf. We do not know the extent of Syrian control over the PFLP-SC or whether Damascus has attempted to restrain the group as it has LARF. (b)(3)

We believe that LARF probably will seek to exact revenge on French interests, but cannot rule out a return to anti-US operations. Attacks on US targets are possible, since the United States played a major role in pressing for Abdallah's trial. Any

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such attacks probably would be similar to the assassination of Lt. Col. Charles Ray in 1982 and the attempt on the life of the US Consul General in Strasbourg in 1984. Before the bombings in 1986, LARF was best known for selective, violent assassinations, as when it killed the Israeli diplomat.

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If LARF is still determined to carry out more terrorism on Abdallah's behalf, one course of action offers a greater chance for success with fewer drawbacks. The group could try to seize, or buy, French hostages in Lebanon or elsewhere and try to negotiate a trade or a pardon for Abdallah. Given Paris's publicly acknowledged policy of hostage negotiations—French hostages have been freed in Lebanon—LARF may calculate it could force Paris to cut a deal.

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This tactic of putting pressure on the government without alienating the public worked once before: in March 1985, LARF members Esbir and Al-Khuri kidnaped French diplomat Gilles Peyrolles in Beirut and successfully negotiated a swap for Abdallah. The deal fell through, however, after Peyrolles was released, perhaps giving LARF an incentive to seize more than one hostage the next time around. The French Government may already be preparing for such

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Highlights (b)(3)


Significant Developments (b)(3)

## Western Europe

### France

#### Arms Cache Discovered in Paris

French police have linked an arms cache discovered on 4 March in Paris to the terrorist apparatus led by senior Fatah security official Colonel Hawari. According to Ziyad Hashash, one of those arrested in connection with the cache, Hawari introduced him in 1984 in Tunis to his principal operative in Western Europe, Muhi-al-Din al Jabir aka Mutran. Mutran arranged for Hashash to receive and store weapons and explosives that were to be used in attacks outside France. Hashash reportedly received two arms deliveries—in December 1984 and in June 1985. A third delivery was planned but never received, probably because Mutran was arrested in July 1985 in Rome for possession of forged documents. (b)(3)



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### Italy

#### Summit Seven Experts Agree on Bonn Declaration Update

The Summit Seven Experts' Group on Terrorism approved a modest expansion of the 1978 Bonn Declaration on hijacking at a meeting in Rome on 13 March. The declaration, which already commits the seven countries to suspend air traffic with any country that fails to extradite or prosecute suspected hijackers, now will cover anyone involved in any form of terrorist act against civil aviation. The experts also accepted a Canadian proposal to extend the declaration to future aviation conventions. The Italians expressed their desire for a broader declaration on terrorism at the Venice economic summit in June. (b)(3)

Stiffening the Bonn Declaration will fulfill a commitment made by the heads of state at last year's Tokyo economic summit and is a small—but positive—step in counterterrorist cooperation. Concern for the safety of European hostages, the revelation of US arms sales to Iran, and the current Italian Government crisis limit the prospects for a strong new counterterrorist statement at the summit. In general, the summit countries are likely to resist any additional proposals for specific measures that would limit their political flexibility. (b)(3)

### Portugal

#### FP-25 Members on Trial

The outcome of the current trials in Lisbon of members of the leftist terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) will affect the group's ability to conduct future operations. On trial at present are 73 members of FP-25 who were arrested

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in a police roundup in June 1984. Currently about 20 members are at large and using the name Armed Revolutionary Faction, but they have not carried out any attacks since the fall of 1986. (b)(3)

FP-25 leaders and key members are being tried by a panel of three judges. The trial must be concluded by 19 June, because Portuguese law forbids holding a prisoner longer than three years without sentencing. The prosecution has asked for the maximum 20-year sentence for popular folk hero Otelio Sarvaiva de Carvalho and 10 other alleged organizers of the terrorist network. Some members may receive stiff sentences, but the case against others is weaker. (b)(3)

## Spain

### Death of Basque Fatherland and Liberty Leader

The accidental death of ETA-M leader Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, known as "Txomin," on 27 February in Algeria may create a leadership vacuum. Txomin was expelled from France last summer and sought asylum in Algeria. He reportedly continued to influence the group, and police estimate that 45,000 Basques marched in Txomin's funeral procession, evidence of his popularity in the Basque region. (b)(3)

Txomin's death is likely to exacerbate internal conflicts because he was able to mediate between hardline and moderate factions within ETA-M. ETA-M will be hard pressed to replace Txomin because other would-be leaders are in prison or exile. No one in ETA-M's current leadership cadre reportedly has the stature and qualifications to take effective control of the group. In addition, France's policy of expelling ETA-M members has eroded the group's support base and reduced its ability to recruit new members. (b)(3)

## Middle East

### Lebanon

#### Assassin of French Attache Arrested

Lebanese authorities announced on 27 February that Mohamed Hassan Tulays, a recently arrested car bomber, had confessed to the assassination of France's military attache in East Beirut on 18 September 1986. Tulays further admitted his membership in Hizballah, which he said was responsible for other attacks in Lebanon, including:

- A car bombing on 21 January 1986 in Furn al-Shabek.
- The assassination attempt on 7 January 1987 against former President Camille Chamoun.
- A car bombing on 30 January in Al-Zalqah.
- An attempted truck bombing in early February in Al-Dawrah.
- An attempt on 6 February to park a bomb-laden car in Hazmiyah, East Beirut, that resulted in his arrest.

The Tulays family also may be connected with the kidnaping in mid-February of Maronite politician Jean Ubayd, a senior adviser to Lebanese President Gemayel. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**Latin America****Bolivia/Peru****Terrorist Sites Discovered**

Bolivian security forces have discovered two possible terrorist training sites that the police suspect are being used by the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (SL). The discovery of the camps follows the arrest last month of several SL affiliates in La Paz.

[redacted] This is the first substantial report of SL training and operations inside Bolivia and suggests the group may intend to expand its operations beyond Peru. Sendero Luminoso may be taking advantage of Bolivia's lightly patrolled borders, largely inaccessible rural areas, and poorly equipped security forces in order to move supplies and train new members. Moreover, the camps—bordering one of the group's new operating areas in Peru—probably were chosen to facilitate cross-border activities. [redacted]

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**South/East Asia****Laos****Bomb Explodes During Soviet Foreign Minister's Visit**

On 9 March a bomb exploded outside the Soviet cultural center in Vientiane during Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's first official visit to the Laotian capital. The blast, which apparently was set off by a timing device, shattered windows and killed one person—possibly the terrorist rigging the bomb—and injured another. The unusual bombing incident may have been intended to embarrass Laotian and Soviet officials rather than cause casualties. The perpetrators are most likely local dissidents or Lao resistance forces staging from Thailand.

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**Pakistan****Massive Truck Bomb Targets Afghan Refugees**

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[redacted] a massive truck bomb that killed 14 persons and injured more than 70 others when it detonated in Peshawar on 14 February. We believe the bomb was intended for the

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offices of one of the main Afghan resistance groups, but it exploded near a primary school, causing death or injury to many children. The truck bomb was the most lethal explosion yet in the KHAD-inspired terror campaign in Peshawar. It touched off two days of violent rioting directed at the Afghan refugees in the area. There were renewed calls by local residents for Afghan refugees to be moved from major Pakistani cities and confined to camps. Soviet and Afghan agents have been stepping up their terrorist campaign to force Islamabad to withdraw support for the Afghan resistance. (b)(3)

**Sri Lanka****Boobytrapped Water Truck Explodes Prematurely**

On 14 February a water truck accidentally detonated, while members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)—the largest and most powerful Tamil insurgent group—were rigging it with 100 kilograms of gelignite. Some 60 persons died and many others were injured in the explosion, which occurred in a small village in northern Sri Lanka. The guerrillas apparently planned to drive the truck inside a nearby Army camp and then detonate the explosives. The terrorist who was welding a hole in the truck, however, apparently tapped a high-line transformer for power, causing a short that touched off the explosive. Many nearby houses were destroyed by the blast. Sixteen insurgents died, including at least four prominent leaders. The LTTE's chief training officer and explosives expert reportedly was the most senior casualty in the blast. Reacting to a series of massive protests, including a strike by the residents of Jaffna, LTTE leader Prabhakaran publicly apologized for the deaths, an unusual action. (b)(3)

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## An Overview of Middle Eastern (b)(3) Terrorism in 1986

The Middle East kept its place as the principal venue for international terrorist attacks in 1986 and, consistent with recent years, accounted for approximately half of all incidents worldwide. State-supported terrorists—backed by Libya, Syria, and Iran—reached unprecedented levels of violence in several dramatic attacks that occurred mostly in Western Europe. In Lebanon, the kidnappings of hostages continued unabated last year—two Americans were released, but one was killed and three more kidnaped. Warring militias—particularly Palestinians and all stripes of Lebanese Christians and Muslims—waged vicious internecine battles, and year's end saw the involvement of many Middle Eastern terrorist groups in the war of the camps in Beirut. (b)(3)

### State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Year of Spectacular Violence

In 1986, Libya and Syria were the major state sponsors to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Terrorists backed or directly guided by those countries carried out attacks that resulted in unprecedented international political and military repercussions:

- The United States responded to evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin in April by launching retaliatory airstrikes against Tripoli and Benghazi.
- The United Kingdom broke off diplomatic relations with Damascus after Syria was implicated in the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner at Heathrow Airport after the conviction of Nizar Hindawi, the terrorist who gave his unwitting girlfriend a bag packed with explosives to carry on board. Moreover, London led the effort to urge the European Community to impose economic sanctions on Damascus.
- West Germany temporarily recalled its Ambassador from Damascus after discovering Syrian complicity in the March bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin. (b)(3)

Reactions by the state sponsors to these measures varied. In the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes, Qadhafi responded with a series of terrorist actions, but Libyan activity slackened somewhat in the last half of 1986:

- Circumstantial evidence points to Libyan involvement in the shooting of a US Embassy communicator in Khartoum one day after the strike on Tripoli.

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- In Ankara authorities apprehended two Libyans on 18 April as they approached the US Officers' Club to attack it with grenades received from the Libyan People's Bureau. The Libyans said they had been instructed to cause the "maximum amount" of US casualties.

- Libya probably had a role in the shooting in Sanaa, North Yemen, of another US diplomat on 25 April. (b)(3) T (b)(3)ects under arrest include a Libyan.

The level of Libyan terrorist activity dropped in the period from the last week in April through mid-July, but Tripoli resumed terrorist planning in midsummer. We believe the August attack on the British Air Force base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, was a Libyan-instigated operation intended as further retaliation against Britain for allowing American aircraft based in the United Kingdom to be used in the airstrikes.

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The publicity surrounding the trials of terrorists involved in Syrian-supported incidents in London and West Berlin severely embarrassed Damascus. We suspect that the lack of terrorist activity on the part of Syrian-supported groups after September was, in part, attributable to Syria's desire to keep a low profile in the terrorist (b)(3) in order to dampen Western criticism. (b)(3)

Iranian leaders in 1986 remained committed to the use of international terrorism to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. Tehran, however, was involved in fewer incidents than in 1985—probably because Iranian leaders have become more selective in their use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Iran continued to provide significant support to the Lebanese Hizballah organization and to benefit from its activities, including the holding of Western hostages. Iran also benefited directly from its ability to threaten to use terrorism, particularly in the Persian Gulf states. Iranian-backed terrorists carried out attacks against oil facilities in Kuwait in June (b)(3)

#### **Palestinian Terrorism: Fewer Incidents**

Palestinian terrorists conducted significantly fewer attacks in 1986 than in the previous year, contributing to a falloff in Middle Eastern terrorist spillover into Western Europe. The abatement of intra-Palestinian squabbles—perhaps only a temporary development—appeared to be a primary cause of the reduction in Palestinian terrorism. (b)(3)

Palestinian terrorists, nevertheless, staged several dramatic attacks. In April a bomb exploded aboard TWA Flight 840 over Athens, killing four Americans.

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The Abu Nidal Group was less active in 1986 than in the previous year—probably largely because of its apparent standdown at Syria's request on anti-Jordan

attacks. The group returned with vengeance in September when it attempted to hijack a Pan Am flight in Karachi, in which 21 persons were killed. The operation clearly involved Libyan logistic support. The Abu Nidal Group probably also conducted the assault on the Istanbul synagogue the next day, killing 22 Jews. The group continued to receive support from both Syria and Libya in 1986, although Damascus tried to improve its image in the West by appearing to crack down on some of Abu Nidal's publicly known members in Syria. At year's end, there was no evidence that Damascus intended to break its ties to the group. (b)(3)

The Abu Musa group apparently joined the list of Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts in Europe. In June a suitcase bomb intended for an El Al flight from Madrid exploded prematurely at a check-in counter in the airport, injuring 13 persons. Police traced the suitcase to a Palestinian who claimed to be a member of the anti-Arafat Abu Musa group. (b)(1)  
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We believe Abu Musa has carried out at least one other operation in Western Europe, but the group has generally operated in the Middle East. (b)(3)

In Israel, Middle Eastern terrorists carried out several notable attacks in 1986. The PLO launched the bloodiest attack in Jerusalem since 1984 when terrorists hurled grenades at Israeli soldiers and their families near the crowded Western Wall in October, killing one person and injuring 69 others. Israeli security officials subsequently arrested three suspects, who claimed to be members of Islamic Jihad who were recruited into Fatah. In July, members of the PFLP and the Syrian-backed Lebanese Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) attempted a commando attack on an Israeli resort town. Four terrorists and two Israeli soldiers were killed. (b)(3)

#### **Lebanon: The Kidnapings Continue**

In Lebanon the violence between warring militias continued throughout the year. In many cases, neither the perpetrator nor the target could be conclusively

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established. We do not know, for example, the terrorists responsible for a series of bombings in July and August in East and West Beirut in which 76 persons were killed, nor their exact intended targets. In the fall, the French contingent of the UN peacekeeping force in south Lebanon suffered several attacks, and a French diplomat was assassinated as he entered the French Embassy in East Beirut. Information received in early 1987 suggests that Hizballah was responsible for the assassination of the French diplomat (b)(3)

Westerners were not the primary victims of the constant violence in Lebanon, but they remained an important target, especially for kidnapers. Elements of Hizballah—using a variety of covernames—probably were responsible for most of the kidnappings, although in some cases freelance terrorists may have taken hostages in order to sell them to the highest bidder. Four members of a French television crew were kidnaped in March; three eventually were released in June and November. Two Americans, Father Lawrence Jenco and David Jacobsen, were released in July and November, respectively, but three more—Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy—were kidnaped in the fall. At the end of the year, we judge that they were still in the custody of Hizballah, along with Americans kidnaped as long ago as March 1985. One other American, Peter Kilburn—along with two British citizens—was executed following the US airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi. We believe Libya was involved in the executions (b)(3)

#### Outlook

Middle Eastern groups proved increasingly willing in 1986 to carry out indiscriminate attacks designed to cause maximum casualties and gain worldwide publicity. This trend is likely to continue into 1987. Any lull in terrorism because of the preoccupation of many Middle Eastern groups and their state sponsors with the fighting in Beirut probably will be only temporary. (b)(3)

In 1986 it became increasingly difficult to assign responsibility for specific terrorist acts to a particular group, especially in the Middle East. The group affiliation of over half the terrorist incidents that we attribute to Middle Easterners last year remains

unknown. We believe the growing use of freelance terrorists accounts for part of this problem. The chaotic conditions in Lebanon initially provided the setting for this development, which also provides state sponsors the deniability they seek for their terrorist operations. Lebanon will continue to play a key role in facilitating contacts among terrorists, and the trend toward anonymous terrorist incidents is likely to continue. (b)(3)

In our judgment, prospects for the early release of the hostages are not good. We are virtually certain that the captors represent Shia extremist elements and that decisions about their fate will be made by Hizballah's leaders, in consultation with Iran. Syrian or Lebanese pressure to release them is unlikely to sway Hizballah. (b)(3)

State sponsors will continue to use terrorism to further their own objectives, but they will make serious efforts to avoid detection. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Both Syria and Libya are likely to view the frequent and continued use of surrogates—particularly radical Palestinians—as a way to prevent their fingerprints from being discovered at the scenes of their crimes. (b)(3)

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
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
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## Tracing Terrorist Explosives (b)(3)

Explosives stolen from a quarry in Ecaussines, Belgium, in 1984 appear to have been dispersed widely throughout Europe, and we expect there will be more terrorist incidents using these explosives. After a number of bombings in 1984 and 1985 conducted by four West European terrorist groups using the explosives, French and West German authorities in 1986 began to find more of the explosives that had been cached for future use. At least 550 of the 815 kilograms stolen remain unaccounted for and probably are in terrorists' hands (b)(3)

The explosives have been used in attacks by the French group Action Directe (AD), West Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF), the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), as well as another Belgian group, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP). This common use represented the strongest evidence of cooperation among these groups in a Euroterrorist campaign that reached its peak in late 1984 and early 1985. There were no attacks using the explosives in 1986, to the best of our knowledge. (b)(3)

The most recent discoveries have been linked to AD and the RAF. French police found some of the dynamite during a raid on a farmhouse near Orleans, France, in which four key leaders of AD were arrested on 21 February. The discovery in Orleans marked the first time any of the explosives have been tied directly to one of the groups since January 1986. That month, Belgian police uncovered a large quantity of the explosives during raids on CCC safehouses (b)(3)

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(b)(3) police in Duesseldorf, West Germany, arrested two French Corsicans on 4 March 1987 in possession of 1.5 kilograms of explosives that may have come from the quarry in Ecaussines. Local authorities believe the Corsicans intended to sell the explosives to the RAF, but the dynamite has not yet been conclusively tied to the quarry theft (b)(3)

French police also found a small quantity of the dynamite in September 1986 in a cache associated with a Marxist Iranian group that possibly has ties to

the CCC. We do not know how the "Iranian People's Fedayeen Guerrilla Organization" obtained the 6 kilograms of explosives, but Belgian police found fingerprints of two of the group's members in the apartment of a key CCC leader who was arrested in June 1986. This was the first indication the explosives stolen in Ecuassine (b)(3) gone to a non-European terrorist group. (b)(3)

### Who Was Responsible?

Police have never made any arrests for the theft, but there is plentiful circumstantial evidence that members of one or more of the terrorist groups that used the explosives were involved in the theft. Witnesses reported seeing RAF hardcore member Sigrid Sterneck near the quarry at the time of the attempted break-in on 1 May. Furthermore, a CCC communique correctly identified the commercial names of the dynamite and the amount stolen. They went on to claim "internationalist revolutionaries" stole the explosives, but (b)(3) group did not directly take responsibility. (b)(3)

The timing of the groups' attacks following the theft and the links among members of the groups also suggest the break-in was carried out by one or more of the groups. The RAF, AD, CCC, and FRAP launched a coordinated campaign against NATO that ran from August 1984 through December 1985 and used the explosives stolen from the Belgian quarry in as many as 18 of their attacks. Before the campaign, in July 1984, West German authorities had discovered documents indicating that the RAF intended to embark on a three-pronged effort, suggesting planning was well along before the Ecaussines theft. Although we do not know when the groups began planning their activities, the complexity, pace, and duration of their operations suggest they needed a significant amount of time to prepare, including locating and acquiring the explosives for the bombings.

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**Accounting for the Explosives**

On 4 June 1984, approximately 815 kilograms (kg) of explosives—75 kg of Tolamite, 45 kg of Dynamite-3, 150 kg of Triamite, and 545 kg of Iremite—were stolen from a quarry near Ecaussines, Belgium. Two earlier attempts to break into the explosives storage area over the preceding four months had been unsuccessful, but police believe that two to five persons finally used electrical power tools and other equipment (b)(3) cut through a reinforced armored door.

Since the theft, only about 165 kg of the explosives have been found intact. This is the amount French, Belgian, and West German authorities have confiscated in safehouses or taken from explosive devices placed by terrorists but which failed to explode. Analyses of residue from bombs that exploded during 1984 and 1985 in Belgium indicated some could have been made from the same type of dynamite stolen from Ecaussines.

Analysis of the residue of bombs used in some successful attacks by the Red Army Faction and Action Directe indicated they did not contain explosives from Ecaussines (b)(3)

Through links among members of the four groups, a network existed by which they could have distributed the explosives. For example, Pierre Carette, one of the founders of the CCC, reportedly printed some documents for AD in 1982. Carette also had close ties to the RAF. He was a member of the Belgian Support Committee for the RAF prisoners and was suspected of playing a support role in the RAF's attack in 1979 on US Army Gen. Alexander Haig in Belgium. In addition, West German police found a map in July 1984 at an RAF safehouse that was marked with the same points on a NATO pipeline that CCC bombed the following December. Joint communiques issued during the Euroterrorist campaign in 1984-85 and documents seized by French police at an AD safehouse in February 1986 point to the ties between the

RAF and AD. Our knowledge of FRAP's ties to the other groups is less detailed. The fingerprints of two AD leaders were found in a FRAP safehouse in 1985. On the other hand, the CCC claimed to know nothing about FRAP in a communique issued in April 1985.

We have little information about the explosives confiscated in March 1987 from the Corsicans in Dueseldorf, especially whether the dynamite came from Ecaussines and how the men acquired the explosives. The two reportedly have long French criminal records. If the explosives were from the quarry, the involvement of these men raises the possibility that

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
we estimate

that approximately 261 kg of the explosives—about one-third of the haul—have been confiscated from or used by West European terrorists. We have no evidence that Middle Eastern terrorist groups have used any of the explosives in their attacks in Western Europe, including the series of bombings the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction carried out during September 1986 in Paris. (b)(3)

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criminals stole the explosives and transferred them to the terrorists—not a unique situation. A Swedish gang reportedly admitted in January 1987 selling Swedish military munitions they stole in November 1986 to terrorists for operations in Belgium and in France. (b)(3)

#### Where Are the Rest of the Explosives?

There is strong evidence the terrorist groups had custody of a large amount of the stolen explosives, although we have not been able to determine that the four organizations had all that was stolen or how much each group had. In at least two cases, the explosives appeared outside the groups. On 24 April 1985, a Turkish national was arrested in Paris with 400 grams of the dynamite he claimed was given to him by a North African in Belgium, but French police believed he was connected with AD. The Iranians arrested last September in France with approximately 6 kilograms of the explosives may have obtained the dynamite from the CCC through Pierre Carette. He was arrested in December 1985, suggesting the Iranians had already acquired the explosives. We do not yet know if the Corsicans arrested in West Germany have access to more than the 1.5 kilograms found in their car. (b)(3)

The coincidental timing of the arrests of Belgian terrorists, confiscation of 100 kilograms of the explosives in eight of their safehouses, and the end of the Euroterrorist bombing campaign suggest the CCC had the major share of the explosives held by any of the four West European organizations. It has been associated with the largest amount of the stolen explosives that has been confiscated or used by any of the four groups. (b)(3)

The RAF and AD may still have some of the explosives. They made only three bombs—amounting to 48 kilograms of dynamite—from their share of the Ecaussines haul, but these were discovered and disarmed before they could explode. Residue from their subsequent bombings indicates they have not used dynamite from Ecaussines since December 1985. The discovery of some of the dynamite in the AD safehouse in February, however, shows the AD still had some of the explosives. West German police have not turned up any of the explosives in RAF safehouses

discovered since 1985, but, like AD, the RAF may be husbanding its supply. (b)(3)

Despite the recent discovery of more of the explosives, we are no closer to knowing for sure how much is in terrorist hands. Nevertheless, due to the continuing appearance of the explosives with terrorists, we estimate that the remaining explosives likely are controlled by terrorist groups, particularly the RAF and AD. Belgian authorities have not uncovered any more CCC or FRAP caches since January 1986. Because we have no indications that members of these defunct groups in custody have been forthcoming about the existence of any more caches, we cannot rule out the possibility that they still have some of the explosives hidden away. (b)(3)

One ominous prospect is that the dynamite has made its way beyond the original four users and could appear in the hands of other radical terrorist groups. If criminals stole the explosives—a possibility raised by the arrest of the Corsicans—and did not transfer the entire 815 kilograms to the CCC, FRAP, RAF, and AD, the probability increases that more groups could get the explosives from those anxious to sell them. Alternatively, if the RAF and AD have all of the explosives that remain with active terrorist groups, they may not be in a position to share it with others. (b)(3)

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1986-87**

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.* (b)(3)

**31 December**

**Chile:** Unidentified individuals armed with pistols and submachineguns threaten employees of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration in Santiago. No one was injured in the incident. A telephone call from an unidentified male claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the "11 September Commandos." (b)(3)

**Uganda:** Handgrenade explodes at a crowded bus stop in Kampala, injuring six people. Witnesses say that the grenade was thrown from a three-story building across from the bus stop. No claim of responsibility has been made. (b)(3)

**13 January**

**Namibia:** Bomb explodes at a gas station in Gobabis, killing one man. A second bomb was found nearby and defused. There was no claim of responsibility. (b)(3)

**14 January**

**Cyprus:** Police at Larnaca airport deport a group of Palestinians trying to enter the country. Police believe they planned to attack Syrian targets in Nicosia. The Palestinians were refused permission to telephone a contact in Cyprus and were put aboard a plane that left for overseas. (b)(3)

**28 January**

**Turkey:** Three members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) involved in a village raid on 24 January surrender to police. Another two militants were expected to give themselves up. The security forces arrested 23 persons in connection with the incident. (b)(3)

**30 January**

**Turkey:** Four Palestinians on trial for the murder in July 1985 of a Jordanian diplomat end a hunger strike in an Ankara jail after prosecutor's visit. They were protesting a court decision refusing their release. The prosecutor reportedly promised to help them. (b)(3)

**Late January**

**Turkey:** Istanbul police arrest two university students for suspicious activities and distribution of leaflets signed by the leftist terrorist group Dev Sol. Several books and publications containing leftist propaganda also were confiscated. (b)(3)

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**Israel: Rockets land in field in Galilee.** The PLO claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**3 February**

**Turkey: Martial law court in Erzurum acquits 218 suspects in Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) trials.** In the Dev Yol trial, 89 suspects were acquitted of charges of belonging to an underground organization and arranging illegal meetings to promote the ideology of their group. There were 129 suspects acquitted in the PKK trial. (b)(3)

**5 February**

**Chile: Bombs damage several pylons of the national high-voltage power network, causing power outages in Santiago and the coastal towns of Valparaiso and Vina del Mar.** No organization has claimed credit for this attack. (b)(3)

**Early February**

**Turkey: Military court in Diyarbakir sentences Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) founder to eight years in prison.** Sakine Polat previously had been tried six times and given various prison terms; this latest sentence raises her total term of imprisonment to 59 years. (b)(3)

**Turkey: Security forces capture seven members of an illegal organization in Istanbul.** The suspects are alleged members of a Marxist-Leninist group. Forged identity cards and organizational documents also were seized. (b)(3)

**7 February**

**Turkey: Suspicious fire destroys San Theater in Istanbul, killing the night watchman.** Fire officials claim a short circuit caused the accident, but the police suspect arson by Islamic fundamentalists. The theater was staging a play that was harshly criticized by conservative Muslims. (b)(3)

**Argentina: Bomb explodes at the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party committee headquarters in Buenos Aires.** The explosion caused damage to the building but no casualties. (b)(3)

**15 February**

**Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktail thru (b)(3) Israeli bus outside police station.** No injuries or damages occurred. (b)(3)

**Israel: Car bomb explodes near hospital in Kfar Saba.** Bomb detonated prematurely, wounding several suspected terrorists. (b)(3)

**Mid-February**

**Turkey: Ankara military court sentences suspected members of the Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) Eskisehir branch.** Of the 104 suspects, two were sentenced to death and one to life imprisonment. Another 52 received prison terms ranging from three to 15 years and 46 were acquitted. (b)(3)

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**Turkey: Diyarbakir military court sentences Rizgari Organization members.** One defendant received five years at hard labor, another had his sentence increased to 24 years, and five others were acquitted. The court also sentenced a Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) militant to 10 years in prison. (b)(3)

**Turkey: Authorities discover weapons cache in Ceylanpinar.** A total of 147 handguns were buried together with 284 magazines and other ammunition. (b)(3)

**16 February**

**Argentina: Bomb explodes outside newspaper agency in Mendoza.** Numerous windows were broken but there were no casualties. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**18 February**

**Turkey: In Erur, separatist Kurdish Workers Party militants raid the home of the village religious leader, whose two brothers (b)(3) as watchmen.** Two civilians were killed and four others were injured. (b)(3)

**West Bank: IDF kills Nablus taxi driver whose cab struck several Israeli soldiers.** Local Palestinians believe an accident caused the incident, and charged that the IDF overreacted. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Unidentified individual throws molotov (b)(3) oil at settlement near Nablus.** No damage or injuries were reported. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Unidentified persons throw molotov cocktails in village near Jenin.** The firebombs exploded but caused no damage or injuries. (b)(3)

**19 February**

**Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) took over 12 radio stations in Lima (b)(3) and broadcast messages attacking the government.** No injuries were reported. (b)(3)

**20 February**

**Israel: Vandals set fire to entrance to East Jerusalem (b)(3) of Israeli Bank Hapoalim.** No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**21 February**

**(b)(3) Gaza: Molotov cocktail damages parked Israeli vehicle.** There were no injuries. (b)(3)

**Israel: Arson destroyed (b)(3)-owned shop.** Witnesses claim they saw three Israelis leave the scene. (b)(3)

**Peru: Bomb explodes harmlessly near the Presidential Palace.** President Garcia was bestowing a decoration on Guatemalan President Cerezo at the time of the explosion. (b)(3)

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22 February

**Israel: Unknown individual throws smoke** (b)(3) **at souvenir shop in East Jerusalem.** No damage was reported. (b)(3)

**Israel: Grenade thrown in Jerusalem wounds 17 persons, including 12 Israeli border policemen.** Both Fatah's Force 17 and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Zambia: Explosion rips through a Lusaka post office, causing extensive damage to the building.** No injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility for the explosion. (b)(3)

24 February

**Spain: Basques stone Renteria town hall in protest over expulsions from France.** There were no injuries or clashes with police in the incident. (b)(3)

25 February

**Turkey: During arms smuggling trial in Diyarbakir government prosecutor accuses Libya and Syria of aiding the Kurdish Workers' Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.** The five suspects in the trial, who are charged with smuggling arms into Turkey from Syria for the separatists will face 15-to-25 year sentences if convicted. (b)(3)

**West Germany: Group of 21 Kurds briefly occupy the BBC radio office in Charlottenburg, protesting the treatment of Kurds in Sweden.** In January 1987 several Kurds were detained when Swedish authorities investigated the possibility of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) involvement in the Olof Palme killing last year. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Israeli extremists vandalize Ar-Rub refugee camp, smashing windshields, and solar panels, and painting threats on Arab houses** (b)(3)

25-26 February

**Spain: Prime Minister Gonzalez gives speech indicating possible repeal of antiterrorist legislation.** This would limit jail retention time of suspected terrorists from 10 to five or six days. (b)(3)

26 February

**Spain: Police defuse 20-pound bomb outside Barcelona synagogue.** No group claimed responsibility for planting the device, but police suspect Middle Eastern terrorists. (b)(3)

27 February

**Spain: France expels three suspected Basque guerrillas, turning them over to Spanish police in San Sebastian.** These new expulsions bring the total number to 39 since July 1986. (b)(3)

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28 February

**Spain: Bomb explodes at Gerona provincial courthouse, causing extensive damage but no injuries.** The Catalan separatist group Terra Lliure claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Spain: France expels suspected Basque terrorist to Spain.** The suspect, a former counselor in Pamplona for the radical Herri Batasuna coalition, sheltered Basque Fatherland and Liberty members in the city before fleeing to France six years ago. (b)(3)

**Gaza: Homemade bomb slightly damages Israeli bus parked near police station.** Anonymous caller in Beirut claims credit on behalf of Force 17. (b)(3)

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**Peru: Four Sendero Luminoso terrorists botch mortar attack against President Garcia's residence.** the mortar exploded in the terrorists' hands. (b)(3)

2 March

**West Bank: Nablus observes first anniversary of Palestinian Mayor al-Masri's assassination.** Israeli authorities restricted public gatherings to prevent a possible outbreak of violence. (b)(3)

3 March

**West Bank: Israeli bus near Amari refugee camp in Ramallah is target of Molotov cocktail.** Israeli soldiers arrested one Arab youth. (b)(3)

4 March

**Costa Rica: Unidentified group leaves small bomb in the driveway of the private residence of President Arias.** The bomb did not explode. (b)(3)

5 March

**Spain: Terra Lliure detonates bomb at television relay station in Gerona.** There were no injuries, and the extent of damage is unknown. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Three Israeli settlers attempt arson attack on Muslim religious school in Hebron.** The settlers were arrested. (b)(3)

6 March

**Honduras: Powerful bomb explodes in front of the home of Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) spokeswoman Adela Icaza.** A leftist group claimed responsibility for the bombing. (b)(3)

7 March

**Spain: Bomb explodes at town council building in Baracaldo.** There were no injuries. No group claimed responsibility, although the police suspect the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization. (b)(3)

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~~Secret~~**9 March**

**Spain: Two masked gunmen seriously wound Spanish Army lieutenant as he is driving to work in Vitoria.** No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but the police suspect the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization. (b)(3)

**Spain: Six French-manufactured vehicles set on fire in various parts of Barcelona.** The arson attacks followed the arrival on 7 March of the body of Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization leader Txomin, who was killed in a car crash in Algeria on 27 February. (b)(3)

**10 March**

**Colombia: Members of the National Liberation Army abduct Canadian oil engineer in Arauca Province.** The victim is an employee of the US-owned firm Occidental Petroleum, and the incident marks the first such kidnapping this year. (b)(3)

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## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

4 March 1988

**Sweden's Bofors Arms Scandal:**  
**A Summary of the Diversions, Investigations, and Implications** (b)(3)**Summary**

The lingering Bofors AB and Nobel Kemi AB arms scandals, which first came to light in 1984, owe to the failure of Sweden's private and public sector leaders to observe their own rules governing a (b)(3) exports in an apparent effort to bolster the domestic arms industry. (b)(3)

Numerous investigations were initiated to examine the complex web of bribery and arms diversions but, despite an admission from a key industry executive, only two individuals have been charged with violating Swedish law: a Nobel Kemi manager and a private arms trader. Stockholm has since called off the investigation of Bofors' bribery, probably in an effort to prevent future revelations of bribes to Indian officials that could embarrass Prime Minister Gandhi. Sidelights to the affair include the mysterious death of a customs official, a possible Iranian connection to the (b)(3) murder of Olof Palme, and a surge in Swedish investigative journalism. (b)(3)

The scandal is likely to lead to a tightening of Swedish arms export restrictions in the near term, but little change in practice in the long term given Sweden's commitment to maintaining its own arms industry. While the affair will almost certainly benefit the Greens in the September 1988 election, neither Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson nor the mainstream socialist and nonsocialist parties are likely to be seriously harmed by the scandal since all are culpable and will therefore refrain from making it a partisan political issue.

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This paper was prepared by (b)(3) West European Division, Office of European Analysis. Information available as of 3 March 1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, West European Division, EURA, (b)(3)

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### The Diversions

The Bofors AB and Nobel Kemi AB cases involve a number of business transactions in which Swedish arms manufacturing executives deliberately violated or circumvented prohibitions on arms sales to belligerents and on bribes to foreign officials. These include:

- Bofors AB selling over 300 **RBS-70 missile systems to Bahrain and Dubai** via Singapore in 1979. (The RBS-70 contains two US components: a gyroscope and a thermal battery.).
- Bofors selling 22 **anti-aircraft guns to Thailand** via Singapore in 1985.
- Bofors selling **ammunition to Oman** via Italy.
- Bofors allegedly selling **RBS-70s to Iran** via Singapore.
- Bofors allegedly **bribing Indian middlemen and officials** in connection with New Delhi's \$1.5 billion purchase of 155mm howitzers.
- Bofors allegedly **bribing an official in Singapore** in connection with arms resales to other countries.
- Bofors allegedly selling **naval ordnance to Taiwan**.
- Bofors allegedly selling **explosives to East Germany** via Austria.
- Nobel Kemi AB--a subsidiary of Bofors--selling 2139 metric tons of **munitions to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Burma** via Austria, East Germany, Italy, and Yugoslavia, with approximately two-thirds of these munitions going to Tehran.
- Private Swedish businessman Karl-Erik Schmitz acting as an international **broker for arms sales to proscribed countries**, including sales involving Swedish-produced weapons. (b)(3)

### The Investigations

Since reports of the diversions began to spread in 1984--through a tip from former Bofors employee Ingvar Bratt to the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association--a number of official inquiries have been initiated. Few of these have produced any tangible results. In approximate order of inception, the investigations are:

- **County Prosecutor:** Stig Age, the Prosecutor from Orebro County--where Bofors is located--began pulling together a case against the arms producer in 1984. He has not yet taken his findings against Bofors to court because new evidence continues to surface--even though Anders Carlberg, the head of Bofors' parent company, Nobel Industries, admitted in March 1987 that top Bofors executives Claes-Erik Winberg and Martin Ardbo deliberately skirted

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Swedish law. Age is also responsible for prosecution in the case of illegal arms sales by Nobel Kemi--a Bofors subsidiary. In June 1987 he charged Karl-Erik Schmitz--a private arms trader--and former Nobel Kemi executive Mats Lundborg with illegal arms trafficking. No further details of court proceedings have been reported.

- **Police Investigations:** Swedish police are conducting separate investigations into Bofors' and Nobel Kemi's arms sales to support Age in developing the court cases.
- **Constitutional Committee:** Because the Bofors case raised the possibility that government officials permitted illegal arms sales, the "Constitutional Affairs Committee"--made up of prominent Members of Parliament--began to oversee the Bofors and Nobel Kemi investigations. This is the same Committee that is overseeing the Palme murder investigation. Minister of Agriculture Mats Hellstrom was criticized by the Committee in May 1987 for misrepresenting facts surrounding Sweden's arms sales to Indonesia during his tenure (1982-1986) as Minister for Foreign Trade.
- **Parliamentary Arms Export Commission:** In February 1985 a special commission was established to report on arms export issues to parliament and provide guidance to the arms industry.
- **Advisory Committee:** The government established a separate committee of experts to recommend revisions in Swedish arms export laws that would provide for tighter enforcement. The recommendations were presented to the Social Democratic Cabinet in June 1987, but have not yet been formally presented to parliament.
- **National Audit:** As the police investigations revealed that Bofors may have bribed Indian middlemen and officials, the Swedish equivalent of the GAO conducted a national audit of Bofors' transactions with India. The audit, completed in June 1987, indicated that as much as \$40 million were paid in commissions to middlemen. Because the information was taken from Central Bank records, the exact amounts and recipients were not made public by the government. Bofors rejected the government's request to reveal this information, claiming such disclosure would jeopardize its credibility as an arms dealer. Both the government and Bofors have asserted, however, that the payments were made to close contracts with middlemen once Indian authorities insisted on excluding intermediaries, rather than as pay-offs to Indian officials.
- **Citizens Committee:** In order to bolster the credibility of Stockholm's account of the bribery case, a "citizens committee" was established to review the classified documents of the Bofors audit and determine whether the government was presenting an accurate picture. This committee has not yet submitted its findings.

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- **Bofors bribery:** Following the national audit, Swedish police launched a separate investigation into Bofors bribery, which would have been illegal if payments were made to foreign officials. This investigation was terminated in late January 1988, following a trip by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to Stockholm. Sweden claimed inability to track the payments through Swiss bank accounts after making a half-hearted request for Swiss assistance.
- **Indian inquiry:** The Indian government initiated its own parliamentary investigation into the possible use of payoffs to middlemen or government officials.
- **Singapore inquiry.** Singapore--a key transshipment point in the Bofors saga--also launched a bribery investigation and charged Tan Kok Cheng, former general manager of Allied Ordnance Singapore, with accepting over \$1 million in bribes from Bofors while working on behalf of Singapore's armed forces. (Bofors owned 40 percent of Allied Ordnance at the time of the transactions.)
- **MFA Demarche:** In support of the ongoing police investigations, the Swedish Foreign Ministry requested its Embassies abroad to ask host governments for permission to inspect their arms inventories in an apparent effort to look for Bofors equipment that may have been delivered in as yet undetected diversions. (b)(3)

#### Notable Sidelights

Beyond the diversions and investigations themselves, several other incidents may be related to the Bofors affair.

- **Algernon's death:** War Materiel Inspector Carl Algernon--the customs official responsible for monitoring arms exports--died when he was struck by a subway train in January 1987. He had met 30 minutes earlier with Anders Carlberg, head of Bofors' parent company, Nobel Industries. Algernon was a personal friend of former Bofors directors Claes-Erik Winberg and Martin Ardbo. Police believe he committed suicide, but accidental death and murder remain possibilities.
- **Did Iranians Murder Palme?** US media speculated in March 1987 that Olof Palme was murdered by an Iranian hitman in retaliation for Palme's alleged suspension of an arms shipment to Tehran. The media further contended that Algernon was killed because he intended to make public the illicit activities of Swedish arms producers and government officials. Swedish investigators consider this thesis unlikely, and it received little further notice until revived by US journalists in December 1987.
- **Press Activism:** The US press article on the Iranian connection--written quickly in Sweden using local sources--embarrassed the Swedish press, which had failed to turn

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up the story in a year of investigative reporting following Palme's death. Since this episode, Sweden's media have doggedly reported on every lead and angle in the Bofors case, no matter how insignificant.

- **Export Ban:** Swedish arms sales to Singapore--the number-one importer of Swedish weapons from 1977-1986--were banned for a brief period in 1985 and have again been banned since early 1987.

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#### Filling in the Gaps

There is little evidence on which to construct an accurate picture of what actually occurred in the Bofors scandal. We believe the following scenario is the most plausible, but we must emphasize that it is only speculation and that other scenarios are quite possible.

- **Sell them anyway:** Swedish arms manufacturers, experiencing financial difficulties in the late 1970s and early 1980s, determined they needed to sell arms to proscribed countries in order to remain financially viable. Government officials acquiesced, concerned that Swedish military reliance on foreign arms suppliers--instead of domestic producers--would undermine Sweden's policy of neutrality. Moreover, officials feared that low export levels would lead to lay-offs in the already ailing region of central Sweden where most arms manufacturers are located.
- **Damage control:** When former Bofors employee Ingvar Bratt provided information to the Peace and Arbitration Society, government officials attempted to preempt criticism of their past acceptance of questionable arms deals by claiming they had just learned of Bofors' activities and were beginning an investigation. Bofors was intended to serve as a scapegoat company that had circumvented--but not broken--Swedish law, and no one would be arrested.
- **Breakdown:** As the Bofors investigation plodded along at a pace designed to dampen public interest in the case, new information continued to surface about potentially illegal transactions conducted by Bofors and its subsidiary, Nobel Kemi. The Peace and Arbitration Society kept the case in the public eye. Hoping to defuse the public outcry over the case, Bofors Chairman Winberg--and, later, his successor, Ardbo--resigned. Nobel Industries' takeover of Bofors in 1985 also failed to put the perception of scandal to rest. The government began to lose control of the case.
- **Resurrection:** Anders Carlberg, head of Nobel Industries, insisted on a new approach. Bofors would still be blamed for using third countries to reexport weapons. Nobel Kemi executive Mats Lundborg and private trader Karl-Erik Schmitz, moreover, would be put on trial in an effort to avoid a public outcry if no one was prosecuted. Winberg and Ardbo might also go to trial, but would be acquitted for having stayed within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law. The

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government would introduce legislation that would give the appearance of tremendous tightening in arms export laws, but would in fact continue to leave much to the discretion of the Cabinet. Over time, the government would reduce the number of proscribed recipients of Swedish arms exports. With Carlberg holding information on official involvement in the illegal dealings, the government acquiesced in Carlberg's expanded strategy.

- **Suicide:** In January 1987, Carlberg presented his strategy to Algernon--who had condoned the Bofors and Nobel Kemi transactions. Despite possible promises by Carlberg to protect him, Algernon believed the new strategy would eventually expose his failure to stop the deals arranged by Schmitz and Nobel Kemi. He probably committed suicide.
- **Bribery:** Bofors almost certainly made payments--either straight to Indian officials, or to middlemen who in turn paid off officials--to secure the \$1.2 billion sale of howitzers. Word of the pay-offs leaked, sparking domestic difficulties for Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Stockholm wanted to save Gandhi the troubles caused him by the Swedish leak, and Nobel Industries wanted to avoid a bribery indictment. The two sides cooperated, therefore, on a scheme to keep details of the payments secret. Stockholm eventually called off the entire bribery investigation. (b)(3) [ ]

## Outlook

The Bofors affair is likely to have a significant short-term impact on Swedish politics and arms export practices, but little effect in the long term.

- **Export policy:** The Advisory Committee's recommendations for revised legislation will almost certainly reach the floor of Parliament. A key variable, however, is how much discretion will be given the government in determining whether particular countries are suitable recipients of Swedish arms. Because the opposition Conservatives are probably even more concerned about the viability of Sweden's defense industries than the ruling Social Democrats are, we suspect that the legislation finally approved in Parliament will continue to give the government great leeway in managing arms export restrictions. The government may also propose some bureaucratic reorganization of the export enforcement apparatus to bolster its credibility in managing export policy. In the first few years under new legislation, controls will probably be tight. Over time, however, the government will probably begin to approve exports to a broader range of recipients in order to keep the arms industry afloat.
- **1988 Election:** Having governed from 1976 to 1982--when a number of the reported arms diversions took place--the opposition parties are nearly as vulnerable as the Social Democrats to charges they condoned Bofors' and Nobel Kemi's activities. Although questions about the Social Democrats' role in the Bofors scandal will almost

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certainly be raised in the runup to the September 1988 election, we do not expect any of the major parties to put the Bofors scandal in the forefront of its election campaign. To date, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has weathered the scandal virtually unharmed. The Greens--who are expected to win their first seats in parliament in the 1988 election--stand to gain the most from the Bofors affair by picking up support from voters disillusioned with the traditional parties and opposed to exporting arms to countries involved--or likely to become involved--in a military conflict. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

FILE

## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

12 September 1988

Sweden: Election Outlook (b)(3)

## Summary

September opinion polls indicate that Sweden's ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP) will probably be able to form a new government following the 18 September national election. The SDP may lose the working majority it traditionally secured with support from the Left-Party Communists (VPK), however, and have to depend on the passive support of the upstart Environmental Party (Greens) in order to form a minority government. Polls conducted in June--prior to a scandal involving a government sponsored secret investigation into the murder of former Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986--had shown the SDP in a dead heat with the nonsocialist bloc consisting of the Moderate, Liberal and Center Parties. Current polls indicate a decline in SDP popularity--probably reflecting a loss of SDP votes to the Greens, rather than an increase in support for the

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of European Analysis and [redacted] Office of Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, [redacted]

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nonsocialists. The Greens--who are expected to win representation in the Riksdag for the first time--have said that they will not enter into a coalition with either the socialist or nonsocialist blocs, but will support Social Democratic government on an issue-by-issue basis. (b)(3)

Neither a minority Social Democratic government nor a nonsocialist coalition government would be likely to significantly change domestic policy, although the nonsocialists want to hold social spending at current levels while increasing defense spending. Both blocs would continue to pursue improved relations with the US and would want to avoid the bilateral strains that festered under Prime Minister Palme. Even the nonsocialists, though, would retain the Swedish penchant for speaking out on regional security and disarmament issues in a way that tends to equate the West with the East. (b)(3)

#### **Will Economic Success Outweigh Political Scandals?**

The Social Democrat's campaign strategy has highlighted the party's economic accomplishments since 1982--pursuing a macroeconomic policy that increased the private sector's share of GDP, reduced the budget and trade deficits, and held down the unemployment rate, which is now at its lowest level in this decade. Consequently, the SDP is boasting that Swedes are better off than ever, and are contrasting their last six years in power with the 1976-1982 period when unemployment reached record highs under nonsocialist rule. SDP domestic policy strategists--primarily Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt--remain popular because of their association with Sweden's economic recovery. Although over 90 percent of economic growth since 1982 has been swallowed by taxes, the tax burden has not become a pivotal issue to the same extent as in previous elections. As a result, the nonsocialists' advocacy of major tax reform, which they have long hoped would become a salient issue triggering a political realignment, has not benefitted them in this campaign. (b)(3)

The rise of the Greens has undercut somewhat the SDP's ability to maintain its level of support by pointing to its economic successes. Instead, many members of the SDP's "environmental wing" are defecting to the Greens because of their growing concern over nuclear power--a trend which accelerated after Chernobyl--and other environmental issues. The Carlsson government tried to staunch this flow by proposing to close down two of Sweden's 12 nuclear reactors by the mid-1990s and the remaining plants by 2010. Even though this proposal would be extremely costly given that nearly half of Sweden's electricity is nuclear-generated, environmental hardliners are unimpressed and back the Greens' demand that all Swedish nuclear reactors be closed within the next three years. Consequently, we believe the Social Democrats have written off many of these hardliners, and instead are counting on their traditional labor union base. Despite trade union opposition to the SDP's plan to dismantle Sweden's nuclear power plants, we do not expect significant labor defections to the nonsocialists; some may, however, not vote at all. (b)(3)

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### Political Scandals Involving SDP Leaders

A series of scandals has also overshadowed the SDP's economic success and seriously damaged the Social Democrats' image of moral superiority. By early summer, the Government had suffered through two major scandals involving Social Democratic leaders condoning illegal arms sales and the use of influence by party and trade union officials to receive special consideration for housing in the extremely tight, government controlled market. The subsequent Ebbe Carlsson affair, however, coming just before the election, could prove to be the most damaging to the Social Democrats.<sup>1</sup> (b)(3)

In this latest scandal, Justice Minister Anna-Greta Leijon--previously one of Carlsson's most popular ministers--admitted to using her position to support a privately financed, secret investigation of the Palme assassination by Ebbe Carlsson, and appeared to place herself above the law in a country that holds the legal system sacrosanct. Prime Minister Carlsson himself came under strong criticism for his staunch defense of Leijon, but his confident performance before a parliamentary committee investigating the affair helped him recover some lost ground. It is unclear what effect the hearings--the first to be nationally televised--had on the populace as many Swedes were on summer holiday, but we believe the whole affair probably further eroded public faith in the SDP government. (b)(3)

The nonsocialists, for their part, still suffer from the perception by most Swedes that they are incapable of leading the country--a point emphasized by a recent poll which showed that half of the likely nonsocialist voters believe that the Social Democrats will form the next government. Although they have tried to capitalize on the recent scandals involving the Social Democrats, the nonsocialists have instead had to devote a significant portion of their campaign to convincing voters that the three parties present a viable, cohesive option. Despite their efforts, we do not believe the nonsocialists have been able to override the memories of policy failures when they governed from 1976-1982, especially in economic policy. By contrast, the Social Democrats have successfully claimed that their economic policies have corrected the economic ills caused by the nonsocialists during that period. (b)(3)

### Social Democratic - Led Government Still Likely

The Social Democrats are likely to slip from their current level of 159 seats (out of 359) in the Riksdag with most of their lost support going to the Greens rather than the nonsocialist parties. In order to remain in power after the election, the Social Democrats will either have to continue their cooperation with the Left-Party Communists (VPK), garner the support of both the VPK and Greens, or form a coalition government with the nonsocialist Center Party. Some Social Democrats traditionally vote for the VPK in national elections to ensure a socialist majority. This year, however, the Social Democrats may lose additional votes to the left because the party's squeaky-clean image has been badly tarnished by the recent scandals. In addition, many SDP partisans

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<sup>1</sup> Ebbe Carlsson--no relation to Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson--is a wealthy publisher with close ties to the SDP.

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believe the government has not been aggressive enough on environmental issues and are turning toward the Greens. (b)(3)

Nonetheless, we believe that a Social Democratic-led government remains the most likely outcome in the election, given nonsocialist party divisions and lack of public confidence in their ability to govern. A Social Democratic government would continue with its present domestic and international agenda--maintaining a tight fiscal policy to eliminate the budget deficit while trying to honor its pledge to increase annual paid vacation from five to six weeks, and participating in international peace and disarmament efforts. A strong showing by the Greens, particularly if the VPK fails to remain in parliament--which cannot be ruled out given recent polls--could force the Social Democrats to address controversial environmental issues, such as an accelerated closing of all 12 of Sweden's nuclear reactors within the next three years. We do not believe, however, that they would accede to the Greens' demand to close all plants so rapidly due to the high cost of finding other energy sources. If the Social Democrats do not meet most of the Greens' environmental demands, we believe that the Greens would not support the Social Democratic legislative agenda and the Social Democrats would then be forced to seek compromises with one or more of the nonsocialist parties on an issue-by-issue basis. (b)(3)

If the Social Democrats are unable to form a government with the support of either the VPK or the Greens, we believe the SDP leadership would explore the possibility of forming a coalition with the Center Party rather than forfeit power. The Social Democrats have already sent some signals to the Center Party through Stig Malm, the leader of the major labor organization in Sweden, who has suggested that the two parties can find a basis for cooperation. Although Center Party leader Johansson has publicly rejected these overtures, claiming his preference for joining a nonsocialist coalition, we believe he would seriously consider an invitation to form a SDP-Center government as a (b)(3) opportunity to rebuild support for his party, which has flagged while in opposition. (b)(3)

On foreign policy, Prime Minister Carlsson has sought to return Sweden to a constructive dialogue with the US in an effort to repair the damage from the more turbulent Palme era. Although Carlsson and other party leaders at the 1987 party congress managed to defeat a grassroots effort to tighten the Social Democrats policy on nuclear-capable ship visits, a Social Democratic government would remain active in international forums for nuclear disarmament. The Social Democrats will continue to believe that they should act as the world's conscience, and moral concerns will remain the driving force behind Swedish foreign policy. At the same time, Stockholm will remain wary of Soviet diplomatic advances and will continue to stress that Sweden will only discuss arms control and confidence-building measures in conjunction with its Nordic neighbors and in such a way as to respect Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO. Nonetheless, Stockholm considered the recent agreement with the Soviet Union on the boundary dispute in the Baltic Sea as a sign that relations with Moscow will continue to improve following strains in the early 1980s. (b)(3)

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**If the Nonsocialists Win**

A nonsocialist coalition would be unlikely to pursue domestic economic policies that differ significantly from the current government's, especially because they have not agreed on a common platform that seriously challenges Swedish social democracy. In addition, a nonsocialist coalition would probably clash on some of the key issues that garnered it voter support. While the Moderates and Liberals would like to privatize many government services, reduce taxes and pursue EC membership, these moves would put them at odds with the Center Party. For instance, the Moderates and Liberals support partial privatization of the cradle-to-grave health care system, while the Center Party wants to maintain the current trouble-plagued system by allocating additional funds in an effort to make it more efficient. The three nonsocialist parties are also split on the nuclear power issue. The Moderates support continued reliance on nuclear power, asserting that greater pollution in the future would result from the increased use of fossil fuels, but the Center Party supports the Social Democrats' plan for closing the two reactors by 1995 and subsequently shutting all plants. (b)(3)

On defense and security policy, the nonsocialists would probably try to increase the defense budget and would remain wary of Soviet diplomatic gestures. A nonsocialist government would probably push for a review of the 1988-1992 defense plan as early as 1990 and would be somewhat more likely to trade off higher defense spending for restraints in social expenditures. Although Moderate Party leader Carl Bildt takes a harder line towards the Soviet Union than other nonsocialist leaders, we do not believe there will be a significant change in Sweden's relationship with the Soviet Union in the absence of a repeat of the 1982 "Whiskey on the Rocks" incident. (b)(3)

Overall, we believe a government of nonsocialist parties would resume its internal bickering--usually abandoned during the campaign--which would thwart its post-election momentum. In the worst case scenario, disagreement among the nonsocialists would prevent the parties from concentrating on a unified legislative program and could lead to a parliamentary stalemate as each party sought a cosponsor for its pet issues. (b)(3)

**Implications for the United States**

Regardless of the outcome of the election, we expect the next Swedish government to place high priority on fostering good relations with the US. Nonetheless, Sweden will continue to "agree to disagree" with the US on several international issues, particularly on US policy in Central America. (b)(3)

If the Social Democrats return to power, the US can expect relatively little change in relations with Sweden. A returning socialist government will probably continue to resist rank-and-file calls for tightening Swedish nuclear ship visit policy or for supporting an acceleration of the Nordic Council's deliberations on a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone. If the Greens play a significant role in the next government, they may be able to stir significant grassroots pressure on the government to reverse these positions. In any event, a Social Democratic government is likely to continue to criticize US policy on

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regional issues, such as Central America. Eventually, the Social Democrats may begin to shed the caution that has tempered their rhetoric since the Carlsson visit to the US <sup>last</sup> year and revert to their traditional moral posturing on "North-South" issues. (b)(3)

While a nonsocialist government may temper the rhetoric against US policy in Central America even further--particularly if Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Pierre Schori is replaced--the Liberal and Center parties would probably continue to seek some role for Sweden as a "moral conscience" on the world scene. The nonsocialists would continue the Carlsson government's efforts to play down Soviet security proposals for the Nordic region and calls for establishing tighter rules for visiting warships. Although either a socialist or a nonsocialist government would implement policies to facilitate adaptation to the EC's 1992 internal market reforms, a nonsocialist government would probably be fraught with bickering between the Moderates, who want to join the EC, and the Center Party, which opposes such a move. (b)(3)

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
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Director of  
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Saturday  
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**SWEDEN: Palme Assassination**

Prime Minister Olof Palme was assassinated yesterday in Stockholm by an unknown assailant, possibly with one or more accomplices. Some Swedish Cabinet members—including Deputy Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson—met in an emergency session early today. Carlsson will head an interim government at least until parliament reconvenes next week. The Swedish press initially quoted police sources as saying Croatian separatists were responsible, but the police chief in Stockholm later said there was no evidence the murder was political.

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**Comment:** The political situation is likely to remain unsettled for the next few days or even weeks as the Social Democratic Party begins to plan its future without the leadership of the popular and charismatic Palme. The opposition parties probably will restrain their usual criticism of domestic and foreign policies. Sweden's international stature in foreign affairs was directly attributable to Palme—who focused much of his attention on disarmament and Third World issues. Stockholm now will probably emphasize domestic concerns at least in the near term.

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